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Abstract
This thesis explores the political aesthetics of ‘procedural films’—media works 
that use generative algorithmic procedures and manifest as moving images. In 
contrast to long-held techno-positivist understandings of generative art, the 
thesis reframes procedural films as a critical media art practice aiming to 
understand the ‘procedure’ as an affective engine of moving image experience. 
It employs an interdisciplinary approach that borrows from materialist theories of 
media, experimental film, artificial life and computational culture, and draws on 
my practices as artist and curator. These processes of making, curating and 
experiencing serve as enacted research, as a scalable architecture of thinking 
through and thinking with the technical media. The thesis proposes a 
conceptual framework for exploring procedural films as techno-cultural 
artefacts, addressing the ‘apparatus’, the affective space-time of their viewing 
and their sociopolitical operation. It proposes that algorithmic autonomy brings 
an affective renegotiation of the traditional roles of the spectator and the moving 
image, instead seeing it as a complex entanglement of human and non-human 
agencies, computational temporalities and generative procedures. Furthermore, 
it addresses procedural mediation and automation as a part of the political 
aesthetics of media art, exploring the techno-capitalist commodification of 
attention, time and images. The thesis investigates two case studies—
screensaver and game engine—as procedural apparatuses. It explores these 
media artefacts as sites of labour, design, affect and experience, addressing 
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If I were to map the history of accidents that contributed to the decision to 
undertake this research project, I could recall two distinct moments. The first 
moment was in 2013, when I made a film entitled Some Entropy in Your Tea,  1
an arbitrary but somewhat engaging collage of found and original footage, self-
made aphorisms and titles of Wikipedia articles. Inspired by online repositories 
of film archives in the public domain, the work contemplated a sci-fi scenario of 
a cinematic consciousness emerging out of the endless archives of footage. I 
was convinced that I was attempting a cinematic interpretation of artificial 
intelligence, something inheriting Epstein’s ‘metal brain’ and Vertov’s ‘kino-eye’. 
The second moment was when I first saw Ian Cheng’s Emissary Forks at 
Perfection in 2015 at Pilar Corrias Gallery in London. The work, a live filmic 
environment made in a game engine and bearing distinct aesthetics, was 
described on the wall as a ‘live simulation’. At the point of encounter I was 
researching experimental film and artists’ moving image, which led me to 
recognise that something that I propose to call ‘procedural films’—media art 
works that use generative algorithmic techniques but operate in a succinctly 
filmic domain—did not really exist in academic and artistic discussions. 
Generative filmic works have been discussed as art objects, simulations, 
sometimes software, but rarely as a unique synthesis of computational logic and 
filmic experience.
The word ‘procedural’, while appearing in many contexts, was in this case 
borrowed from the field of game design, where ‘procedural generation’ means 
automating processes such as creating landscapes or game levels. As 
algorithmic processing enters higher levels of complexity, such as machine 
learning, various procedural operations of automation become more and more 
common. In digital visual culture, this means that decision-making is often 
delegated to algorithmic processing. In this thesis I aim to analyse the 
consequences of this for film and media art, in terms of broader artistic 
methodologies as well as my own practice.
Taken broadly, the idea of procedural film can be extended to almost 
anything that has some kind of operative logic at its core and produces moving 
 See Practice Overview and Documentation section of the current thesis, p. 167.1
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images, such as train schedules, clocks, advertisements or mobile devices. 
After all, they are also operated by a program and, in most cases, if one 
watches long enough, the images will move. What separates procedural film 
from other, more familiar and established, moving image forms? I suggest that 
we should understand procedural films as films that are generated, with the 
help of software or a custom algorithm, as opposed to being reproduced, and 
that the generative process happens live. I also restrict procedural films in the 
current investigation to media artworks and artefacts. While any video file is 
already enabled by the various protocols and procedures that render it visible 
each time it is played, this rendering, as a rule, results in perceptually identical 
copies. The distinct emphasis of procedural film, therefore, falls precisely on the 
generative and autonomous nature of the algorithmic procedures insofar as 
they can offer exceptions to this rule, resulting in a live process that exhibits 
variation, unpredictability and randomness.
Procedural works, often made by independent game designers or artists, 
have autonomous operation as their primary goal. For example, in his work San 
Andreas Deer Cam (2015–2016), artist Brent Watanabe automates the 
environment of the game Grand Theft Auto V by running a modified version. 
The camera is attached to a model of a non-player character—a deer—that is 
programmed to operate autonomously, wander and interact with its 
surroundings. As mentioned in the description on the website that streamed the 
work live at the moment of its installation, ‘in the past 48 hours, the deer has 
wandered along a moonlit beach, caused a traffic jam on a major freeway, been 
caught in a gangland gun battle, and been chased by the police’.  In works such 2
as this, the hidden and often comically absurdist ‘life’ of images comes to the 
surface, and the figure of the human viewer recedes into the background. In this 
thesis, procedural films are investigated in direct relation to the idea of 
autonomy that comes from the algorithmic automation of the image.
Research Background and Scope
Procedural film is an object of study that exists at the intersection of moving 
image, media and computational cultures. In academic research, the algorithmic 
 Brent Watanabe, ‘San Andreas Deer Cam’, 2016. http://sanandreasanimalcams.com/.2
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and filmic intersection has become the focus of various areas, including the so-
called ‘digital turn’ in film studies, media archaeology, new media and, to some 
degree, game studies. However, a specific focus on how cinema can become 
generative, and how the computational and the cinematic can be seen as 
equally co-constitutive sides of the experience of media art works, has been 
rare. The intersections of film and media art have been addressed by important 
exhibitions such as Future Cinema: The Cinematic Imaginary after Film (2002) 
at the ZKM Center for Art and Media in Karlsruhe and Dreamlands: 
Immersive Cinema and Art, 1905–2016 (2016) at the Whitney Museum of 
American Art. Even in these cases, however, generativity was only one of the 
aspects surveyed. Academic conferences such as SIGGRAPH, Media Art 
Histories and Society for Cinema and Media studies have touched upon the 
topic, producing some of the papers that were instrumental in this research. The 
idea of procedural or automated film practices is currently attracting more 
scholarly attention. In 2019, two conferences addressed this specific 
intersection: the International Film Studies Conference (2019) in Gorizia, Italy, 
which was themed Moving Pictures, Living Machines: Automation, Animation 
and the Imitation of Life in Cinema and Media, and the Besides the Screen 
conference (2019) with its theme of Graphic Intelligences & Algorithmic Fictions. 
Scholars with focuses on more mainstream practices, but with the same 
understanding that it is impossible to see the cinematic as separate from the 
computational, have produced relevant approaches—Gabriel Menotti-Gonring 
has worked on executable cinema  and Kyle Joseph Stine on calculative 3
cinema.4
This thesis focuses on procedural film as a research media art practice. I 
understand it as an art practice that is not only tasked with creating new 
affective spaces, but also with unpacking the socio-technical and 
epistemological conditions of producing these spaces. In the current moment, in 
which computational processes are increasingly difficult to separate from the 
 Gabriel Menotti-Gonring, ‘Executable Cinema: Demos, Screensavers and Videogames as 3
Audiovisual Formats’, in Re: Live Media Art Histories 2009, edited by Paul Thomas Sean Cubitt 
(Conference Proceedings, The University of Melbourne & Victorian College of the Arts and 
Music, 2009), 109–13; Gabriel Menotti-Gonring, ‘Executable Images: The Enactment and 
Distribution of Movies in Computer Networks’, The Velvet Light Trap (September 2012): 49–58.
 Kyle Stine, Calculative Cinema: Technologies of Speed, Scale, and Explication, PhD 4
dissertation, University of Iowa, 2013.
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cultural processes, such investigations become particularly important. Besides 
keeping to the strict definition of procedural films as media artworks that employ 
generative algorithmic processes, I also highlight the implications of algorithmic 
autonomy as central to the experience, discussion and interpretation of such 
works. Seeing film as a result of procedural operation orientates artistic 
consideration towards specific questions of how agency is assigned or removed 
from technical media, what kind of affect it enables and how to consider the 
experience of film when computational culture enters filmic culture as a 
procedural operation. For this reason, the distinct aims of the current research 
include, first, outlining a materialist framework for considering procedural films 
as techno-cultural artefacts that would allow for a nuanced and critical reflection 
on them and, second, investigating their specificity in the context of my practice.
The challenge, therefore, lies in constructing procedural films as an object of 
study, while navigating the various frameworks that relate to its iterations and 
marginal genealogies, from artificial life to screensavers. One of the existing 
debates most relevant to procedural films in a media art context is the 
discussion of generative art. However, the generative art approach is 
insufficient for a discussion of procedural film because it fails to address the 
sociopolitical context of such works and their critical potential as media art. In 
order to respond to this challenge, I suggest approaching procedural films in 
their material specificity as techno-cultural artefacts, drawing on media studies 
and visual culture.
The affective space-time of procedural films is the nexus of my argument. 
Where algorithmic autonomy enters the process of watching a film, it also 
renegotiates the traditional roles of the film and the spectator. Furthermore, in 
the context of the increasing automation of various cultural operations, including 
film-making processes, the question of affect in wider networks of media 
infrastructure, as well as algorithmic autonomy within vectors of algorithmic 
governance, requires further discussion. The question of procedural films, 
therefore, requires an investigation of political aesthetics of an extended 
procedural apparatus that involves algorithms, interfaces, temporalities and 
software operations.
It is important to underline that my approach, in relation to frameworks of 
media art practices, also insists that the media in question are filmic and relate 
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to the long history of cinema practices as much as they do to software and 
interfaces. In particular, this includes experimental film and artists’ moving 
image works that have often been developed in opposition to, or at the margins 
of, the mainstream cinema industry. In this sense, procedural film can be seen 
in light of the critical potential of media art, as well as within the space of 
experimental practices that Akira Mizuta Lippit calls ‘ex-cinema’,  works ‘outside’ 5
cinema that nevertheless continuously return back to it, displacing traditional 
notions of cinematic space, time and experience. I situate procedural film within 
debates on media art and media studies, but also film studies, and within the 
discussions of spectatorship in particular. This helps to show that the challenges 
outlined above can be addressed by seeing procedural film as an artefact in 
transversal connection to its affective and epistemic spaces—through the 
technical conditions of its existence—to the broader cultural and political 
implications.
This transversal approach to procedural film allows me to unpack its salient 
aspects that come from the automaticity at the core of this practice. The 
emphasis on the autonomy of procedural film becomes important as it reveals 
the cultural imaginaries of technology in a new light. Both of the two case 
studies—the screensaver and the game engine—represent complex 
entanglements of procedures, affects and filmic space-times that work with such 
imaginaries. Moreover, through practice-led research they conjure up fictional 
worlds that introduce ideas of liveness, emergence and multiple choices into the 
traditionally linear understanding of time within moving image. 
Research Questions and Chapter Overview
The main research themes of this project can be summarised with the following 
questions:
- What distinguishes procedural films and what schools of thought would 
be most useful in situating them?
 Akira Lippit, Ex-Cinema: From a Theory of Experimental Film and Video (University of 5
California Press, 2012).
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- What distinguishes our experience of procedural films? In what way do 
generative algorithmic procedures change the film-watching 
experience? 
- What role does algorithmic autonomy play in the investigation of affect 
in procedural films?
- What is the potential of seeing procedural mediation as a part of political 
aesthetics of media art? What kind of infrastructural entanglements of 
affect, economic and political motivations shape the human experience 
in information technology frameworks?
- How can the two case studies—screensaver and game engine—be 
seen as sites of labour, design and experience, and as affective space-
times in artistic research on procedural films?
The overall structure of the argument reflects these questions. The first two 
chapters are dedicated to situating procedural films among other experimental 
media practices, taking a materialist approach to media and technical affect. 
The third chapter relies on my curatorial practice to address the questions of 
political aesthetics in wider infrastructural scaling. Finally, the last two chapters 
are dedicated to the case studies, each situating the technical artefact and then 
addressing their affective space-times and their techno-cultural apparatuses.
The first chapter constructs a conceptual framework for ‘procedural film’, 
situating it in existing debates. I start by outlining the initial problematisation of 
procedural film through the debate on generative art. I then propose procedural 
films and procedurality as a distinct area of research, outlining its major 
theoretical trajectories of filmic-algorithmic entanglement and algorithmic 
autonomy. Further, I argue for a materialist methodology that approaches 
procedural films as techno-cultural media artefacts. I consider how procedural 
films renegotiate the traditional film spectatorship model, how their apparatus 
can be addressed, drawing on the work of Karen Barad, and how materialist 
view of computational processes opens new ways to investigate affect.
The second chapter analyses how the affective space-time of procedural 
films can be considered in the light of questions of autonomy, agency and 
liveness, drawing on experimental film and contemporary media art practices. I 
address the process of construction of affect as materialist and techno-cultural, 
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offering a posthumanist reading of affective space-time of procedural films. 
Further, I suggest a tentative genealogy of autonomy in moving image, from 
structural film-makers to contemporary generative films. I investigate the idea of 
logics of liveness—the ways in which the experience of autonomy in films draws 
on the specificity of their technical apparatuses. Finally, I introduce notes on my 
artistic methodology, responding to the particular challenges identified in the 
chapter.
The third chapter investigates the concept of ‘algorithmic superstructuring’ 
that developed as a part of my curatorial practice. The questioning of 
algorithmic superstructuring allows me to address the issue of political 
aesthetics as processes of procedural algorithmic remediation and to align 
transversal connections with the questions of labour, design and affect within 
the unwieldy configurations of algorithmic infrastructures. Drawing on the work 
of Jacques Rancière, I propose a reading of algorithmic superstructuring as a 
distribution of the sensible, and I consider how algorithmic autonomy operates 
within vectors of algorithmic governance. Further, I analyse procedural media 
artworks in order to see how artistic approaches construct the questioning of 
algorithmic superstructuring. Finally, I address the position of the media artist in 
relation to critical capacity of art, as well as the readings of literacy, visibility and 
opacity, as specific to media art.
The fourth and fifth chapters are dedicated to two bodies of artistic work that 
are based on two software artefacts—the screensaver and the game engine. 
The fourth chapter takes on the materialist temporalities of idle and productive 
time with regard to screensavers and situates my work Chronic Film and its two 
iterations as procedural film and lecture-performance. I investigate the transition 
of the screensaver’s design from its initial hardware function of protecting 
screens towards a decorative and affective element of computer’s 
personalisation. I further analyse the socioeconomic design of screensavers’ 
affective space-time as situated at the centre of cognitive labour, its patterns 
and temporalities of idle and productive time. I argue that considering the 
screensaver as a site of reflection and boredom within the attention economy 
opens up a productive questioning of both traditional models of cinematic 
perceptions and perceptions of machinic autonomy. The final section offers a 
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discussion of my work Chronic Film and its iterations as they participated in this 
questioning.
The fifth chapter explores the idea of topological gamespace, emergence 
and liveness of non-human agents such as bots and non-player character in 
order to conceptualise procedural films made with game engine, drawing on my 
work Non-Player Character. I draw on McKenzie Wark’s reading of gamespace 
as an hierarchical site of power relations and further analyse it as a space 
where human and non-human participants meet. Drawing on cultural 
imaginaries of autonomous agents, I argue for the potential of considering the 
logic of liveness coming from the simulation apparatus of artificial life software 
as a non-hierarchical construction of the gamespace. The last section further 
situates Non-Player Character as a direct investigation of issues of autonomy, 
liveness and simulation techniques in the gamespace.
Finally, this thesis includes an additional section titled ‘Practice Overview and 
Documentation’. This is not an ‘appendix’ but an integral referencing system, 
which acts in the same way as the bibliography does with theoretical 
references. As a practice-based PhD requires a certain amount of flexibility in 
order to conform to accepted formats, I introduce this element here as a 
necessary contextual tool, reflecting the fact that the context of this research 
expands beyond academic coordinates.
The Context of Practice-Based PhD
While the interdisciplinarity of the current research already calls for an 
imaginative reconfiguration of existing frameworks, there are additional 
difficulties presented by the nature of practice-based PhD projects. In the 
context of academia, which has itself been undergoing a process of 
commercialisation, art practice-based research is a comparatively recent idea. 
The questioning of art as research has produced a multiplicity of methodologies 
that now characterise the field.  These methodologies are by necessity diverse, 6
reflecting their respective fields, institutional boundaries, economic constraints 
and national policies for education. The distinctions between these 
 Mika Hannula et al., Artistic Research: Theories, Methods and Practices (Academy of Fine 6
Arts, 2005).
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methodologies are sometimes lost in the process of flattening into the 
administrative apparatus, and reversing this becomes again the task of the 
graduate student, their supervisors and examiners. Therefore, the current 
ambiguity within the field of artistic research is at the same time a challenge to 
the administrative framework and an opportunity for the researcher to develop 
methodologies that work outside traditional academic boundaries and even 
open up routes to institutional critiques.7
More importantly, in the encounter with academia, or in taking on the position 
of an educator, the processes of articulating practice inevitably enter practice 
itself. Speaking about practice, without reducing it to an illustration of theory and 
without resolving or explaining tensions that are present in the direct experience 
of the work, requires careful negotiation. This requires the artist to develop 
tactics of resistance and ways of articulating practice that cannot be subsumed 
by or reduced to academic arguments. Artist and film-maker Hito Steyerl 
addressed that when she prefaced one of her lectures presented in an 
academic context with the words ‘This is not research. This is not theory. This is 
not art’.  At the same time, it opens up ways of enriching and expanding both 8
practice and theory.
While the feedback loops between my artistic, curatorial and academic 
practices has been invaluable for their development, I consider keeping 
distance from the protocols of formalisation of artistic research a valuable tool 
that ensures that the critical approach to knowledge production is anchored in 
the situated, affective understanding of moving image. My artistic methodology 
is informed by the idea of art as a method of knowledge production. I work with 
film-making and software, but also with lecture-performances and other forms of 
technical media. The technical investigation assumes the role of an affective 
engine that provides a continuous questioning of the conditions and contexts, of 
the ‘givens’, of underlying historical, political and cultural currents. Artistic 
research is enabled by, but not limited to, aesthetics and affect, and I consider 
addressing epistemological challenges as its main function, suggesting the 
 Danny Butt, Artistic Research in the Future Academy (Intellect, 2017).7
 Hito Steyerl, ‘Withdrawal from Representation’, paper presented at the conference The 8
Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism, Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry (ici), Berlin, 7–9 
March 2013. http://www.ici-berlin.org/event/476.
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ways of experiencing, living, sensing or comprehending the techno-materialist 
configurations in question.
While being an art-making endeavour at the core, my practice is also 
sustained by curating, teaching and film programming. In this regard, I consider 
the different activities I engage in, such as making and curating artworks, 
teaching and programming films, as a part of my research process, where I am 
positioned more as an ‘actor in the world’ rather than confined to any of these 
specific positions. For this reason, this PhD project draws equally on my 
curatorial and artistic work, and artistic research is seen as a method of 
knowledge construction in both. Theory and practice inform each other through 
feedback loops, both defining the limits and opening new possibilities. Artistic 
works that I submit with this project also serve as records and as witnesses of 
the long-winded process that lead to their creation. For this reason, and the 
discussions of my artistic works are interwoven into the structure of the thesis 
by concluding the two case study chapters. 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Chapter 1
Conceptual Framework for Procedural Films
In the context of the current research, procedural films are media artworks that 
employ generative algorithmic procedures and manifest as moving images. The 
term ‘procedural’ puts focus on the procedure as an affective engine of moving 
image experience, and on the tactics and problems of procedural automation 
(as follows from the connection of the term to game design). It navigates 
through conversations in media arts, computational culture and experimental 
film and maps procedural films onto their territories. I argue that the focus on 
the ‘procedural’, as opposed to other relevant terms, such as ‘generative’ or 
‘operational’, is useful because it highlights its image’s algorithmic autonomy, 
opening it up for questioning and debate. 
In this regard, I suggest that we should see procedural films as a kind of 
operational images, following Harun Farocki’s idea of images ‘that do not 
represent an object, but rather are a part of operation’.  There is, however, a 9
distinct difference between the two terms. While Farocki speaks about the 
machine images that might not even be visible to human eye, or about the 
‘inconsequential’, transitory image records that are not even stored,  10
procedural films still imply the existence of ‘film’ as a moving image work 
perceived by a human subject. Therefore, where Farocki distances operational 
images from representation, procedural films consider this distance as a source 
of productive tension between the human faculties and the technical media. 
What generative algorithms produce are not only transitory images, but also a 
dynamic, persisting, animated process. Furthermore, procedural films, in the 
tradition of experimental film, refer to, and continuously reconstruct the 
established modes of film-watching. Algorithmic autonomy, then, becomes one 
of the operations that challenge the centrality of human subject within film 
studies by refocusing the experience of film-watching on material aspects of 
computation, and on temporality of algorithmic affect.
 Harun Farocki, ‘Phantom Images’, Public, no. 29 (2004), p. 17.9
 Harun Farocki, ‘Phantom Images’, p. 18.10
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Procedural films therefore can prove their usefulness within the 
contemporary debates in film, media arts and media studies. The fact that 
questions of technology have shaped and complicated discussions of media art 
has led to varied approaches, and an even greater variety of terms.  In the past 11
two decades, however, as attention has turned towards the increasing presence 
of algorithmic processes in the world, researchers in media studies have 
pointed out the necessity of a more integrated view of technical media as 
complex material phenomena that transverse political, economic and cultural 
contexts. In particular, the complexity has been reflected in new materialist 
approaches towards technical media,  as well as in the adoption of the terms 12
‘media ecology’ and ‘post-digital’ in relation to media arts.  Many other 13
discussions signal the urgent need for critical investigations of software and 
algorithmic culture.  The philosophical understanding of artificial intelligences 14
of different kinds, including machine learning and other advanced algorithms, 
now includes readings of algorithmic thinking that exhibit autonomy from human 
agency.  In addition, with the growing interest in machinic subjectivities and 15
non-human algorithmic agents, a similar urgency has also been imparted to the 
task of de-mythologising the various imaginaries of technology, as well as with 
the deliberate artistic use of such mythologies.
In response to these investigations, I position procedural films as a distinct 
area of study, in which they can be seen both as an affective technical artefact 
 By that I mean terms such as ‘computer art’, ‘new media art’, ‘digital art’ and ‘post-digital art’ 11
in relation to certain periods and/or theorisations of technological arts. It is also worth 
mentioning the terms ‘creative artificial intelligence’, or ‘creative AI’, which usually signify a more 
techno-positivist attitude, or ‘machine art’, which can be traced to technological artworks from 
before the advent of the computer.
 See Jussi Parikka, ‘New Materialism as Media Theory’, Communication and Critical/Cultural 12
Studies 9, no. 1 (1 March 2012): 95–100; Sean Cubitt and Paul Thomas, ‘Introduction: The New 
Materialism in Media Art History’, in Relive: Media Art Histories (MIT Press, 2013, e-book), 27–
82; Nathalie Casemajor, ‘Digital Materialisms: Frameworks for Digital Media Studies’, 
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 10, no. 1 (2015): 4–17.
 See Matthew Fuller, Media Ecologies: Materialist Energies in Art and Technoculture (MIT 13
Press, 2005); Ryan Bishop et al., Across & Beyond: Transmediale Reader on Post-Digital 
Practices, Concepts, and Institutions (Sternberg Press, 2016).
 Alexander R. Galloway, Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture (Minneapolis: University of 14
Minnesota Press, 2006); Matthew Fuller, Behind the Blip: Essays on the Culture of Software 
(London: Autonomedia, 2003); Olga Goriunova, Fun and Software: Exploring Pleasure, Paradox 
and Pain in Computing (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2014).
 Luciana Parisi, Contagious Architecture: Computation, Aesthetics, and Space (MIT Press, 15
2013); Luciana Parisi, ‘The Alien Subject of AI’, Subjectivity 12, no. 1 (2019): 27–48.
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and as a symptomatic media object, inextricable from larger data 
infrastructures. The current chapter serves as a literature review and as an 
introduction to the debates that contextualise procedural films. I will present 
procedural films as artistic artefacts within the context of contemporary debates 
in media art and media studies in general. I will argue that in order to be seen 
as a distinct phenomenon, with its own unique challenges and relations, 
procedural film needs to be regarded in the light of multiple understandings of 
agency, and as a part of the scalable architecture of algorithmic-affective 
entanglement, in which data infrastructures necessarily plug into the production 
of affect. The next two chapters will engage more closely with the aspects of 
this scalable architecture: the affective space-time of procedural films and their 
entanglement in processes of algorithmic governance and automation of 
cultural and artistic processes.
The first section of the current chapter is dedicated to the debate that 
developed around generative art, which provides the initial problematisation of 
procedural films as a media art practice. By contextualising the practice of 
procedural film within existing debates, I aim to focus the discussion on the 
perception of algorithmic autonomy. The second section responds to this 
debate, outlining the idea of procedural films and the distinct questions that they 
pose for understanding moving image experience. The final section proposes 
conceptual and methodological considerations of this new term. It also outlines 
the materialist conception of the apparatus of procedural film, drawing on media 
studies and on the work of Karen Barad. Taken together, the two final sections 
address the necessary and easily overlooked oscillation between the 
computational and the filmic in such media art practices. I argue that by 
approaching these two sides transversally, one can explore the affective space-
time of procedural films as techno-cultural artefacts—part of algorithmic and 
media art culture, and part of filmic practices and experiences. 
Generative or Procedural?
The term ‘procedural’, relying on the generative capacity of algorithmic as its 
distinguishing feature, shares in the complicated history of generative art. The 
discussion of differences between the terms will therefore help clarify the value 
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of selecting the ‘procedural’ as the main operational term. The instrumentalist 
connotations of the term ‘generative’ in the area of software and media art have 
constituted one of the most persistent debates in the technological arts. This 
debate reflects a larger epistemic rift that involves not only the specifics of 
institutional frameworks, but also the discussions of medium-specificity in art 
and of human agency in relation to technological arts, both of which have been 
historically complicated by the two different understandings of ‘media’. As 
Cramer notes, 
there are two almost unrelated notions of ‘media’ that clash in art theory 
today: the notion of medium as a means of artistic expression, such as 
painting or sculpture, that has existed in English literature since the 
eighteenth century and continues to structure the study disciplines of 
most art academies in the world; and the notion of medium as a carrier 
of information that has its roots in nineteenth-century physics.  16
The difference between these two senses of ‘media’ can be illustrated by a 
historical anecdote. In 1936, the same year that Turing published the famous 
paper ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem’, German engineer Konrad Zuse constructed the first 
programmable computer—a mechanical calculator that operated with the help 
of a tape with punched holes that contained instructions. On the advice of his 
friend, ex-movie projectionist Helmut Schreyer, Zuse used discarded 35mm 
celluloid film for the tape. Lev Manovich reads this story as a metaphor for the 
way an older cinematic medium passes the baton to the medium of the 
computer, computation ultimately subsuming all the other media within itself in 
the form of software operations and interface instruments.  Zuse’s film, as he 17
writes, ‘with its strange superimposition of binary over iconic code, anticipates 
the convergence that will follow half a century later’.  However, while this 18
convergence delegates to the computer the role of the ultimate ‘meta-medium’  19
to end and subsume all media, it also paradoxically keeps the definition of the 
 Florian Cramer, Anti-Media: Ephemera on Speculative Arts (Rotterdam: nai010 publishers, 16
Institute of Network Cultures, 2013), pp. 12–13.
 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (MIT Press, 2001), pp. 47–48. 17
 Ibid., p. 25.18
 Ibid., p. 33.19
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‘medium’ contained as functional traits that can be interchanged, inherited or 
subsumed. In response, Geoffrey Batchen constructs a media archaeological 
analysis that shows that rather than a sudden convergence, an intertwining 
history of computation, photography and telegraphy already existed in the 
century preceding the inventions of Turing, Zuse and others.  The formal signs 20
of the new media that Manovich points out—‘numerical representation, 
modularity, automation, variability, and cultural transcoding’ —were already 21
present in the inspirations and thinking of the inventors before the arrival of 
Zuse's computer.
Similarly, the distinctive gap between the thinking computer as a ‘medium’ of 
artistic expression and as a ‘media’ artefact that is included in cultural, social 
and political life, can be identified in the history of media art. The first 
theorisations of computer art in the 1960s were conducted by scientists and 
engineers who had little involvement with theories of contemporary art, much 
less with the contemporaneous criticism of minimal and conceptual art. As 
Taylor notes, computer art in its early years did not want for public interest, but it 
also did not rise to the status of ‘real art’ in the eyes of art critics and artists.  22
Therefore, while its status could not be described as entirely marginal, up until 
the 1990s it was excluded from art discourse. Instead, computer art was 
developing along the waves of innovation and corresponding aesthetic 
configurations: ‘the pioneering phases of the 1960s and 1970s, the commercial 
software of the 1980s, and the multimedia of the 1990s’.  Accordingly, the early 23
studies that aimed to analyse this new field tended to ignore the sociopolitical 
reality of computers, concentrating on the discussion of its role as a novel art 
medium.  Cubitt and Thomas attribute some of the reasons for this epistemic 24
 See Geoffrey Batchen, ‘Electricity Made Visible’, in New Media Old Media: A History and 20
Theory Reader, edited by Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Thomas Keenan (pp. 27–44) 
(Routledge, 2006).
 Manovich, The Language of New Media, p. 20.21
 Grant D. Taylor, When the Machine Made Art: The Troubled History of Computer Art 22
(Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2014), pp. 4–9.
 Ibid., p. 10.23
 See John R. Pierce, ‘Portrait of the Machine as a Young Artist’, Playboy 12, no. 6 (1965): 24
124–25, 150, 182–84; A. M. Noll, ‘The Digital Computer as a Creative Medium’, IEEE Spectrum 
4, no. 10 (October 1967): 89–95; Herbert W. Franke, Computer Graphics, Computer Art 
(Phaidon, 1971).
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rift to the changing methods of art-making: where contemporary art at the time 
asserts the transcendence of its own materials and aesthetics in favour of 
conceptual development, and where the post-medium condition is introduced 
into art discourse,  media art has an inherent insistence that the work needs to 25
operate well and therefore should be well crafted.  In this situation, such 26
insistence is taken by contemporary art as ‘a return to medium-specific 
aesthetics of classical modernism’.  At the same time, the leading theorists, 27
curators and critics of contemporary art have often been found to be out of 
touch with media art.  For these reasons, when in the 1990s the term 28
‘computer art’ slowly receded into the background, new kinds of techno-art, and 
among them generative art, gained traction. Generative art found a great deal 
of inspiration in the field of artificial life, the most popular direction taken by 
techno-science. It comes as no surprise, then, that generative art has found 
itself indebted to models of complexity, chaos theory, fractals and evolutionary 
biology, rather than any theorisation coming from the discourses of art or the 
humanities. 
The perception of generative art as a matter of craft rather than art has 
persisted in recent discussions. In a widely cited definition by Galanter, 
generative art is described as ‘any art practice where the artist uses a system, 
such as a set of natural language rules, a computer program, a machine, or 
other procedural invention, which is set into motion with some degree of 
autonomy contributing to or resulting in a completed work of art’.  While this 29
provides a good formal description, it does not specify any sociopolitical 
motivation behind the work. Galanter underlines that he considers generative 
art to be ‘ideologically neutral’.  By disregarding the potential ethical, social or 30
critical role of the artist, this definition tends to fall back on modernist 
 See Rosalind E. Krauss and Marcel Broodthaers, A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age 25
of the Post-Medium Condition (Thames & Hudson, 2000).
 Cubitt and Thomas, ‘Introduction: The New Materialism in Media Art History’.26
 Ibid., p. 29.27
 Ibid., p. 30–43.28
 Philip Galanter, ‘What Is Generative Art? Complexity Theory as a Context for Art Theory’, in 29
GA2003 – 6th Generative Art Conference, 2003, p. 4. https://philipgalanter.com/downloads/
ga2003_what_is_genart.pdf.
 Ibid., p. 19.30
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discussions of the artist’s practice as autonomous, internalist and aiming at 
aesthetic excellence—the view that was made popular, in particular, by the 
writings of art critic Clement Greenberg.  This view also tends to colour the 31
contemporary contributions that come from the domain of science and 
technology. For example, in the widely cited paper ‘Ten Questions Concerning 
Generative Computer Art’ the questions revolve around the ideas of originality, 
creativity and authorship.  Where the affective regimes of visual generative art 32
are discussed, they are often considered in terms of complexity  and 33
information theory,  approaching the optimal aesthetic as a calculated output 34
rather than discussing it within a cultural context. 
At the same time, Galanter cites a long historical perspective for generative 
art that stretches from so-called system-, rule- or instruction-based works found 
in Dada and Fluxus, as well as in the works of Sol Lewitt or John Cage, to a 
wide range of contemporary computational art and design practices that 
embrace live coding, music composition, VJ-ing, robotics, animation and others. 
By omitting the diverse motivations that underpin these movements (some 
explicitly political, such as the Dadaist attack of bourgeois culture, or Fluxus’s 
anti-institutional stance), such historicising appears as a legitimising instrument. 
This directly connects to the nature of financing of many existing art and 
science programs, where the techno-positivist attitude is promoted by the 
necessity of obtaining corporate funding, and where such legitimising becomes 
necessary. Many of these discussions return to the original concerns of 
‘authorship’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘creativity’, especially in the fields adjacent to 
commercial art context where such questions aid in processes of establishing 
value.
In the writings of media theorists, artists and curators working within critical 
media studies and cultural studies, the idea of technical media and of software 
as a given condition is denounced, and the attitudes of generative art are 
 See Caroline A. Jones, Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg’s Modernism and the 31
Bureaucratization of the Senses (University of Chicago Press, 2005).
 Jon McCormack et al., ‘Ten Questions Concerning Generative Computer Art’, Leonardo 47, 32
no. 2 (2014): 135–41.
 Lev Manovich, ‘Abstraction and Complexity’, in MediaArtHistories, edited by Oliver Grau (pp. 33
339–354) (MIT Press, 2007).
 Galanter, ‘What Is Generative Art?’34
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criticised. Cramer suggests drawing the line between generative art and 
software art in the sense of a culturalist–formalist opposition, where the former 
addresses the code as a culturally embedded construction, and the latter is 
preoccupied with the formal operations of the code.  Cramer points out that 35
both can be reductionist: the formalist view by remaining a purely aesthetic 
exercise, and the culturalist view by ending up as ‘a critical footnote to Microsoft 
desktop computing, potentially overlooking its speculative potential at formal 
experimentation’.  Mitchell Whitelaw, arguing that neither position is productive 36
on its own, calls for ‘critical generativity’.  He suggests that to read a software 37
critically means looking at it as a ‘system story’—as a cultural text that exists not 
only as a source code, but also as ‘specific figurations, relations, decisions, 
values and ideologies’.  The ideological potential of generative art then lies in 38
exploring and re-combining these aspects in order to create new configurations, 
and to sketch and model ‘possible worlds’.  39
Inke Arns, in a preface to Whitelaw’s text points out, however, that even 
approaching generativity as a ‘system story’ would ultimately mean 
appropriating the sociopolitical context of the work as another formal feature—in 
other words, that world-building within a system is bound to reproduce the 
system. Like Cramer, Arns treats the term ‘generative art’ as an instrumentalist 
endeavour and argues for ‘software art’ as the designation for art that aims to 
engage with the seemingly invisible aesthetic, economic and political currents 
concealed by the black box of technology.  Arns suggests that in Galanter’s 40
definition, which strives to be universally applicable and includes such diverse 
areas as VJ-ing, electronic music, animation and others, generativity appears 
 Florian Cramer, ‘Concepts, Notations, Software, Art’, in Software Art: Thoughts, edited by 35
Olga Goriunova and Alexei Shulgin. read_me 1.2 media art festival catalog. Moscow, 2002. 
http://readme.runme.org/1.2/teb2e.htm.
 Ibid.36
 Mitchell Whitelaw. ‘System Stories and Model Worlds: A Critical Approach to Generative Art’, 37
in Readme 100: Temporary Software Art Factory, edited by Olga Goriunova (pp. 135–54). 
Readme 100 Festival for Software Art and Cultures (Hartware MedienKunstVerein, 2005), p.
138.
 Ibid., p. 139.38
 Ibid., p. 146.39
 See Inke Arns, ‘Read_Me, Run_Me, Execute_Me: Software and Its Discontents, or: It’s The 40
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not as a creative force that can bring new configurations, but as ‘negation of 
intentionality’.41
In light of this debate, I adopt the term ‘procedural' in order to re-instate the 
‘generative’ dimension as an area of interest, while removing its instrumentalist, 
formalist connotations. In this sense, ‘procedural’ is much closer to ‘software art’ 
in the comparison that Arns provides, addressing this question. She articulates 
the following vectors: software art puts the focus on generative processes, as 
opposed to the focus on results in generative art; software is seen as a 
questioning of culture, as opposed to a tool; the balancing of randomness and 
control is more important than the negation of intentionality; and the interest lies 
in the performativity of code, as opposed to fascination with the generative 
quality itself.  Furthermore, in the individual artworks where the motivations of 42
the artist become clear and where drawing the line becomes a question of 
balance rather than of divided academic camps, it is easier to find the resolution 
of this divide. Arns herself suggests that ‘software art can… be the result of an 
autonomous and formal creative practice as well as… critically refer to existing 
software and the technological, cultural or social impact of software’.43
Procedural film reassembles the various fissures that have been created 
over time—aesthetics versus cultural politics, art versus science—into a 
complex entanglement of material, discursive, technical, cultural and historical 
forces. Seeing procedural films as techno-cultural artefacts, questioning their 
temporality, investigating the performativity of code means to embrace the 
tension between assumed binaries and make this tension productive and 
generative. 
Why ‘Procedural Films’?
Approaching procedural films as techno-cultural artefacts means investigating 
the affective technical entanglements that involve specific cultural contexts and 
configurations of algorithmic moving image apparatuses. Situated within this 
discussion, the term ‘procedural’ places the focus on algorithmic agency and its 
 Whitelaw, ‘System Stories and Model Worlds’, p. 178.41
 Arns, ‘Read_Me, Run_Me, Execute_Me’, pp. 183–184.42
 Ibid., p.184.43
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role in the experience of the viewer. The affective space-time of procedural 
films, therefore, becomes an important nexus for investigating such 
entanglements.
In this section I outline the defining aspects of the idea of the ‘procedural’. 
Procedural films, as I show, not only open up a space in which to consider 
filmic-algorithmic affect, but also allow for an investigation of the autonomy and 
liveness of such works. The affective process of watching a procedural film is 
the main area of investigation here, both as a conceptual focus of research, and 
as a reading of my practice. Seeing autonomy as a part of it, therefore, requires 
a disambiguation of the idea of autonomy in relation to automation and 
algorithmic procedures. The existence of a procedure highlights a certain 
rendering logic behind the moving image; procedurality both reflects the 
process of real-time filmic mediation and the logical stability of algorithmic 
argument.44
The autonomy of an algorithmic procedure assumes two meanings. 
Autonomy, in the most basic sense, means the capacity to operate 
independently, without intervention or direction. In the case of addressing the 
logical stability underpinning a procedural film, autonomy appears as a fixed 
measure of the limits within which the film can unfold. In that regard, autonomy 
can be understood as a structuring principle that defines the operation of the 
message. If one, however, approaches algorithmic procedure in its real-time 
mediation, autonomy emerges as a quality of the film’s temporal unfolding, as 
an affective or experiential aspect. Then, autonomy also emerges as a 
generative quality, as production of the unexpected and the emergent.
Procedural films might employ different generative techniques, but the 
common point is the random occurrence. Here I draw on an interpretation of the 
term ‘procedural’ that comes from gaming communities, where a ‘proc’ (or that 
something ‘procs’) means the triggering of a random chance or effect (usually 
beneficial). One of the possible etymological interpretations of the term comes 
from early computer games’ code, which would contain semantic elements such 
 The existence of the stable logical structure is also reflected in the use of the word 44
‘procedural’ in the film industry to describe television series that are dependent on a detailed, 
realistic treatment of professional procedures (especially police, legal or medical procedures) 
and where each episode is often dedicated to solving a particular case. 
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as ‘spec_proc’, or ’special process’.  Even if this randomness is restricted, it 45
inevitably leads to the unpredictability of autonomous operation. As I explain in 
more detail in Chapter 2, procedural films create a particular affective space-
time; the autonomous operation of algorithms leads to a continuous re-
negotiation of the traditional roles of the spectator and a moving image work, 
played out in the affective space between the human faculties and the technical 
media. The feedback loop formed by the cognitive process of watching the film 
becomes the site of production of affect. At the same time, the algorithmic affect 
of procedural films is impacted by the technical and infrastructural operations 
that are necessarily involved in their making. 
The emphasis on algorithmic autonomy and agency also reflects the current 
discussion around algorithmic culture, in which automation is an increasingly 
problematic issue. As mentioned in the introduction, the term ‘procedural films’ 
draws directly on the use of the word ‘procedural’ in game design, where 
‘procedural generation’ means automating processes such as creating 
landscapes or game levels. In procedural films, therefore, the questioning of 
automation (and autonomy) becomes a distinct aspect of the term. In this, and 
in many other contexts, the processes of automation cannot be seen only as 
neutral operations aimed at increasing efficiency. Ultimately, because the use of 
algorithmic models of reasoning and decision-making are increasingly seen as 
a definitive technological solution, the naturalisation of such devices and their 
uncritical treatment makes automation problematic.  The consequences of 46
producing rationalised models that automate the operations of prediction in 
policing, and in the financial and environmental spheres have already been 
widely explored in critical approaches to algorithmic cultures.  The automation 47
of image processing makes an integral part of such data infrastructures, 
especially in the areas of computer vision and data visualisation. The images 
enter into a particular relationship with the regimes of prediction and decision-
making that are technically dependent on the temporality and materiality of 
 The exact etymology of the term is still to be established. Other versions include ‘percentage 45
occurrence’, ‘process’, or an acronym for ‘potential rate of cast’ and ‘programmed random 
occurrence’. 
 Matteo Pasquinelli, ‘How a Machine Learns and Fails’, Spheres: Journal for Digital Cultures, 46
no. 5 (2019): 1–17.
 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and 47
Information (Harvard University Press, 2015).
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calculation. As Abelardo Gil-Fournier and Jussi Parikka note, ‘these imaging 
devices are part and parcel of an infrastructure that does not merely “observe” 
microtemporal moments in a passive manner…rather, microtemporal moments 
are here an integral part of data mobilised to sustain a relation with a particular 
form of governance: data and projective temporalities governance’.  The 48
processes of automation of the moving image, therefore, can be considered in 
the light of their potential to remake traditional understandings of filmic space-
time and procedural films—as artefacts that participate in this remaking. 
While not all procedural films participate in the data governance directly, they 
are implicated in software and data infrastructures of governance and control. 
Returning to Farocki’s definition of operational images as images ‘that do not 
represent an object, but rather are a part of operation’,  the operations in the 49
case of procedural films should be understood as generative algorithmic 
operations that define the parameters of the film’s unfolding. However, this 
includes not only the algorithms that specifically define the parameters of the 
image, but also software and interfaces involved in its rendering and 
distribution. This produces an investigative space in which the process of 
watching a film needs to be considered in relation to the specific design and 
temporality of algorithms that drive it. Procedurality therefore addresses how 
filmic affect plugs into the systems of algorithmic control. Thus, the investigation 
of procedural films requires a scalable architecture that can move from localised 
filmic-algorithmic affect, and from the material aspect of seeing an algorithm 
unfold, to considerations of agency and control of algorithms within wider 
infrastructural networks.
In this regard, the ‘procedures’ behind procedural films cannot simply be 
regarded as autonomous processes, in the way that generative art debate 
proposed. The ‘autonomy’ of procedural films is an entanglement of various 
understandings of agencies, imagined and real, which require articulation. This 
also invokes a more normative understanding of the word ‘procedure’, which is 
often used to describe mechanisms of administration, law and political 
 Abelardo Gil-Fournier, Jussi Parikka, ‘“Visual Hallucination of Probable Events”: On 48
Environments of Images, Data, and Machine Learning’, pre-print/forthcoming in Big Data: A New 
Medium? edited by Natasha Lushetisch (para 1) (Routledge, 2020/2021).
 Harun Farocki, ‘Phantom Images’, p. 17.49
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regulation. In this sense it echoes a longer history of computation whereby 
algorithmic logic followed in the footsteps of increasing bureaucratisation and 
control over the time and lives of workers.  I address this idea in detail in 50
Chapter 3 by introducing the concept of ‘algorithmic superstructuring’, which 
was a result of my curatorial work and which I am continuing to develop. 
Discussion of algorithmic superstructuring involves the pursuit of layered modes 
and scales of algorithmic infrastructures that participate in the construction of 
affect. It opens up a space for discussions of the political aesthetics of 
procedural films, questioning how the naturalisation of algorithmic agency gets 
entangled with the real forms of governance. 
To summarise, procedural films invoke two questions: the question of 
affective filmic-algorithmic entanglement and the question of algorithmic 
autonomy. These two issues, as I will show, require some further articulation, as 
well as a renegotiation of existing positions and theoretical coordinates. The 
idea of algorithmic autonomy, in particular, opens up a layered discussion of the 
different agencies at work within the film and the ones accorded to spectators. 
Different understandings of autonomy (and, therefore, of perceived and real 
agency) come into play. They can be distinguished in the material conditions of 
film-playing and film-watching, the perceived agency, or liveness of algorithmic 
agents and agency in the context of algorithmic governance. The next section 
will address the former, while the two latter issues are the focuses of Chapter 2 
and 3 respectively.
Procedural Apparatus
If the autonomous operation of algorithms in procedural films leads to a re-
negotiation of the traditional roles of spectator and moving image work, what 
comprises the apparatus of procedural films? How does algorithmic autonomy 
reconfigure the existing apparatuses of film and media theory? How does it 
reflect the entanglement of filmic affect and algorithmic agency? The current 
section addresses these questions, drawing on post-human and media theory.
 Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information 50
Society (Harvard University Press, 1986).
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Thomas Elsaesser argues that in order to consider the film-watching 
experience in the light of changes brought to it by digital technologies, it needs 
to be mapped according to its specificities: 
cinema’s relation to other media-forms, such as television, video art and 
digital media, can be mapped by analysing their different and distinct 
diegetic worlds, comprising the technical apparatus and mental 
dispositifs, but also dependent on the temporal, spatial and enunciative 
locators/activators that together constitute their particular ‘ontology’.  51
Procedural films could similarly be seen as techno-cultural artefacts forming 
their own conditions of existence. In order to see how these conditions are 
formed and constructed, procedural films should be considered not only as sites 
of technologically shaped affect, but also as end points of longer infrastructural 
chains of software, algorithmic models and techniques. At the same time, the 
central difficulty remains that, while procedural film is undeniably a 
computational practice, it also owes a significant debt to the filmic apparatus 
and to theories of cinema. Often this needs to be articulated through specific 
moments of historical intersection, through marginal technologies and 
experimental practices.
In the first section of this chapter I showed that generative media art already 
has a complicated history. Cubitt and Thomas suggest that an interdisciplinary 
approach to media art, in order to reflect its fragmented histories, needs to a) be 
technologically (mathematically, computationally) rigorous without being 
reductivist in the sense of a modernist return to medium-specificity and its 
concerns; b) address the institutional and epistemic rift by including media arts 
in the broader history of art; and c) consider that it involves not only digital 
practices, but also film, video or other media.  In procedural films, the last of 52
these points becomes particularly relevant, as the very idea of procedurality 
requires a negotiation of the oscillation between moving images and the 
computational. The capacity to approach media cultures through various 
technical artefacts, institutional and individual networks, materialities and 
genealogies becomes important. Elsaesser, Cubitt and Thomas refer to media 
 Thomas Elsaesser, ‘The New Film History as Media Archaeology’, Cinémas: Revue D’études 51
cinématographiques/Cinémas: Journal of Film Studies 14, no. 2–3 (2004): 75–117, p. 110.
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archaeology, which offers a robust critique of the narratives of linear 
technological progress, by addressing the materialist and epistemic conditions 
of technical artefacts.  Media archaeological investigations have undoubtedly 53
influenced the current research, not least in the choice of the obsolete artefact 
of a screensaver as one of the two main case studies. However, the current 
investigation is not a media archaeological one. Rather, it adopts a materialist 
approach to procedural films in order to situate them as techno-cultural artefacts 
at the intersection of multiple fields. This method allows me to address the 
procedures at work in the technical artefact on multiple ‘levels’. Looking at them 
as dynamic matter enables me to attend to the processes of labour and design 
behind the procedural films, and also investigate the affects, stories and 
imaginaries of technology, as well as the technical temporalities and 
specificities.
Traditionally, the discussion of agency in film studies has been bound up with 
the discussion of spectatorship, and to the space of cinematic theatre. The 
1970s apparatus theory saw the spectator as a passive subject of ideology.  54
Jean-Louis Baudry argues for the optical centrality of the camera’s ‘eye’ as the 
reason for cinema’s ideological effect,  which is implicated in the institutional 55
apparatus, including the architecture of the room, the technologies of capture 
and projection, and the narrative shape of the film. Michele Aaron underlines 
the importance of the interplay between the three elements: ‘of the technical 
(projection), the physical (seated spectator in darkened auditorium) and the 
 Important sources for media archaeology include Michel Foucault’s archaeologies of 53
knowledge and power, Marshall McLuhan’s work on media, Walter Benjamin’s writings on 
media’s effect on modernity, as well as the work of Friedrich Kittler and the theorists of New Film 
History of the 1990s. Within media archaeology itself there are a variety of approaches, and 
well-mapped introductions to the different strands of media archaeologies can be found in 
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Thomas Keenan (eds), New Media, Old Media: A History and 
Theory Reader (Psychology Press, 2006); Erkki Huhtamo and Jussi Parikka (eds), Media 
Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, and Implications (University of California Press, 2011); 
Jussi Parikka, What Is Media Archaeology? (Polity Press, 2012); and Wanda Strauven, ‘Media 
Archaeology: Where Film History, Media Art and New Media (Can) Meet’, in Preserving and 
Exhibiting Media Art: Challenges and Perspectives, edited by J. Noordegraaf, C. G. Saba, B. Le 
Maître and V. Hediger (pp. 59–79) (Amsterdam University Press, 2013).
 Jean-Louis Baudry, ‘Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus’, translated 54
by Alan Williams, Film Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1974): 39–47; Jean-Luc Comolli and Paul Narboni, 
‘Cinema/ldeology/Criticism’, Screen vol. 12, no. 1 (1971): 27–38.
 Baudry, ‘Ideological Effects’.55
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psychic (the psychological effects of this configuration and of the film viewed)’.  56
The interplay, however, does not occur on equal terms. The ideological 
treatment of the film apparatus, while providing an important contextualisation of 
the concealed working of power relations, constructs a strictly hierarchical 
relation between the spectator and the apparatus. The former is denied an 
active role. The materialism in Baudry’s approach refers to the processes of 
production and to the relatively stable model of the basic (technical) apparatus 
of film; thus, the embodied experience and the variations in the conditions of 
watching are not further questioned.
Later discussion of spectatorship called into question the passive and 
universalised conception of the spectator. Cultural studies and related 
ethnographic methods, as well as feminist approaches, pointed out that 
apparatus theory did not sufficiently address the specific experiences of the 
individual, and that the individual, while under ideological influence, can also be 
a resistant agent.  Teresa de Lauretis, for instance, appeals to the existence of 57
a complex perceptual apparatus that involves both signifying processes and 
cognitive aspects: 
if, then, subjectivity is engaged in semiosis at all levels, not just in visual 
pleasure but in all cognitive processes, in turn semiosis (coded expec-
tations, patterns of response, assumptions, inferences, predictions, and, 
I would add, fantasy) is at work in sensory perception, inscribed in the 
body—the human body and the film body.  58
For her, this is a necessary part of displacing the traditionally male and white 
subject-spectator. At the same time, this is a different approach from strictly 
cognitivist claims that concentrate on the neuro-biological factors of film 
perception.  Instead, de Lauretis suggests that cultural and cognitive factors, 59
 Michele Aaron, Spectatorship: The Power of Looking on (Wallflower Press, 2007), p. 9.56
 See Judith Mayne, Cinema and Spectatorship (Routledge, 1993) for a detailed outline of this 57
debate.
 Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (Indiana University Press, 58
1984), p. 56.
 David Bordwell, ‘A Case for Cognitivism’, Iris 9 (1989): 11–40; Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of 59
Motion Pictures (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).
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as well as the ‘film body’, mutually implicate each other, resulting in a complex 
dynamics of perception rather than a one-sided relation. 
The ‘film body’ in question—the one with a cinematic theatre and a passive 
spectator—changes in the case of procedural films. Depending on their 
categorisation as experimental films or as media art (or both), they take part in 
the fragmented and diverse distribution networks of these fields. Procedural 
films can be screened in a gallery, at a media art festival, or seen in a multitude 
of digital formats and presentation modes. They can be made with a custom 
code, using commercial software or open source software. The unique 
assemblages that can be seen as procedural films, therefore, do not follow what 
is traditionally understood as cinematic apparatus. Erika Balsom suggests that 
in order to reflect the variability and heterogeneity of contemporary filmic 
practices, the notion of the apparatus should be considered not in the sense 
described by Baudry—to signify the basic technical apparatus—but, rather, in 
Foucault’s sense, as an ensemble of material and discursive practices.  60
Foucault describes dispositif as
a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. 
Such are the elements of the dispositif. The apparatus itself is the 
system of relations that can be established between these elements.61
The view of procedural films as techno-cultural artefacts, therefore, refers not 
only to the institutions (or the lack thereof) that participate in their distribution, 
but also to the technological infrastructures that determine the processes of 
production and distribution, that limit or allow access and that implicate the 
spectator (or, rather, the user) in the range of interfaces. The conditions include 
the processes of labour and design, as well as the stories and imaginaries of 
these technological infrastructures.
 Erika Balsom, Exhibiting Cinema in Contemporary Art (Amsterdam University Press, 2013).60
 Michel Foucault, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 61
Other Writings, 1971-1977, edited by Colin Gordon (pp. 194–229) (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 
p. 194; translation modified.
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The apparatus of procedural films needs to account not only for its 
experimental networks, but also for the autonomous algorithmic procedure at 
the heart of its production and functioning. The spectatorship theory 
concentrated on renegotiating the agency of the viewer, and the ‘agency’ of the 
film itself in this debate was not considered. Baudry, constructing the hierarchy 
of ideological apparatus, drew on mainstream Hollywood cinema. Nonetheless, 
the apparatus of procedural films, fragmented as it is, still retains a model of 
immersive viewership even if it doesn’t take place at the cinema. And while the 
viewer of procedural films cannot be seen simply as a ‘user’ who views a 
computer as a tool, or in the techno-determinist sense, as a powerless subject 
of algorithmic control, closer attention needs to be paid to the ‘film body’ itself 
and its technological temporalities and procedures. In order to do this, the 
traditional model of spectatorship that relied on binaries such as object/subject, 
ideology/subject, text/spectator, need to be addressed instead as a diverse 
multiplicity of entangled forces.
Feminist science studies scholar Karen Barad elaborates the idea of the 
apparatus through an analysis of a scientific apparatus and its capacity to have 
material effects on the results of observation. She extends this premise further 
to describe apparatuses as material-discursive practices that also make 
boundaries, including those between objects and subjects: ‘it is not merely the 
case that human concepts are embodied in apparatuses, but rather that 
apparatuses are discursive practices, where the latter are understood as 
specific material reconfigurings through which “objects” and “subjects” are pro-
duced’.  Barad goes on to define apparatuses as ‘the material conditions of 62
possibility and impossibility of mattering; they enact what matters and what are 
excluded from mattering’.  This reading of the apparatus reformulates all 63
bodies, not just human or biological ones, as participants in a complex 
entanglement, wherein a posthumanist, rather than solely human-oriented, 
understanding of discursive practices becomes possible.
Barad further develops this approach as a ‘specifically posthumanist notion 
of performativity’ which ‘calls into question the givenness of the differential 
 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 62
Matter and Meaning (Duke University Press, 2007), p. 148.
 Ibid.63
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categories of “human” and “nonhuman”, examining the practices through which 
these differential boundaries are stabilized and destabilized’.  As an alternative 64
to the representationalist view (which relies on the interaction of independent 
entities that are often already predefined in dualisms such as subject/object, 
human/non-human), Barad suggests the idea of agential realism. In this 
framework, the primary epistemological units are phenomena, and not subjects 
and objects. The phenomena emerge from the specific intra-actions (as 
opposed to the inter-action of separate entities). Therefore, agential realism 
results in local, rather than transcendental, definitions of the epistemological 
boundaries:
A specific intra-action (involving a specific material configuration of the 
‘apparatus of observation’) enacts an agential cut (in contrast to the 
Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between subject and object) 
effecting a separation between ‘subject’ and ‘object’. That is, the agential 
cut enacts a local resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent 
ontological indeterminacy.65
The posthumanist performative approach not only renegotiates the subject-
object hierarchy, but also allows for a consideration of the role played by the 
materialist specificity of procedural films in constructing affect. The apparatus 
begins with the computational processes that enable the very existence of film 
and render it visible. Here Menotti-Gonring’s proposition of executable cinema 
becomes pertinent, as it directly addresses the technical underpinnings of 
procedural film.  He argues that seeing digital moving images as primarily 66
enabled by computational processes has a bearing on the cinematic dispositif, 
on participation in distribution and circulation networks. The notion of 
executable cinema that he proposes sees the digital moving image as a 
simultaneous co-running of computer operations that enable the process of 
visualisation of the digital film file. In this, Menotti-Gonring draws on Kittler’s 
essay ‘There Is No Software’. According to Kittler, the distinctions between 
 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes 64
to Matter’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28, no. 3 (1 March 2003): 801–31, p. 
808.
 Ibid.65
 Menotti-Gonring, ‘Executable Cinema’ and ‘Executable Images’.66
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operating system, software, graphic interface and programming language are 
symbolic and ultimately come down to ‘signifiers of voltage differences’.  All 67
coding operations serve as systems of abstraction and representation, which 
facilitate the work of the user but, at the same time, obscure the complex 
machine operations from her. Based on this, Menotti-Gonring argues that a 
digital movie file itself can be considered software. The popular perception of a 
film file as a self-contained thing, not unlike a film strip that must be played ‘on’ 
the computer, does not hold up when one considers that the file does not simply 
‘contain’ a film. For the movie to be displayed, instructions that are only partially 
contained in the movie file must interact with the operating system, with the 
media player software, with the video codecs and other protocols. In his take on 
the computer’s point of view on playing a film, Menotti notes:
as much as a digital movie, they [interfaces] are rational organizations of 
the machine, resulting from the way the computer processes 
information. From this perspective, a media player window is no more of 
a structure than the movie playing ‘inside’ of it is. […] All of these ‘layers’ 
are produced concomitantly while the computer is running; thus 
everything that is on the screen is of the same nature as a real-time 
abstraction of the machine.68
What this Kittlerian distinction highlights is the inextricability of the film from 
machine procedures, as well as its dependence on the smooth and 
simultaneous running of multiple processes. As in structuralist-materialist 
approaches, the apparatus of the film can then be reconstructed in order to 
show that neither element is more or less crucial than the other. Ultimately, it 
repositions the film as something that ‘can only be displayed upon the real-time 
decodification by the machine…even the most static images, while they are 
being shown on a computer, are a consequence of procedural interactions—the 
effect of the system’s unprecedented activity’.  As the foundation of this 69
process is the material temporality of processor speed and other time-
measuring processes used in order to display information (e.g. monitor refresh 
 Friedrich Kittler, ‘There Is No Software’, in Literature, Media, Information Systems: Essays, 67
(pp. 147–55) (OPA, 1997), p. 150.
 Menotti-Gonring, ‘Executable Images’, p. 50.68
 Ibid., p. 51.69
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rate or video frame rate), the temporal constitution of procedural film can 
similarly be seen as a series of layered procedures, each having to be 
consistent with existing standards in order to create images smoothly. This 
description directly speaks to Wolfgang Ernst’s investigation of temporal 
regimes of media that do not simply refer to the traditional axis of time, but 
create their own ‘tempor(e)alities’, which are separate from the time of human 
culture and ‘can only be understood according to their own operative 
dimensions through an analysis of technical (time) signals as opposed to 
cultural (semiotic) signs’.70
The layers of abstraction (code, software commands) and representation 
(graphic user interface, codecs) then become the primary space where the film 
itself is constructed. As I will argue throughout my research, this enables a 
particular aesthetic regime and artistic methodology, in which various operations 
of concealing or revealing of these layers take the primary place. Glitch art, for 
example, explores this tension by consciously using computational (or 
analogue) errors for aesthetic purposes. Procedural film is able to explore and 
exploit the same tension productively. In my practice work, discussion of which 
is included in the last two chapters, I consider two different operative spaces—
of the screensaver and of the game engine—which allow me to explore the 
aesthetic, epistemic and affective configurations of the layers in them. While 
screensavers speak more towards early computation and its limited processing 
power, the procedural films made in game engines are often borrowing from the 
aesthetics of videogames and other high-powered environments (in terms of 
both processing power and of resources that they require). Each case study, 
therefore, is seen as a unique localised encounter where the focus lies in the 
challenge that the work brings to the emotional and intellectual faculties of the 
viewer.
In this chapter I have explored the potential to investigate procedural films as 
a distinct area of study, relying on a range of relevant literature. I have 
summarised the existing debate which provides an initial problematisation for 
the question of generative art. I have outlined what the term ‘procedural’ entails, 
 Wolfgang Ernst, Chronopoetics: The Temporal Being and Operativity of Technological Media 70
(Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016), p. xx.
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and discussed its specific focuses on the filmic-algorithmic entanglement and 
on algorithmic autonomy. Finally, I have provided a potential model of a 
procedural apparatus and its computational underpinnings, drawing on the 
ideas of Karen Barad. The materialist approach to ‘tempor(e)ality’ of the 
technical artefact paves the way for approaching affect in a post-human light, 
and for a closer look at the affective space-time of procedural films, which form 
the focus of the next chapter.  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Chapter 2
Procedural Films: Affect, Agency, Autonomy
As the investigations of the first chapter show, while the computational 
procedures behind procedural films condition the experience produced by the 
work, they cannot account for it entirely. Whereas the first chapter concentrated 
on the positioning of procedural film in relation to existing approaches and 
terms, the second chapter focuses on the affective space-time and one’s 
experience of algorithmic autonomy in it. Following the non-hierarchical model 
of spectatorship, one can take a closer look at the ideas of autonomy and affect.
As Galanter underlines in his description of generative art, ‘a system that 
moves an art practice into the realm of generative art must be well defined and 
self-contained enough to operate autonomously’.  Procedural films open up a 71
renegotiation of agency between the artist and the work, and between the 
audience and the work. This shift in agency, even if it is restricted within the 
boundaries of the artwork, makes a crucial difference to the construction of 
affective space-time. I aim to show that the affect that generative and 
autonomous algorithmic works produce involves not only the technical workings 
of the apparatus, but the diverse experiences and imaginaries of machinic 
autonomy, unique for each apparatus. 
In this posthumanist framework the interplay of perceived and real agencies 
becomes important: the processes of distinguishing, imagining, perceiving, 
assigning or interpreting autonomy as agency. David Tomas suggests that the 
posthumanist potential of moving image can manifest as ‘a function of how film 
or video installation has eclipsed or processually rearticulated the human body, 
its identity, and subjectivity in terms of their machine-based visions (and 
models) of the world’.  The filmic artefact can be ‘devoted to the exploration of 72
its own spatiotemporal boundaries and characteristics as medium of mass 
communication’, but also serve as ‘a critical tool of analysis, hyper-reflexive 
 Galanter, ‘What Is Generative Art?’, online.71
 David Tomas, Vertov, Snow, Farocki: Machine Vision and the Posthuman (Bloomsbury 72
Publishing USA, 2013), p. 10.
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artefact and archaeological site of a medium’s contributions to society, its 
development and memory’.  Procedural film, in this paradigm, can address the 73
specificities of technologically constructed affect and its spatiotemporal aspects.
However, affective space-time is not reducible to pre-cognitive understanding 
of affect, but also includes a process of agential renegotiation, following Barad’s 
view of agential realism. In this regard, I see my own practice of procedural 
films as located within the tradition of the works of structural film-makers and in 
the field of experimental film and artists’ moving image in general. Autonomy as 
understood within the structural films would often take on the task of severing 
the relations established by the traditional cinematic spectatorship model in 
order to re-assemble them in a new configuration—through the technical 
experimentation with the film apparatus. Structural films, through technical 
manipulation of the apparatus, re-articulate their affective space-time in a 
material encounter with the viewer. In this way, as I will show, the explicit 
relegation of control over the image creates an additional layer of experience of 
such works—a layer that reflects the tension between the viewer and the film, 
and that reconfigures an assemblage of pre-cognitive affects and cultural 
imaginaries.
This chapter thus serves as a more specific investigation of the practices of 
procedural film and its place within experimental media. In the first section, I 
outline the affective space-time of procedural films. In the following section I 
discuss the role of autonomy in film by drawing on the practices of structural 
film-makers. Further, I approach liveness as a specific aspect of procedural 
affect and suggest several underlying cultural logics that can be understood 
through the procedural films' specific technical apparatuses. Finally, in order to 
situate the argument, I include some notes on de-centering artistic methodology 
that follow from the topics discussed in this chapter.
The Affective Space-Time of Procedural Films
What constitutes the affective space-time of the moving image? As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the models of distribution of procedural films are built 
into contemporary art, media art and experimental film circuits, festivals and 
 Ibid., p. 4.73
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networks. Unless the work has breached the walls of the art institution and can 
be seen fairly regularly in museum and gallery settings (such as Ian Cheng's 
work at the moment of writing) chances are that it is only available to see online: 
as a documentation, as a textual description, as a working or obsolete copy of 
software. Therefore, a singular spectator or viewer does not exist. Similarly, 
there is no singular institutional space of viewing, so each encounter takes 
place within its own unique apparatus. 
Instead, I consider the site of moving image experience as a site under 
construction. As Thomas Elsaesser notes,
key elements of cinematic perception have become internalised as our 
modes of cognition and embodied experience, such that the ‘cinema 
effect’ may be most present where its apparatus and technologies are 
least perceptible… The cinema is part of us, it seems, even when we 
are not at the movies.74
In the presence of multiple screens, devices and forms of moving image present 
in our daily life, cinema becomes a condition of contemporary life rather than a 
medium-specific art confined to the movie theatre.  Pasi Valiaho suggests that 75
cinema can be seen as a ‘specific formation of rationalities, bodies and 
machines’.  He calls this formation ‘the moving image’, putting the emphasis 76
the techno-physiological design of the cinematic perception, denouncing the 
idea that human perception can be uncontaminated by technology. The moving 
image, therefore, leaves the space of cinema, but still retains some aspects of 
its former configuration.
A procedural work by Lawrence Lek provides an illustrative starting point for 
reflection. Lek works with both recorded and live simulations,  often making 77
site-specific virtual worlds. In Dalston, Mon Amour (2015), later re-made as 
Europa, Mon Amour (2016 Brexit Edition), he reconstructs Rio Cinema, an 
independent film theatre with a more than century-long history in Dalston, 
 Elsaesser, ‘The New Film History as Media Archaeology’, p. 76.74
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 Pasi Väliaho, Mapping the Moving Image: Gesture, Thought and Cinema Circa 1900 76
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films.
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London. The virtual camera, floating past the facade, and then inside of the 
deconstructed building, is accompanied by a voiceover on the nature of 
memory, extracted from Alain Resnais’ Hiroshima, Mon Amour (1959). The 
cinematic space (and, perhaps, nostagia for it) becomes built into the apparatus 
of a game engine.
Miriam de Rosa suggests that to trace the contemporary cinematic 
experience in the threefold overlap of media, cultural and visual studies, moving 
images should be seen in their ‘sensory and meaningful immediacy’,  and as 78
much redefining and shaping their context as they are defined and shaped by it. 
This view of moving images allows us to see the specificity of their situated and 
embedded condition, but also highlights the experience as a primary lens that 
allows one ‘to seize their true nature and their full potential in the very moment 
in which they are moving’.  De Rosa underlines the pervasive nature of 79
cinematic experience:
…the proliferation of screens and the wide variety of occasions in which 
the filmic device finds its space in the contemporary scenario, does not 
simply cause a new collocation of cinematic experience. A relocation is 
definitely the first phenomenon to occur, but something else seems to 
characterize the situation as well: a real colonization of space takes 
place, and the moving image does not just enter new contexts but 
merges with them. It becomes part of it, forming its surface, allowing it to 
be practicable and dwelled in. The filmic experience becomes the rough 
material of space, which gives birth to a complex visual and experiential 
texture.80
This view shifts the emphasis towards the technical and material infrastructures 
and affect, where the way the moving image work is constructed overtakes the 
importance of the exhibition context. 
An almost direct illustration of this view is Pirate Cinema, a procedural work 
by Nicolas Maigret, ‘a cinematic collage generated by peer-to-peer network 
 Miriam de Rosa, ‘Image, Space, and the Contemporary Filmic Experience’, Cinéma & Cie 12, 78
no. 2 (2012): 119–30, p. 125.
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activity’  that investigates the pirate economy of file sharing networks. It is 81
constructed as a monitoring room which shows audiovisual contents of current 
peer-to-peer transfers as a real-time montage.  The installation also displays 82
technical information such as the IP address and location of the displayed 
fragment’s source and destination. The work therefore literally remixes the 
traditional cinematic space-time into the new technological frameworks of 
sharing and distribution. The movement of affect and experience is shown as 
inscribed in the algorithmic infrastructures, spatially and temporally. As Geoff 
Cox notes, the work’s 
networked real-time properties necessitate wider discussion of how the 
infrastructures of temporalization render our present the way it is, and 
how these structures inscribe a certain spatial logic of differences—such 
as those between servers and clients or indeed those between peers 
and other peers.  83
He also underlines the materialist temporality in peer-to-peer networks, ‘a 
micro-temporal dimension that is not simply discursive but one that is enhanced 
by the nondiscursive realm of technical objects and infrastructures’.  A 84
procedural apparatus, therefore, is not a stable one, but rather presents as a 
set of moving parts—diverse artefacts, histories, interfaces and physical spaces
—that feed into the affective space.
The technical inscription of affect reveals its externality to the observer. In 
procedural films, as I would like to emphasise, however, the externality of affect 
plays a specific role. I use the term ‘affect’ as describing the experience of the 
encounter with the moving image works, but also to underline the difference 
 See the project website, The Pirate Cinema https://thepiratecinema.com/.81
 As opposed to a direct download, peer-to-peer protocols such as BitTorrent (which was also 82
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 Ibid., p. 10.84
	  47
between emotion and affect, where the former is seen as subjective and 
internal, and the latter as pre-individual and external. Following Barad’s idea of 
apparatus, this continuous renegotiation does not assign new permanent 
agential positions, but allows the questioning of the effect of artefact’s own 
autonomies. What I outlined in the previous chapter as computational 
procedures and temporality of computer processing constitutes the space of 
affect of procedural films as pre-individual and technical (algorithmic), and 
beyond the control of the human viewer/user. This autonomous aspect of affect 
is underlined by Brian Massumi, who notes that
affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in 
the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is. 
Formed, qualified, situated perceptions and cognitions fulfilling functions 
of actual connection or blockage are the capture and closure of affect.85
Carolyn Pedwell, following Massumi, describes affect as a ‘form of intentional 
relationality’ that ‘signifies emergent interactions of human and non- or more-
than human actors which are productive of different kinds of sensations and 
becoming’.  This agential shift in the new materialist and posthumanist 86
approaches to media sees the technically mediated affect not as internal 
emotional states, but rather as a constant questioning of what used to be 
conceived as stable cause-and-effect relations between the human and the 
non-human.
The renegotiation could be seen as a process of agency attribution by the 
observer to the work, at the moment of witnessing and understanding that the 
continuous selection of what is rendered on the film’s surface is controlled by 
the algorithm. How does autonomy renegotiate the borders between the film 
and the viewer? Gabriel Menotti-Gonring reflects on it with the following 
observation:
As the user is excused and control leaves its reach, all that he can do is 
to observe: a fourth wall naturally appears…. That to which the system 
demands nothing tends to become audience. A system produces 
 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, p. 35.85
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audiences precisely where it turns out to be autonomous (and therefore 
closes itself). In that situation, the system becomes an image, but does 
not reveal its operation. Most of the times, what happens is the contrary: 
the system appears transparent and the surface is pure facade; a 
simulation. That means the user becomes redundant, but not 
unnecessary. What is an image for, if not being watched?87
Even if autonomy is restricted to the programmed range of possibilities and 
emergence, it still creates a certain imaginary of the film’s agency. This means 
that affective space-time also cannot be reduced to the space of pre-cognitive, 
technically induced affect, but also includes the process of rationalisation and 
perception of the film ‘as film’, insofar as it is identified as an inanimate cultural 
object. Seeing film as ‘film’ therefore becomes part of the affective space-time. 
This imaginary and perceptual agency becomes the crucial part of 
algorithmic affect. In other words, where the moving image is imbued with 
autonomy, it tends to create resistance to being easily consumed, unlike in the 
traditional spectatorship models that presuppose immersion. The affective 
space-time of procedural film is characterised by mixing alienation and 
attraction. On the one hand, the very perception of the system as autonomous 
creates alienation, as the internal rules by which the film is generated are often 
unspoken. On the other hand, the liveness, the unexpected deviation and the 
perception of the film as autonomous make it stand in an agential position 
rather than that of an object made for consumption. This dialectic, while 
anchored in the affective space of moving image, also brings us back to the 
idea of machine art and to the associated metaphor of the machine perceived 
as ‘other’ to the human. Andreas Broeckmann characterised machine art as 
follows:
Works of machine art encourage us to not take the apparatuses for 
granted, but to problematize them by making the sibling ties between 
subjects and machines visible, or feelable—in the modes of comfort, 
pain, or humor. The artistic encounter with machines is therefore 
 Menotti-Gonring, ‘Executable Cinema’, p. 111, emphasis mine.87
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characterized by strangeness (and familiarity), by distance (and 
proximity), by rejection (and love, or intimacy).  88
The diverse cultural imaginaries of algorithmic affect, be they academic or 
artistic, coincide with the materialist affects of technological processes within 
the affective space-time of procedural films.  While initially this can seem a 89
paradox, I argue that it is precisely within the space of that paradox that 
algorithmic (or technical) affect resides. The fact that something happens too 
quickly or too slowly to be perceived by human senses does not prevent it from 
being recognised or understood—whether through technical literacy, or through 
constructing imaginaries that attempt to visualise or map it, be they artistic or 
academic. Similarly, it is only in the interaction with human bodies that the 
distinctive technical modes of time-passing become clear. Where the 
temporality of machine processes confronts human ones, the primacy of the 
human position can be renegotiated. At the same time, the imaginaries, 
visualisations and mythologies that are constructed in the view of that difference 
and that gap, become part of the renegotiation.90
In the case studies investigated in this research—screen saver and game 
engine—the material temporalities of human bodies (the patterns of sleep and 
labour, attention span, leisure time) inevitably come into contact with their non-
human counterparts (chemical and electric temporalities built into computation). 
The first case study, the screensaver, opens up a distinctly materialist, looped 
temporality of the film that plays on the screen while the worker is absent, as 
well as the dialectics of productive and idle time. The second case study, 
through the exploration of a game engine, looks at the programmed time: the 
algorithmic time of programmed processes, unfolding in the gamespace of 
simulation. These temporalities underpin the vast machine of algorithmic control 
that, more often than not, processes living time according to the protocols of 
standardisation and the logic of maximising profit. As Hansen and Mitchell 
suggest, this creates a sense of alienation on a larger scale: 
 Andreas Broeckmann, Machine Art in the Twentieth Century (MIT Press, 2016), p. 30.88
 As Parikka notes in What Is Media Archaeology?, ‘technical media are posthuman media in 89
the sense of addressing a whole other sensorium than that of the human being’ (p. 256).
 See also Taina Bucher, ‘The Algorithmic Imaginary: Exploring the Ordinary Affects of 90
Facebook Algorithms’, Information, Communication and Society 20, no. 1 (2 January 2017): 30–
44.
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the time of the world—and specifically, of computational objects and 
processes—has become fundamentally disjoined from the time of 
experience, with the result that we find ourselves facing a new, 
structurally unprecedented form of alienation: alienation from the flow of 
information in the world around us.91
The reading of algorithmic affect that I would like to suggest here, therefore, 
draws on the two aspects described in this section: the sense of externality of 
affect that is channelled by the autonomy of algorithmic performance, and the 
imaginary ‘inhumanity’ of the material processes involved. Both construct the 
gap between the human and the technical (as ‘inhuman’), a gap that can be 
sensed, imagined, theorised and described in various ways. 
The posthumanist intonation that colours my use of the term ‘affect’, 
therefore, does not signify a radical departure from human senses, but rather a 
refusal of certainty that has characterised the traditionally central placement of 
the human subject in relation to technology in Western thought. The 
posthumanist attitude towards the media environment calls for an investigation 
of the entanglement of the aesthetic and epistemic procedures as ‘a particular 
mode of capture where resonances between bodies—both human and non-
human alike—enter systems of value and value production’.  In procedural 92
films, intimacy is created by the fact that it presents as moving image, and 
therefore includes the viewer in the process of watching; and at the same time, 
alienation is created by the fact that it is perceived as autonomous. The artwork 
uses its own methods of abstraction and representation to establish an affective 
space between itself and the viewer; at the same time, it re-calibrates the 
temporal and visual regimes from the agential position. This interesting dynamic 
will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5, where I discuss the position of 
non-human agents within procedural environments, and further draw on Karen 
Barad’s posthumanist notion of performativity, which suggests that the borders 
 W. J. T. Mitchell and Mark B. N. Hansen, Critical Terms for Media Studies (University of 91
Chicago Press, 2010), p. 110.
 Tero Karppi et al. ‘Affective Capitalism: Investments and Investigations’, Ephemera: Theory & 92
Politics in Organization 16, no. 4 (4 November 2016): 1–13, p. 9.
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between ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ are re-defined in each local material 
encounter, rather than seen as a given.93
Experiencing Autonomy: 
From Experimental Film to Algorithmic Affect
The consideration of filmic autonomy invites an interesting recognition that 
procedural films—at least in the narrow understanding of my own artistic 
practice—owe a particular debt to the practices of structural film-makers. In this 
and the next section I sketch a tentative genealogy of autonomy in the moving 
image, extending from structural film practices and their unique capacity to 
create self-reflexivity in film experience, to the current algorithmic generative 
works and techniques.  94
In experimental film, the disassembling of the film apparatus often becomes 
part and parcel of its experience. The film strip does not have to contain a 
chemically imprinted image in order to create a film—like in Stan Brakhage’s 
Mothlight (1963); the film does not have to be two-dimensional or confined to 
the screen (Anthony McCall’s Line Describing a Cone (1973)). Ultimately, the 
film does not even have to exist anywhere except on the soundtrack and in the 
imagination of the viewer (Derek Jarman’s Blue (1993)). These, and many other 
films each have their own ways in which they disrupt the mainstream filmic 
procedures and the ‘naturalised’ film perception. In this sense, they induce a 
particular sense of meta-awareness of their own medium that affects the 
experience of the film. 
 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity’.93
 While beyond the scope of the current research, a larger and more detailed genealogy of 94
procedural films would consider the productive moment of the 1970s, when the film-makers 
Hollis Frampton, Paul Sharits and Tony Conrad, video artists Steina and Woody Vasulka, and 
media artist Peter Weibel taught at the pioneering Center for Media Study at the State 
University of New York in Buffalo. The Center for Media Study was aimed at media and image-
making technologies—film, video and computer. In one of his talks, the founder of the centre 
Gerald O’Grady describes media as ‘the codes and modes of expression in human culture, and 
their creation and exploration as information carriers, art forms and structures of both individual 
and social consciousness’. See Gerald O’Grady, ‘The Three Universes of Media’, in Buffalo 
Heads: Media Study, Media Practice, Media Pioneers, 1973-1990, edited by Woody Vasulka 
and Peter Weibel (pp. 85–87) (ZKM Center for Art and MIT Press, 2008), p. 86. 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Stan Brakhage defined such meta-awareness as ideological resistance to the 
naturalised experience of mainstream cinema, elegantly describing Hollywood 
film tropes as ‘soothing syrup’ and ‘the depressant of imagistic repetition, a film 
akin to counting sheep to sleep’.  This is not, by any means, an overarching 95
political stance, but clearly a point of a larger discussion of the 1960s, when art 
discourse grappled with the rapid changes in media technologies, new concepts 
of information and globalisation. Some of the results of this debate materialised 
as conceptual art, systems art, the very early beginnings of computer art and 
structural film. While the use of the term ‘structural’, introduced by P. Adams 
Sitney,  was criticised early on for imposing a reductive interpretation onto very 96
diverse artistic practices,  I argue that it is possible to identify a point of 97
commonality in the way the structural works, by addressing the technical 
conditions of the films’ own making, activate the cognitive processes of seeing a 
film. This can be seen, in particular, in the practices and writings of Paul Sharits, 
Peter Gidal, Michael Snow and Hollis Frampton. By re-structuring the traditional 
systems of cinematic presentation and apparatuses, structural film engages in a 
kind of technical unmaking of the perceptual processes involved in watching a 
film.
How does this relate to procedural films? The attention to the technical 
medium in the practices of structural film-makers took on varying shapes. 
However, the crucial attitude was the exploration of film as autonomous system, 
as is particularly noticeable in the works of Hollis Frampton and Paul Sharits. 
Many of Frampton’s films, including States (1967), Zorns Lemma (1970) and, to 
some extent, (nostalgia) (1971) or Poetic Justice (1972), utilise a certain 
procedure that defines the structural organisation of the film and is formulated 
symbolically, linguistically and/or mathematically. Zorns Lemma, for example, 
 Stan Brakhage, Metaphors on Vision (Film Culture, 1963).95
 P. Adams Sitney, ‘Structural Film’, Film Culture No. 47, Summer 1969, and Visionary Film: 96
The American Avant-Garde (Oxford University Press, 1974).
 While the definition elicited criticism from theorists and artists for its mis-representatively 97
generalising view of very different artists and their motivations, it nevertheless provided a 
general description of the trend in which the technical nature of film was accorded a crucial 
place (Bruce Jenkins, ‘A Case Against “Structural Film”’. Journal of the University Film 
Association 33, no. 2 (1981): 9–14;  George Maciunas, ‘Some Comments on Structural Film by 
P. Adams Sitney.’ Film Culture no. 47 (1969); Peter Gidal, Structural Film Anthology (BFI, 1976), 
p.13–14; Hollis Frampton, ‘Hollis Frampton in San Francisco’. Cinemanews 77–6 (1977): 8–
9; Malcolm Le Grice, ‘Thoughts on Recent “Underground” Film [1972]’. In Experimental Cinema 
in the Digital Age (pp. 13–26) (BFI, 2001).
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reuses Frampton’s earlier photographic project Word Pictures (1962–63) as a 
dataset, displaying in alphabetic order the photographs of words that he took in 
urban space. The procedure keeps repeating, but as some of the less common 
letters run out, they come to be substituted by abstract moving images.  With 98
characteristic irony (and predating glitch art and debugging), Frampton notes 
that since ‘a number of misfortunes’ are bound to occur in a time-based work of 
art, he might as well incorporate them in a deliberate fashion, and provides a 
detailed description of errors in the film’s system. Even more importantly, in a 
later discussion on Zorns Lemma, Frampton notes: ‘That desire for internal self-
consistency, or for self-provingness, suggests the possibility, at least, for 
outrageous hypotheses. There are language-like discourses that can carry with 
them a grand suggestion that they can be internally self-proving, that they can, 
among other things, get along without the artist’.99
A pertinent interpretation of Frampton’s works can be found in the practice 
and writings of Barbara Lattanzi. Her website describes her works as cinema 
software, or idiomorphic software,  shared under copyleft licence. The work 100
HF Critical Mass (2002)  is based on Hollis Frampton’s 1971 film Critical 101
Mass, adopting its structure as ‘an interface for improvising digital video 
feedback’.  When the viewer downloads the software, they are able to apply it 102
to local video files in .mov format, creating endless remediations of the original’s 
rhythm. HF Critical Mass therefore codifies the essence of structural film, its 
internal logic, gestures and movement, into algorithmic form. In her notes on the 
film, Lattanzi remarks that she proposes ‘Frampton’s work… as a model for 
software construction because of the particular way that his work engages the 
intentionality and subjectivity of the viewer—the way his work stages viewers’ 
acts of perception, or registration, as intentional achievements of the viewer’.  103
 See Hollis Frampton, ‘Zorns Lemma: Scripts and Notations’, in On the Camera Arts and 98
Consecutive Matters: The Writings of Hollis Frampton, edited by Bruce Jenkins (pp. 192–202) 
(MIT Press, 2009).
 Hollis Frampton, ‘Interview with Scott MacDonald: “Zorns Lemma”’, In Buffalo Heads, p. 194.99
 See website wildernessPuppets, http://wildernesspuppets.net/about.php.100
 In 2015 Lattanzi also released HF Critical Mass, version 2. 101
 See website description HF Critical Mass Software, http://www.wildernesspuppets.net/yarns/102
hfcriticalmass/description.html.
 Barbara Lattanzi, ‘Critical Mass, the Software’, wildernessPuppets, 6 November 2004.103
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Her insistence that ‘structures fundamentally perform something’  aligns 104
structural film directly with performative understanding of code (and software) 
as ‘speech acts’,  and could be extended to procedural films as well. As Inke 105
Arns writes, drawing on a series of lectures by John Langshaw Austin at 
Harvard University in 1955, How to Do Things with Words, ‘linguistic utterances 
by no means only serve the purpose of describing a situation or stating a fact, 
but are used to commit acts’.  Speech is regarded as action in and of itself, 106
and a performative process in its own right. Arns suggests that code can 
similarly be seen as a speech act, and its capacity or failure to be executable as 
the performativity of code. 
Between procedural and structural films, the performativity of the technical 
system also becomes significant as it is perceived as autonomous from human 
being, or as an equal participant in the exchange. Paul Sharits addressed the 
technical apparatus of cinema as a communication system. Speaking in the 
context of how cinema measures up to the conceptual conquests of art in the 
1970s, and implicitly drawing on the contemporaneous research in cybernetics, 
systems theory and communication, Sharits calls for seeing film practice as a 
form of ‘research in contemporary communication and “meaning” systems’.  107
The task of the artist, according to him, is to approach films as informational 
systems, without imposing humanistic pre-suppositions such as ‘capturing a 
likeness of the world in motion’.  In this definition Sharits likens the distinction 108
between narrative-based filmic realism and between the film as a system to the 
distinction between ‘human’ and ‘non-human’.  109
Peter Gidal reframes structural film as materialist: ‘In Structural/Materialist 
film, the in/film (not in/frame) and film/viewer material relations, and the relations 
 Ibid.104
 See Arns, ‘Read_Me, Run_Me, Execute_Me’, ‘Code as Performative Speech Act’, Artnodes 105
4 (2005); Geoff Cox and Christopher Alex McLean, Speaking Code: Coding as Aesthetic and 
Political Expression (MIT Press, 2013), pp. 35–38.
 Arns, ‘Code as Performative Speech Act’, p. 6.106




of the film’s structure, are primary to any representational content…’.  It is set 110
in opposition to the dominant cinema of representation and narrative, which 
Gidal sees as a one-way system that ‘categorically rules out any dialectic’  111
and relies on the passivity of the viewer and their identification with the 
characters. Unlike Sharits, Gidal includes the viewer in the system of the film. 
The structural/materialist film requires an active and involved viewer:
The mental activation of the viewer is necessary for the procedure of the 
film’s existence. Each film is not only structural but also structuring. This 
is extremely important as each moment of film reality is not an atomistic, 
separate entity but rather a moment in a relativistic generative system in 
which one can’t simply break down the experience into elements. The 
viewer is forming an equal and possibly more or less opposite ‘film’ in 
her/his head, constantly anticipating, correcting, re-correcting—
constantly intervening in the arena of confrontation with the given reality, 
i.e. the isolated chosen area of each film’s work, of each film’s 
production.112
On the one hand, as can be seen from this quote, the film experience is 
produced by the re-assembling of the technical elements of the cinematic 
machine; on the other hand, the mental process of viewing plays a crucial role. 
The viewer becomes an equal part of the cinematic machine. For Gidal, 
therefore, the film produces a kind of tension, a productive oscillation between 
expectation and experience, between perception and existing knowledge. 
Significantly, he uses the words ‘filmic event’ to underline the temporal process 
which becomes part and parcel of a film-induced self-reflection: ‘filmic 
reflexiveness is the presentation of consciousness to the self, consciousness of 
the way one deals with the material operations; filmic reflexiveness is forced 
through cinema’s materialist operations of filmic practice’.  113
One of the best examples of such mental processing of experimental film is 
Michael Snow’s film La Région Centrale (1971). The film was made using a 
 Gidal, Structural Film Anthology, p. 1.110
 Ibid., p. 3.111
 Ibid.112
 Ibid., p. 10.113
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remotely controlled, programmable robotic arm that allowed the camera to 
move through 360 degrees in all directions. For the three hours of the film, a 
deserted, remote landscape in Northern Quebec remains its only subject. As the 
camera moves around its invisible point of anchor, all possible expectations are 
forfeited, turning the film into a meditation between the technical apparatus and 
the scarce elements of the landscape. As Michael Snow notes, ‘I only looked in 
the camera once. The film was made by planning and by the machinery 
itself’.114
Not only the movement of the camera, but also the knowledge that the film is 
made by autonomous machinery, and that each screening is also a re-
enactment of the process of production, gives it a strong sense of autonomy. 
The most powerful relationship in the film is the one of the camera to the centre 
around which it revolves. The viewer feels the way they are being displaced 
from the seemingly closed system of the film that seems to do very well on its 
own. There is an emphatic lack of the kind of merging of the camera’s and the 
subject’s points of view that is common in the narrative film. In this sense, the 
experience of the film described by Thierry de Duve offers a seminal reflection 
on La Région Centrale’s autonomy:
The camera never reaches out into the landscape, it pulls the landscape 
towards the center. It is astonishing, especially in those sequences 
where the camera moves at high speed, because the body sensations 
that one would expect to see induced by such camera movements (as in 
I-Max entertainment movies) should be those of centrifugal forces. And 
there is no phenomenological accounting for that effect, save for this 
strangest hypothesis: I do not identify with the camera. I am here, no 
doubt, in the center, there where the eye of the camera is, but my body 
is not, and thus, that’s not me, here. I don’t feel it’s me. The sensation I 
get is one of kinesthetic sensory deprivation.115
 Michael Snow, ‘Converging on La Région Centrale: Michael Snow in Conversation with 114
Charlotte Townsend’, in The Michael Snow Project: The Collected Writings of Michael Snow, 
edited by Michael Snow and Louise Dompierre (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010 [1971]), 
p. 60.
 Thierry de Duve, ‘Michael Snow: The Deictics of Experience, and Beyond’, Parachute 78 115
(April–June 1995): 28–41, p. 32.
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The sense of the film’s autonomy accrues with sufficient strength to push the 
spectator out of her traditional place established by mainstream cinema, and to 
force her to renegotiate the experience of watching. But this kind of de-
centering is also irreducible to indifference or complete exclusion of the viewer. 
Rather, it produces a feedback loop between the viewer and the film, a 
continuous de-centering and displacement of their positions.
Experimental film thus brings several important considerations to the 
discussion of procedural films. First, affect resides in ‘space-time’, rather just in 
‘space’; it unfolds temporally, as a self-reflective process, a feedback loop 
between the viewer's perception and the film’s autonomy. Second, the technical 
procedure can be seen in light of its posthumanist performativity and production 
of affect. Finally, procedural films, like structural films, can become an engine 
for unmaking of the perceptual processes involved in watching a film, which 
opens a potential discussion of political aesthetics of procedural film. 
Liveness
But while agency cannot be simply ‘assigned’ and stay with one party or 
another, there is still a matter of perceiving the performativity and autonomy of 
code as having agency, as one can while watching La Région Centrale. In this 
section I address liveness in procedural films as a specific effect of autonomy. 
Liveness is understood as the sensation that occurs when the film’s autonomy 
is perceived, both subconsciously (simply as a reaction to animated movement) 
and rationally (as imagination of something as having agential qualities). These 
ideas of liveness are underwritten by existing apparatuses, cultural logics and 
imaginaries.  I will outline several techno-cultural logics—of database, of live 116
mediation and simulation—and analyse how they affect the procedural space-
time. This also introduces the way in which these topics will later be discussed 
as affective-epistemic encounter in the two case studies in my practice. 
It is important to consider here, I argue, that even in the approaches to 
generative film where autonomy is seen as a given condition or is not 
articulated, the artists or programmers still operate under the cultural 
 For a similar investigation, see Dejan Grba, ‘Avoid Setup: Insights and Implications of 116
Generative Cinema’, Technoetic Arts 15, no. 3 (2017): 247–60.
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imaginaries of autonomous technology, machines and artificial intelligence that 
are at work within the ideological paradigms of techno-science. The positing of 
the machine as autonomous creates a sort of a darkened area in which various 
agencies, fictional or real, have to be identified. The imagination of the 
autonomous machine itself becomes one of the hidden conditions of knowledge 
in these models, along with the power relations built into the apparatus.  Ideas 117
of autonomous moving image agents have themselves existed in very different 
paradigms, from military simulations to artificial life and contemporary 
entertainment, and they bring their own conceptions of autonomy along. While 
these debates fall well beyond the scope of the current project, the ways in 
which they create aesthetic paradigms that have influenced the practices of 
artists working with procedural and generative processes are important. In this 
regard, the renegotiation of agency happens not only for the viewer, but also for 
the artist in the very process of production. While in the most basic sense the 
real-world agency still lies with the human operator (and to the degree that they 
choose to establish it in regards to the autonomy of the programme), the sense 
of perceiving entities in a film as autonomous, remains to be investigated.
The first case I would like to consider is the cultural logic of the database. 
Database cinema refers to the works which establish a dataset, a library of 
singular units (for example, video clips) and recombine them under a particular 
rule-set. It can be seen as a generative montage that treats the film as an 
actionable database rather than a stable sequence of images. For the early 
cinematic expressions of this, one could refer to the cut-up method, which was 
originally formulated by Tristan Tzara in 1920,  and which Brion Gysin later re-118
 For further elaboration, see Broeckmann, Machine Art in the Twentieth Century.117
 TO MAKE A DADAIST POEM118
Take a newspaper.
Take some scissors.
Choose from this paper an article of the length you want to make your poem.
Cut out the article.
Next carefully cut out each of the words that makes up this article and put them all in a bag.
Shake gently.
Next take out each cutting one after the other.
Copy conscientiously in the order in which they left the bag.
The poem will resemble you.
And there you are—an infinitely original author of charming sensibility, even though 
unappreciated by the vulgar herd.
— Tzara, Seven Dada Manifestos and Lampisteries, p. 39.
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discovered and applied to film-making with William Burroughs and Anthony 
Balch. This resulted in The Cut-Ups (1966)—a film made by dividing edited 
footage in four rolls of equal length, and then re-assembling one-foot-long 
sections of each roll consecutively one after another.  Contemporary 119
examples include manually assembled supercut films such as Christian 
Marclay’s Telephones (1995) and The Clock (2010). Procedural projects based 
on the database principle vary in approach. Here one could refer to the 
interactive hypermedia system Aspen Movie Map (1978) developed at MIT; Lev 
Manovich’s Soft Cinema and its three instalments, Texas (2002), Mission to 
Earth (2003–4) and Absences (2004), which, I would argue, exemplify the 
approach to database cinema, as well as Sam Lavigne’s algorithmic Videogrep 
(2014), a Python script that assembles supercut films based on a keyword. 
What these works have in common is a certain montage sensibility, where 
recombination of existing materials amounts to the production of new 
experiences. Manovich outlines in the description of Absences that this work 
ensued from the assumption that ‘meaning and narrative coherence can be 
created through associative chains’, and that these chains respond to ‘visual 
properties of images’.  The action of assembling activates the database as 120
procedural, as meaning-making. 
Another logic of liveness could be located in live mediation. Works treating 
computer graphics as live materialist artefacts can be identified from as early as 
in the 1950, when Ben Laposki started to create the oscilloscope works (even 
though they exist as photographs). Woody Vasulka and Brian O’Reilly’s Scan 
Processor Studies (1978) and other works using analogue video feedback offer 
interpretations of generative aspect as mediation, or a translation of one kind of 
process into another. The procedural aspect in case of their practice is primarily 
 The Cut-Ups was made out of footage for an unrealised documentary on Burroughs, Guerilla 119
Conditions, that Balch shot between 1961 and 1963. The footage was conventionally edited, 
and then cut up in four equal-length rolls, which were given to an editor to re-assemble, using 
foot-long sections from each of the four rolls consecutively. As Balch puts it, ‘the actual 
chopping was done by a lady who was employed to take a foot from each roll and join them up. 
A purely mechanical thing, nobody was exercising any artistic judgement at all’ (See Balch, 
‘Interview with Anthony Balch’. Cinema Rising 1 (April 1972): 12). The soundtrack of the film 
equally consists of several phrases (the most repeated ones include ‘Yes’, ‘Hello’, ‘Look at that 
picture’, ‘Does it seem to be persisting?’), which were repeated in different intonations during 
the initially twenty-minute long film, which was later cut to twelve minutes, as the staff at the 
Cinephone Academy Moviehouse, where it was showing five times a day, could not bear it.
 Lev Manovich and Andreas Kratky, Soft Cinema: Navigating the Database (MIT Press, 120
2005).
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materialist, relying on the immediacy of electromagnetic response. Live coding 
artists such as Joanne Armitage, Alex McLean and Adrian Ward are known for 
the audiovisual performative events in which they also often project the process 
of their working on the screen, opening the black box to the viewer, supporting 
the visual with the self-reflective process. However, the live works face the 
same representational dilemma as any performance work, essentially bound to 
existence as only live processes or as documentation that cannot reproduce the 
original experience. As any generative method can be used in the production of 
the work and then recorded, it is not necessarily a part of the live rendering of 
the work if it is not distributed as an actionable software. This is particularly 
important for the considerations of the ‘liveness’ of the work. In this case, 
machinima films that are made in game engines or simply recorded in-game 
become an interesting reference for the procedural process. Essentially, one 
could argue that the generative aspect of the in-game world is employed as a 
kind of performance which is recorded, not dissimilar to a theatrical staging.
Finally, the logic of the simulation process owes to the scientific domains 
from which the instruments and models are borrowed. Artificial life simulators 
and evolutionary algorithms were appropriated by artists such as Jane Prophet, 
Karl Sims and William Latham in the late 1980s and 1990s in order to create 
biologically-inspired environments. As liveness in the simulation apparatus will 
be explored in detail in Chapter 5, I will limit its discussion here to a brief 
mention. Among the current artists, the practices of Lawrence Lek and Ian 
Cheng (whose work I will address in the final chapter) offer an interesting 
interpretation of simulation through game engines. While Ian Cheng calls his 
works ‘live simulations’ and programs them in order to achieve a fully simulated 
environment that develops by its own rules, Lawrence Lek utilises the game 
engine in order to create site-specific simulations of locations, which are then 
often recorded and shown as non-procedural films.
Notes on De-centering Artistic Methodology
The renegotiation of the role of technology also influences my artistic research 
methods and ways of working. In the process of developing and questioning 
procedural films I have been inspired by the posthumanist idea of de-centering 
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the role of the researcher, in the sense of critical posthumanism represented by 
work of Rosi Braidotti. In her book The Posthuman, Braidotti shows that 
traditionally the humanities operated with the Vitruvian ideal of Man at its centre, 
and thus were organised in an unfairly anthropocentric manner that resulted in 
exclusion of ‘others’—starting from non-Europeans and women to non-human 
animals. She also points out that where the traditional nature-culture divide has 
collapsed, replaced by the ‘complex systems of data-feedback, interaction and 
communication transfer’,  a new renegotiation of relations between nature and 121
culture becomes necessary. She suggests that
technologically mediated post-anthropocentrism can enlist the resources 
of bio-genetic codes, as well as telecommunication, new media and 
information technologies, to the task of renewing Humanities. 
Posthuman subjectivity reshapes the identity of humanistic practices, by 
stressing heteronomy and multi-faceted relationality, instead of 
autonomy and self-referential disciplinary purity.  122
The posthumanist approach to theory, therefore, also introduces a 
reconfiguration of the traditional apparatus of research. The necessary 
guidelines for thinking posthuman theory are then ‘cartographic accuracy, with 
the corollary of ethical accountability; trans-disciplinarity; the importance of 
combining critique with creative configurations; the principle of non-linearity; the 
powers of memory and the imagination and the strategy of defamiliarization’.  123
Following these parameters, I suggest posthumanist de-centering as a multi-
scalar process that operates in different ways in my practice. 
First of all, it is de-centering of the dominant position of the human and the 
artist in relation to technology, as I hope is clear from the discussion of affect 
throughout the chapter. Secondly, it is also de-centering of the affective kind as 
a viewer of other procedural films. And of course, it is de-centering of other 
kinds—a situated knowledge of being a foreigner in the UK and being a woman, 
both of which can contribute to keenly felt cultural and discursive displacement. 
In this section I will articulate how technical and affective de-centering works in 
 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), p. 145.121
 Ibid., p. 145.122
 Ibid., p. 163.123
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terms of practical aspects of making art, and what it means in the ethical sense, 
for my position as an artist-researcher. 
In my practice I see art primarily as a method of knowledge construction. 
That means questioning the technical mediation, the language, the 
epistemological framework in which the experience of the work takes place, the 
new epistemologies that it creates, and the affective space. In other words, art 
practice is not only tasked with the creation of knowledge systems, but also with 
unpacking what kind of other systems the experience of the work activates in its 
turn, and what the conditions of producing these systems are. Both affect and 
the aesthetic space are plugged into this goal, suggesting the ways of 
experiencing, living, sensing or comprehending these epistemological 
questions. Because of that, the production of a local encounter for each viewer, 
and the production of knowledge, as in structural-materialist approaches, 
becomes a priority, as well as the autonomous existence of the work. 
Another aspect of de-centering that I would like to address is multi-modality 
as a method in my practice. Both of the two sets of works that are included in 
the project, Chronic Film and Non-Player Character, exist in multiple formats. 
Chronic Film exists as an algorithm, as a four-channel installation and as a 
lecture-performance. Non-Player Character exists, thus far, in two modes. The 
first one is a gallery work: a generative film that is meant to be contemplated. 
The second is a performative part in an ongoing series of lecture-performances.
In this project, I chose to take on the ideas of screensaver and game engine 
as two main case studies. While this research could have been done with only 
one of the case studies in mind, I argue that juxtaposing them in a kind of multi-
modality similar to that which my works exploit produces de-centering on a 
larger level, one that allows the work to be perceived in the way intended and in 
the context of development of my practice. The investigations of both case 
studies offer entry points into the two sets of layered apparatuses. However, it 
was only by following these two sets through one after another that I could 
explore the processes of labour, design and human experience in the larger 
critical posthumanist framework, and only through having them next to each 
other that one can see that the processes of both control and emergence are at 
play in the algorithmic processing. Where screensaver is seen as a more 
marginal case of procedural film, game engine represents a leading paradigm, 
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as more and more artists adopt it as a method for making simulated audiovisual 
environments. In a sense, the sequence of the two case studies also 
documents a transition, from the purely filmic practice that I pursued at the 
beginning of my research, towards more collaborative media art practices that 
include advanced algorithmic techniques into the context of film. For this 
reason, the procedural film practices presented in the two artistic bodies of work 
in this project are not purely or solely generative; rather, they combine, 
juxtapose and situate the procedural elements through other practices.
Collaboration in my practice is seen as part of de-centering. While in film, 
collaboration of a film-maker with the sound artist or composer is often seen as 
a given, a collaboration of artists with programmers is a more contested subject. 
While complete technical mastery of the apparatus is a big advantage, hybrid 
practices such as mine present a certain difficulty. In my practice, working in 
collaboration with programmers on the code was a part of a learning and 
discovering process in this project. When I started working on Chronic Film, for 
example, it quickly became clear that the task imposed mathematical and 
conceptual difficulties that went far beyond my skillset. The collaboration 
process then was not only a necessary part of the work, but also a valuable 
experience, in which the necessity to bring into the theoretical discussions such 
aspects as media literacy and approaches to media art became evident.
In this chapter I have addressed the construction of affect in procedural films 
through the lenses of autonomy and agency. I have outlined the considerations 
on the affective space-time of procedural films. Referring to practices of media 
art and experimental film, I have drawn a tentative genealogy of autonomy in 
moving image, and addressed how technical apparatuses might carry different 
logics of liveness. Finally, I have considered de-centering as an artistic method 
in my own practice.
The posthumanist consideration of algorithmic affect shows that autonomy 
becomes an important aspect of the film experience. However, concentrating 
solely on autonomy as a part of the viewer’s experience risks a return to the 
anthropomorphic or mythological view of the technical artefact. In order to 
consider the questions of power relations and algorithmic control, the 
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algorithmic construction of affect cannot be seen as separate from 
infrastructural networks. Therefore, a transversal discussion of the sociopolitical 
construction of algorithmic autonomy and affect becomes necessary. This will 
be the focus of the next chapter. 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Chapter 3
Political Aesthetics of Algorithmic Superstructuring
If procedural films can be seen as part of a vast economy of images and affects, 
it is important to acknowledge the proprietary nature of the procedures that 
constitute it, built into the regimes of standardisation and control. The 
‘materiality of networks and equipment is part and parcel of the media art 
history movement’,  and economic and political structures constitute an 124
important part of the affective space-time of procedural films. Therefore, the 
apparatus of procedural film is viewed as intrinsically enmeshed with questions 
of political economy and algorithmic governance. The difficulty of connecting 
information technology infrastructures and their modes of performance, and 
their networked and distributed affect, requires a transversal approach, which I 
will investigate in this chapter through the concept of ‘algorithmic 
superstructuring’, developed as a part of my curatorial project for a media art 
festival.
Media art has traditionally responded to questions of algorithmic governance 
by opening the ‘black box’ of technology, by revealing the power structures 
inside the machine, be it explicitly or implicitly, through hacking, commentary, 
speculative narratives, glitching and other methods. In the current moment it 
seems that such blackboxing takes on more menacing forms, as algorithms are 
increasingly used for decision-making and analytic in a variety of fields, while 
remaining proprietary and, therefore, opaque. This is reflected in the 
investigations of algorithmic governance, or even ‘algocracy’,  characterised 125
by the unprecedented consolidation of access to big data and to proprietary 
algorithmic solutions in the hands of various state and corporate bodies.  126
Zeynep Tufekci identifies the main dangers of algorithmic governance as ‘lack 
 Cubitt and Thomas, ‘Introduction: The New Materialism in Media Art History’, p. 62.124
 See A. Aneesh, Virtual Migration: The Programming of Globalization (Duke University Press, 125
2006); A. Aneesh, ‘Global Labor: Algocratic Modes of Organization’, Sociological Theory 27.4 
(2009): 347–370; John Danaher, ‘The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and 
Accommodation’, Philosophy & Technology 29. 3 (2016): 245–268.
 See John Danaher, et al., ‘Algorithmic Governance: Developing a Research Agenda through 126
the Power of Collective Intelligence’, Big Data & Society 2 (2017) for comprehensive outlines of 
the stakes and challenges of algorithmic governance.
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of transparency, information asymmetry and hidden influence.’  The shift to 127
focus on the ‘algorithmic’ from ‘software’ has been also reflected in media 
studies.  128
Drawing on contemporary media art practices and on studies of visual and 
algorithmic cultures, I would like to develop the idea of algorithmic 
superstructuring as a reading of aesthetic regimes of algorithmic governance, 
their procedural affect, conditions of labour and design. First, drawing on the 
work of Jacques Rancière, I will consider the political aesthetics of algorithmic 
autonomy and suggest how algorithmic superstructuring can be seen as 
distribution of the sensible. Second, I will draw on media art works in order to 
situate the processes of algorithmic superstructuring as localised in media art, 
labour, in blackboxing and imaginaries of technology. Finally, I will consider how 
interfaces and ‘persistence of vision’ affect algorithmic superstructuring as a 
larger condition and as an aesthetic regime of algorithmic governance.
Distribution of the Sensible
In this chapter I will be drawing on my curatorial practice. While the previous 
chapter focused on the affective space-time between the film and its viewer, as 
well as between the artist and the work, the current chapter addresses wider 
networks and infrastructures of algorithmic affect. I will articulate the socio-
political field of procedural films and other media art practices. Furthermore, I 
will further elaborate the position of spectator, the political space and public 
narratives of media art, drawing on the experience and knowledge produced by 
curating a festival.
 Zeynep Tufekci, ‘Algorithmic Harms beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent Challenges of 127
Computational Agency’, Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law 13 (2015), p. 
207.
 In the last two decades, theories of media have adapted to the emergence and proliferation 128
of algorithmic processing. Some of the pivotal discussions in this sense are represented by 
software and new media analysis by Lev Manovich, and the critical studies of software by 
Matthew Fuller and Alexander Galloway (see Manovich, The Language of New Media; Fuller, 
Behind the Blip; Galloway, Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture). Due to the challenges that 
have been brought on by advanced data processing techniques such as machine learning, data 
mining and predictive analysis, the algorithmic itself, seen as a concatenation of design, 
economic, cultural and political concerns, has become the focus. Further mapping of the term 
can be found in Tarleton Gillespie, ‘The Relevance of Algorithms’, in Media Technologies: 
Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society, edited by Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo 
Boczkowski and Kirsten Foot (pp. 167–194) (MIT Press, 2014) and Ted Striphas, ‘Algorithmic 
Culture’, European Journal of Cultural Studies 18, no. 4-5 (2015): 395–412. 
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I see curatorial work as a form of practice research. This means that a 
curatorial project is not simply a presentation for completed research, but rather, 
in the words of Simon Sheikh, a space for enacting research. As he notes, 
‘research is here not only that which comes before realisation but also that 
which is realised throughout actualisation’—a statement that is also true for 
artistic research.  The festival format, which includes exhibitions, screenings, 129
public discussions, workshops and other modes of engagement, is especially 
suitable for creating spaces of productive questioning. The curatorial concept, 
Algorithmic Superstructures, was developed as a theme for IMPAKT media art 
festival by Yasemin Keskintepe, Luba Elliott and I. It took place in Utrecht, 
Netherlands, in October 2018. Algorithmic Superstructures in its initial iteration 
was aimed at investigating widely, through artistic, theoretical and design 
approaches, the epistemic and affective shifts brought on by algorithmic 
processing, as well as disrupting the techno-positivist narratives of progress. 
The idea of algorithmic superstructures appeared as an attempt to question the 
ways in which the traditional systems of politics, media, labour and art are being 
overlaid and displaced by new algorithmic frameworks, interfaces and protocols, 
installed under the techno-capitalist drive for quantifying, consolidating and 
regulating human experience. Referring specifically to these processes of 
displacement, we imagined algorithmic superstructures as pervasive, 
expansive, open vectors of algorithmic processing and logic that flourish under 
the auspices of the attention economy, where codes, images, software and 
protocols serve as primary mediators in the networks of the commercialisation, 
capture and circulation of affect. The spaces of knowledge and affect production 
that are created within algorithmic culture were the primary focus of our festival 
concept. 
In line with this thinking, we likened the space of the festival to an interface, 
where human participants could engage with algorithmic frameworks through 
encounters with techno-cultural artefacts, artworks, games and public 
discussion. Considering the festival space as a critical interface, it could be 
seen in the light of descriptions of critical software suggested by Matthew Fuller
—as speculative software ‘that creates transversal connections between data, 
 Simon Sheikh, ‘Curating and Research: An Uneasy Alliance’, in Curatorial Challenges: 129
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Contemporary Curating, edited by Malene Vest Hansen, Anne 
Folke Henningsen, Anne Gregersen (Routledge, 2019), p. 102.
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machines, and networks’.  The ‘enormous spread of economies, systems of 130
representation, of distribution, hiding, showing, and influence as they mesh with 
other systems of circulation, of life, ecology, resources’  can be mapped with 131
the help of the statistical abstractions of the lived processes, ‘blips’, behind 
which the real politics are located. Following the transversal computational 
logics built around (and continuously building) such blips means exploring the 
superstructuring qualities of algorithms—processes that cannot be regarded as 
solely computational or solely human precisely because of the enmeshing of 
lived experience and technical artefacts in them. For this reason, for the festival 
we also commissioned projects that explored that ‘enmeshing’ in different ways. 
These included the all-female collective Keiken’s lecture-performance, which, 
by mixing various modes of speech, from millennial social media slang to 
academic diction, bypassed the interpretative structures of these modes; a live-
action role play (LARP) commissioned from the Omsk Social Club that created 
virtual alliances among the visitors of the festival; and a geolocation-based 
resource-trading game by the Patternist collective that was adapted for the 
urban space of Utrecht and created further possibilities for the visitors to explore 
the infrastructural space. 
The reason for engaging the festival concept here is, therefore, that it 
presents the possibility of looking at the processes of algorithmic 
superstructuring (now used exclusively as a verb) as transversal lines 
connecting procedurality to the ideas of labour, design, political aesthetics of 
media art, visibility and algorithmic autonomy within infrastructures—all of which 
extend and question the previous investigations of procedurality. The question 
of how algorithmic autonomy operates within structures of control, and if it can 
be seen as a tactic of resistance, or artistic appropriation, becomes central. In 
the course of the festival and its many public discussions and conversations 
with artists, it seemed that there was a particular ambiguity where artistic 
fascination with the inhuman nature of algorithmic reasoning intermingled with 
the inhumanity of rationality (and autonomy) clearly seen in the proprietary 
structures of algorithmic governance. These two kinds of inhumanity seemed to 
 Matthew Fuller, Behind the Blip, p. 30.130
 Ibid.131
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be at times confused, equated, or intentionally interchanged. In this section I 
discuss autonomy and inhumanity as connected but different concepts.
The superstructuring in algorithmic superstructuring takes on a different 
meaning from that in the original Marxist debate about determining base and 
determined superstructure. In the transition, as Raymond Williams puts it, ‘from 
Marx to Marxism’, the economic base has been often interpreted as determining 
the political and legal (later also ideological and cultural) superstructure.  The 132
strict economically reductionist approach was already criticised by Engels in a 
letter to Joseph Bloch in 1890,  and many theorists argued for a more 133
nuanced reading of the interrelation of base and superstructure. Williams in his 
insightful analysis suggests that instead of a rigid, static understanding of base 
and superstructure, there needs to be a ‘more active idea of a field of mutually if 
also unevenly determining forces’.  Alex Callinicos suggests that the forces 134
and relations of production merely set limits to the “superstructure” rather than 
determine it.  135
Similarly, the use of superstructuring in this chapter is not aimed at 
representing algorithms as a rigid superstructure, but rather at investigating 
them as enmeshed and dynamic processes, and discovering their potential 
affective and cognitive agency in governing structures, as well as the resulting 
aesthetic configurations. This needs to be seen in the light of a set of 
amendments to base and superstructure, suggested by Raymonds:
We have to revalue ‘determination’ towards the setting of limits and the 
exertion of pressure, and away from a predicted, prefigured and 
controlled content. We have to revalue ‘superstructure’ towards a related 
range of cultural practices, and away from a reflected, reproduced or 
specifically dependent content. And, crucially, we have to revalue ‘the 
base’ away from the notion of a fixed economic or technological 
 Raymond Williams, ‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’, New Left Review, 132
I/82, November-December 1973: 3–16.
 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence (Moscow: Foreign Languages 133
Publishing House, 1956), p. 498.
 Raymond Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays (London: Verso 134
Editions and NLB, 1980), pp. 36–37.
 Alex Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx (London and Sydney: Bookmarks 135
Publications, 1983), p. 97.
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abstraction, and towards the specific activities of men in real social and 
economic relationships, containing fundamental contradictions and 
variations and therefore always in a state of dynamic process.  136
In the current context, therefore, ‘base’ can be described as economic 
motivations of those who produce algorithmic models, services and scripts, and 
‘algorithmic superstructuring’ - as a complex techno-cultural process of 
procedural remediation  of lived practices and experiences through 137
algorithms, in which the differences, relations, borders and limits of the human 
and non-human participants are renegotiated. Remediation here is meant in the 
light of Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska’s critique of Jay David Bolter and 
Richard Grusin’s treatment of remediation as human-centric. Instead, they 
suggest looking at it, in line with new materialist suggestions, as a space of 
renegotiating the ideas of singular human agency: ‘It is not simply the case that 
“we”—that is, autonomously existing humans—live in a complex technological 
environment that we can manage, control, and use. Rather, we are—physically 
and hence ontologically—part of that technological environment, and it makes 
no more sense to talk of us using it, than it does of it using us’.138
Theorists of digital culture have often had recourse to Rancière’s formulation 
of the distribution of the sensible to describe the regulatory function of 
computational processes in the acts of concealing and revealing.  In this 139
sense algorithms, software, protocols and interfaces can be seen as politico-
aesthetic regulators, in Rancière’s sense of such phenomena serving the 
function of ‘delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of 
speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of 
politics as a form of experience’.  Where the distribution of the sensible 140
‘reveals who can have a share in what is common to the community based on 
 Raymond Williams, ‘Base and Superstructure’, p. 6.136
 See Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska, Life After New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process 137
(MIT Press, 2012); David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media 
(MIT Press, 2000).
 Kember and Zylinska, Life After New Media, p. 13.138
  Hito Steyerl, ‘Proxy Politics: Signal and Noise’, E-Flux 60 December (2014); Michael Dieter, 139
‘The Virtues of Critical Technical Practice’, Differences 25.1 (2014), p. 222.
 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018 [2003]), p. 8.140
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what they do and on the time and space in which this activity is performed’,  141
algorithmic superstructuring also establishes modes of being, sensing and 
acting. 
In Rancière’s account, the scope of the ‘aesthetic’ is not confined to 
questions such as the status of the art object, but rather pertains to the general 
field of life and its sensible forms and practices. Seen in this light, aesthetics 
under algorithmic governance refers to the visible and sensible aspects of 
cognitive production and movement of affect. As Michael Dieter notes, ‘the 
alteration of sense and perception in CTP [critical technical practice] speaks to 
the classic meaning of aisthesis, but now explicitly defined by sociotechnical 
events’,  where aisthesis is meant as perception through the senses. In this 142
sense Rancière’s argument for the distribution of the sensible directly aligns 
with the vectoral character of algorithmic governance. Algorithms produce 
meaningful and affective aspects of life, often guided by the vectors of 
algorithmic governance. As algorithmic infrastructures underlie the conditions 
for working, learning, consuming and creating, algorithmic superstructuring re-
distributes the sensible aspects through its interfaces, analytical modes and 
choices. 
Furthermore, it also suggests a different role for the critical function of art. 
Traditionally, Rancière notes, it aimed ‘to build awareness of the mechanisms of 
domination to turn the spectator into a conscious agent of world 
transformation’.  Instead, he proposes an aesthetic regime of art. As Suhail 143
Malik and Andrea Phillips summarise, Rancière’s aesthetics-art 
shifts the focus of an analysis of art's politics away from its internal or 
socially-driven claims towards its structural capacity to instantiate a 
politics, effecting a different relation with the spectator of art than 
historical models of critical art. The free play between poiesis and 
aisthesis in aesthetics-art sustains a ‘tension’ between, on the one hand, 
a logic that maintains the separation of art from other kinds of sensory 
experience—all the more to have political effectivity through its 
autonomy from the domination of life by capitalism and so on—and, on 
 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, p. 8.141
 Michael Dieter, ‘The Virtues of Critical Technical Practice’, p. 220.142
 Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents (Polity, 2009), p.45.143
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the other hand, a logic that pushes art towards ‘life’ in which it becomes 
fully integrated as an effective and direct form of activity.144
If one applies Rancière’s call for aesthetics to serve ‘the invention of the 
sensible forms of the life to come’,  the ethical task of the media artist seems 145
to be located precisely in uncovering and re-inventing forms of experience 
produced by technical media. Procedural film in this sense is just one of such 
forms.
The key capacity of algorithmic superstructuring to circumvent modern 
modes of organisation and install its own logic can be seen as an ability to 
affect the very conditions of knowledge production. Where the value chain and 
information distribution are controlled, the communication space is also 
reorganised accordingly. Tarleton Gillespie argues that the algorithm has 
become ‘a key logic governing the flows of information’.  Algorithmic 146
superstructuring has to be seen as a materialist reorganisation of economic or 
other structures that also affects meaning itself. While interfaces participate in 
the distribution of the sensible in the most direct way by offering and limiting 
choices of action of the user, it is the invisible algorithmic processes and power 
formations that affect the conditions of meaning-making. It is in this sense that 
Ganaele Langlois argues for the shift towards understanding meaning not only 
as a human process, but as ‘one that is increasingly dependent on media 
technologies’.  In her investigation of social media algorithms, she finds that 147
software contributes to meaning-making as ‘a semiotechnology in charge of 
producing both meaning and the conditions for the experience of 
meaningfulness’.148
By aligning the investigation of procedural films with ‘algorithmic 
superstructuring, new understandings of algorithmic autonomy come to light. 
While previously the temporality of algorithms was considered within the 
 Suhail Malik and Andrea Phillips, ‘The Wrong of Contemporary Art: Aesthetics and Political 144
Indeterminacy’ in Reading Ranciere: Critical Dissensus, edited by Paul Bowman and Richard 
Stamp (pp. 111–129) (Continuum Books, 2011), p. 113. Also see Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics 
and Its Discontents, p. 46.
 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, p. 24.145
 Gillespie, ‘The Relevance of Algorithms’, p. 167.146
 Ganaele Langlois, Meaning in the Age of Social Media (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 5.147
 Ibid., p. 19.148
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localised encounter of a viewer with an artwork, in algorithmic superstructuring 
temporality presents itself as a necessary part of enacting control through 
algorithms. The distribution of the sensible involves an active algorithmic 
renegotiation of pre-cognitive aspects of ‘sensible’, meaning those that occur 
either outside the scale of human cognition and senses (such as high-frequency 
trading), or pass below the threshold of user’s media literacy (such as interface 
elements). Parisi suggests, in the essay ‘Reprogramming Decisionism’, that 
with the incursion of algorithmic automation into decision-making processes, it 
becomes possible to speak of a kind of ‘technological decisionism, which values 
making a clear decision quickly more than it does making the correct one’.  149
She posits algorithmic processing, following N. Katherine Hayles, as a 
‘nonconscious form of cognition, solving complex problems without using formal 
languages or deductive inference’,  as well as working at scales and speeds 150
inaccessible to human perception.
The ‘autonomy’ within algorithmic superstructuring, therefore, can be 
attributed to the technical impossibility of tracing the entirety of micro-decisions 
that went into building a specific algorithmic model—similar to the discussion of 
autonomy in the discussion of affective space-time in procedural films. 
However, and more importantly, it must be considered from the point of virtual 
opacity of such models as they enter the areas of decision-making, often 
staying within the proprietary copyright of their owners. While there has been a 
noticeable increase in recent initiatives for ethical guidelines and legislation 
surrounding the use of datasets,  in the current moment such models are 151
freely built into the processes of analysing experience and channelling affect.
The participation of ‘proprietary’ inhumanity in the algorithmic distribution of 
the sensible can be clearly seen in how it is organised around the axis of the 
commodification of experience. The process of data commodification runs 
  Luciana Parisi, ‘Reprogramming Decisionism’, E-Flux, no. 85 (October 2017), para. 2.149
  Ibid., section ‘Learning to Think’, para. 5.150
 For example, the Institute for Ethical AI & Machine Learning in UK (opened in 2018), the 151
Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative launched by MIT Media Lab and the 
Harvard Berkman-Klein Center in 2018, and the European AI Alliance (2019). This is not to 
exclude earlier work accomplished in this direction, or a wide range of open systems that are 
community-run (such as Women in AI or Platform Cooperativism Consortium), but to underline a 
recent surge in the wider acknowledgement of necessity for ethical regulation of algorithmic 
processing.
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parallel to the commodification of affect and the design of user experience. 
Following the vector of algorithmic superstructuring from the initial economic 
motivation to the design and implementation of algorithms, it becomes possible 
to see how the design of user experience perpetuates the automation of various 
cultural operations through software abstraction. This can be seen in platforms 
such as Netflix, as well as other services using recommendation algorithms. In 
this sense, the dangerous aspect of algorithmic superstructuring lies not only in 
its pervasiveness, but in the loop of commodification of experience and affect 
that it enables; a procedural automation of cultural choices. Where data 
collection participates in infinitely updating feedback loops, it guarantees 
continuous commodification: as data analysis turns human choices, experience 
and attention into rationalised models, these models, in their turn, create more 
and more refined and precise definitions of what kind of experience is 
marketable. As Brian Massumi notes, ‘the ability of affect to produce an 
economic effect more swiftly and surely than economics itself means that affect 
is a real condition, an intrinsic variable of the late capitalist system, as 
infrastructural as a factory.  The affective capacities of algorithmic procedures 152
are therefore embedded in the software regime of abstractions.
The potential for algorithmic inhumanity remains, however, that it can also 
become an exit towards other models of distribution of the sensible. In ‘The 
Incomputable and Instrumental Possibility’, Antonia Majaca and Parisi draw on 
Judith Butler’s writing to suggest a possibility of feminist re-claiming of machinic 
instrumentality.  They suggest that machine logic, primarily seen as a part of a 153
‘paranoid techno-industrial apparatus’ relying on collecting and flattening data 
as predictive models, could be also reclaimed on its own terms, as an alien 
logic that embraces its own instrumentality and repurposes it for its own ends, 
potentially disrupting the white-male concept of humanness as a whole.  154
While this suggestion is speculative in nature, it offers a way to acknowledge 
that the ‘proprietary’ inhumanity of algorithmic superstructuring does not 
exclude the possibilities for other kinds of inhumanity, built in different ways and 
 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, p. 45.152
 Antonia Majaca and Luciana Parisi, ‘The Incomputable and Instrumental Possibility’, E-Flux 153
77, Nov. (2016).
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experienced in different ways. The inhuman scales of technical infrastructures 
introduce affective and cognitive renegotiation of human experience.
Alternative Superstructuring 
Could the artistic appropriation and remaking of the proprietary algorithmic 
models constitute alternative forms of algorithmic superstructuring? In order to 
look at algorithmic superstructuring through the inquiry of artistic practice, I will 
draw on several projects from the festival, selected for exhibition by Yasemin 
Keskintepe. These projects, in particular, engage with the question of 
procedural algorithmic techniques, deployed in order to question existing 
techno-cultural configurations. The work of Constant Dullaart, The European 
Classes, Euronet (2017), developed in collaboration with Adam Harvey, uses 
convolutional neural networks that recognise objects within images in order to 
create an image dataset. The artists retrained the networks on ‘European 
artefacts’ in order to investigate how European cultural output can be presented 
in a dataset, and how the network can classify something as European.  The 155
152 classes for image recognition ranged from common – ‘guitar’, ‘beret’ – to 
more specific: ‘Hagelslag’, ‘Chancellor Angela Merkel’. The neural networks, 
essentially tasked with the question of European identity, are solving the 
technical question of semantic segmentation – what parts of the images are 
recognised as a particular descriptor, and what images can be reconstructed 
from these correlational links. Highlighting how algorithmic automation can enter 
the areas that have been considered a cultural domain, this work also 
reconstructs the capacity of machine learning to produce meaning, referring to 
the cases in which machine learning techniques, when applied to existing 
datasets, produced sample bias, in that they uncovered pre-existing bias in the 
set itself.
Anna Ridler’s video Mosaic Virus (2018) was developed during the EMAP 
residency at the festival. It draws a parallel between ‘Tulip Mania’, the economic 
bubble that witnessed an extraordinary inflation of prices for tulip bulbs in the 
Netherlands and Europe in the 1630s, and the current moment of crypto-
currencies. The video continuously generates, through a neural network, an 
 See description and documentation on the work’s website, ImageNet.xyz.155
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image of a tulip, mimicking the prototypical Dutch still life. The number of stripes 
on the tulip, which in the seventeenth century would have signified its value, is 
in Ridler’s work linked to the fluctuation of the value of bitcoin. One could 
suggest that Mosaic Virus does not so much provide commentary on crypto-
currencies as ironically re-position media art within the discussion of value 
formation of the more traditional forms of art. 
Both of these works can be interpreted in the tradition of ‘blackboxing’ as 
revealing of the algorithmic thinking behind the machine and ‘highlighting’ its 
inhumanity. They also, however, have the capacity to underline processes of 
labour and alienation hidden behind the procedures of machine learning. While 
the common perception of neural networks is still largely perceived as 
‘computers doing all the work’, there is a significant amount of human labour 
involved in the annotation of images. In the case of Ridler it was made 
especially visible since the ten thousand photographs in the dataset were taken 
by the artist herself, categorised manually and exhibited as additional work, 
Myriad (Tulips). In Dullaart’s work, some of the classes could be defined using 
semi-automatic image scrapers, and for some of the classes the bounding 
boxes that define objects had to be manually drawn, using outsourced and in-
house labour. The question of making this labour visible becomes an artistic 
choice alongside others.
Artist Sebastian Schmieg, whose work Segmentation.Network (2016–2018) 
highlights exactly this kind of manual labour, speaks of ‘humans as software 
extensions’ in his discussion of the outsourcing platforms such as Fiverr or 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  In the quick-gig economy it is still possible to see 156
how ‘bodies and minds that are algorithmically managed [are] under the 
permanent pressure of constant availability, efficiency and perpetual self-
optimization’.  However, as Schmieg points out, citing a 2015 court case in 157
which Gabriela Rojas-Lozano sued Google for alleged exploitation of users by 
micro-tasking them with Google reCAPTCHA, the labour can be fragmented to 
the point where its very definition as labour becomes contestable.  In the work 158





of Anna Ridler, where the labour process is shown as an artwork in its own right, 
the alienation of labour that machine learning facilitates runs parallel to 
alienation of the subject, seemingly excluded from the imaginary financial loop 
that the tulips constitute. Media artworks that seem to operate on their own, not 
needing any human input beyond the initial set-up, create a perception of 
agency by default. Here, chance and autonomous operation emerge as a more 
familiar reading of independency of algorithms. The potential for accidents is 
created and determined at the moment of the invention of a particular 
technology, as Virilio reminds us.  But as accidents, according to glitch artist 159
Rosa Menkman, can create ‘a new protocol after shattering an earlier one’,  160
they inevitably return even such limited agency back to the realm of 
instrumentality.
Artistic approaches to destroying the opacity of algorithmic superstructuring 
need to navigate both the economic relations and technical conditions behind 
automated processes, and the way in which instrumentality translates into 
images. As Ian Bogost suggests, by making processes visible, procedures open 
up a way to act on them, acting as enabling rather than limiting forces.  161
Procedural mediation in the works discussed in this section operates within 
datasets, which represent a particularly interesting entanglement of visibility and 
concealment. On the one hand, if the ‘poor’ image, in Hito Steyerl’s insightful 
suggestion, becomes about ‘its own real conditions of existence’,  the images 162
used for datasets in machine learning seem to be the poorest of all, losing its 
status as an image in the process of technical abstraction. On the other hand, 
the images that are contained in the datasets needed to train the neural 
networks result in the creation of ‘image-models’,  sets of operational relations 163
that lead to the creation of figurative, representational images. And these 
images can become ‘rich’ in other ways, when impossible sofas, non-existing 
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people and paintings generated by neural networks are put in the context of art 
market and auctions.  164
The technical processes are therefore entangled in the problem of 
intelligibility, of the dialectic of signal and noise. In Shannon and Weaver’s 
theory of information a signal or a message is always seen as ‘one selected 
from a set of possible messages’.  In other words, the message is seen in its 165
materialist capacity to be intelligible, as a message distinguished from the 
surrounding noice. While technical procedures can introduce randomness, they 
can also serve to structure ‘noise’ into signals. It does not only make something 
intelligible, but also selects what exactly is made intelligible and what is omitted, 
making the process of ‘figuration’ out of data a political gesture. 
As Rancière underlines, art by definition designates itself as ‘art’, meant for 
human senses. The discussion of political aesthetics therefore should include 
not only the motivation of the artist to make something visible, but to the 
viewer’s capacity to discern the technical operations of visibility and 
concealment. In other words, if we see self-reflection as a part of procedural 
mediation, it  also becomes necessary to consider the idea of procedures in the 
light of the critical capacity of the subject to recognise the very presence and 
operation of procedures.
Persistence of Vision
Negotiation of the visibility and opacity, as well as the concealment, of labour 
behind the algorithmic practices also returns us to the idea of spectatorship that 
was previously discussed in relation to the traditional models of film viewing. In 
an encounter with a technical work of art, technical literacy becomes another 
parameter of intelligibility of artwork. Rancière’s critique of the passive spectator 
becomes pertinent here. Rather than seeing the ‘performance’ of art as an act 
of instructing the viewer, of imparting knowledge, and therefore constructing 
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spectatorship as a hierarchical situation, he suggests the idea of ‘emancipated 
spectator’.  He outlines,166
Emancipation begins when we challenge the opposition between 
viewing and acting; when we understand that the self-evident facts that 
structure the relations between saying, seeing and doing themselves 
belong to the structure of domination and subjection. It begins when we 
understand that viewing is also an action that confirms or transforms this 
distribution of positions. The spectator also acts, like the pupil or scholar. 
She observes, selects, compares, interprets.  167
Viewing the act of spectatorship as an active engagement with the work, and 
not simply a passive process, opens up the political agency of the spectators. 
As Rancière underlines, it also opens up the capacity for the artwork to be 
perceived freely: ‘there is the distance between artist and spectator, but there is 
also the distance inherent in the performance itself, insofar as it subsists, as a 
spectacle, an autonomous thing’.  Therefore, even within the distribution of 168
the sensible, the spectator still acts as a participant and not as a passive 
receiver. Furthermore, it leaves it to the artist to ‘produce a form of 
consciousness, an intensity of feeling, an energy for action’, instead of 
performing critique straightforwardly.  169
However, where one speaks of critical media art, the question of perceiving 
the work immediately opens a question of technical literacy. The Critical 
Engineering Manifesto by Julian Oliver, Gordan Savičić and Danja Vasiliev 
articulates the triangulation between the technical function of the work, the user 
experience (as potentially obscuring the entirety of the function), and its critical 
perception by the engineer. The Critical Engineer ‘considers any technology 
depended upon to be both a challenge and a threat’, and also ‘recognises that 
each work of engineering engineers its user, proportional to that user's 
dependency upon it’; at the same time, the Critical Engineer ‘raises awareness 
that with each technological advance our techno-political literacy is challenged’, 
 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator (Verso, 2009).166
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and ‘deconstructs and incites suspicion of rich user experiences’.  Following 170
Rancière, we can still see the operations of raising awareness and of 
deconstructing black box configurations a part of a possible suspicion towards 
the processes of algorithmic superstructuring.
However, addressing the complex space of algorithmic superstructuring still 
requires particular attention to what role various visuals, mythologies, fictions 
and imaginaries play in the construction of technology. For example, James 
Bridle’s New Aesthetic, which comprises a diverse collection of images, blog 
posts, lectures and artworks, addresses various kinds of images that arise from 
the incursion of the digital into the span of human perception—from 3D models 
and glitched Google Maps to documentation of machine vision techniques.  171
This view incurred critique for its umbrella-like character and the conflation of 
many different technologies and contexts under what seemed like an obsession 
with surface-level aesthetics.  Bridle’s response of keeping the New Aesthetic 172
as a diverse collection of items, as ‘an attempt to “write” critically about the 
network in the vernacular of the network itself: in a tumblr, in blog posts, in 
YouTube videos of lectures’,  only highlights the problem of separating the 173
audience into those who possess technical literacy and those who do not.
I would like to see the spectator’s emancipation and the technical opacity of 
media art as an entanglement of forces. Algorithmic superstructuring relies on 
vision as perpetuating engine. The aesthetic regime of algorithmic governance 
and its participation in the distribution of the sensible is actualised by the 
interfaces. With their help, the inhumanity of algorithmic superstructuring can 
instantly scale down back towards instrumentality in order to become invisible—
or, more precisely, to hide behind the visibility of the interface. It is also the 
‘persistence of visual knowledge’  that Wendy Chun suggests is the main 174
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engine enabling power dynamics in software, and which she later analyses as 
‘invisibly visible’ logic of naturalisation of interfaces.  While she compares 175
software to ideology, she also underlines that it allows critical thinking, therefore 
putting emphasis on the encounter itself, rather than on the subject as 
completely constructed. As she puts it, ‘software and ideology fit each other 
perfectly because both try to map the material effects of the immaterial and to 
posit the immaterial through visible cues’.  She remarks on the formal 176
similarity between software and various definitions of ideology, from the ‘false 
consciousness’ such as that represented in the film Matrix, to the Althusserian 
idea of ideology as a representation of the lived social relation. Chun also 
highlights the fetishistic logic of the graphic interface: ‘users know very well that 
their folders and desktops are not really folders and desktops, but they treat 
them as if they were—by referring to them as folders and as desktops’.  As 177
there is a process of making visible, ‘through this process the immaterial 
emerges as a commodity, as something in its own right’.  At the same time, 178
Chun points out that precisely because of the dual relation of concealing and 
making visible, software cannot be seen as completely analogous to ideology. 
As software reveals as much as it conceals, given a critical eye, it acts both as 
ideology and critique of ideology. The interplay of figurative and operational 
images makes software ‘algorithmically affective in ways that ideology never 
was’.  Alexander Galloway similarly highlights the central paradox of the 179
ideological reading of software as ‘technical transcoding without figuration that 
nevertheless coexists with an exceedingly high level of ideological fetishism and 
misrecognition’.180
Scaling between the human and the algorithmic, deciding what stays visible 
and what does not lies at the heart of algorithmic superstructuring and its re-
distribution of the sensible. Infrastructural affect works pre-cognitively, at the 
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level of computational temporalities, but also consolidates at the visible level of 
interfaces as various kinds of images. These images include symbolic 
navigation and other interface elements that simultaneously make possible and 
limit the user’s interaction, that guide, prompt, attract and distract. Algorithmic 
superstructuring presupposes that different kinds of images co-exist in the same 
operation, both as figurations subject to commodity fetishism and as 
participants in software and algorithmic abstractions. At the interface level, the 
vectors of axiomatisation are always actualised both as data structures, and as 
aesthetic operations interweaved with code. As Benjamin Bratton underlines in 
his theoretisation of algorithmic governance as The Stack, the platforms evolve 
in relation to their aesthetic formalisation: 
Platforms are infrastructural but rely heavily on aesthetic expression and 
calibration. […] Even as the majority of the information they mediate 
may be machine-to-machine communication (as, for example, today’s 
Internet), the specific evolution of any one platform, in the ecological 
niche between the human and inhuman, depends on how it frames the 
world for those who use it.  181
The key focus of the aesthetic regime of algorithmic superstructuring therefore 
lies in the interpenetration of algorithmic abstractions and aesthetic codes used 
to represent these relations to the human.
Capturing and understanding instrumentality in order to open the 
technological black box remains a difficult task when one is confronted with 
persistence of vision. Algorithmic superstructuring is characterised by its 
scalability, by its ability to cut across contexts; it is stimulated towards constant 
expansion by capitalist logic, has to rely on ever-changing data and is unable to 
stabilise. Along with the algorithmic superstructuring entering individuals’ lives, 
the representations and abstractions that lie at the core of software operations 
enter their very bodies and become internalised as modes of perception and 
habits, furthering the opacity of the processes that actually take place (e.g. data 
collection). This becomes particularly important when we consider the 
transnational and extra-legal character of capitalist relations, and the globalised 
cultural economies that automate logic of consumption. While a recent 
development such as EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
  Benjamin Bratton, The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty (MIT Press, 2016), p. 46.181
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implements the ‘right to explanation’ of the algorithmic blackbox, it does not 
legally compel the companies to disclose the technical details fully.  Even 182
more important is the capacity of algorithmic superstructuring to set new 
protocols and logics, altering the conditions of knowledge production. 
Algorithmic superstructuring operates in a grey zone in terms of both distribution 
of power relations and human experience. 
Locating and addressing the specific spaces where the entanglement of 
design, labour and aesthetic is visible, and where it becomes possible to 
reclaim the instrumentality for other ends, is the task that in the field of media 
practices has often been delegated to artists, hackers, activists and engineers. 
In this regard, a model of planetary computation such as Bratton’s The Stack 
that envisages the algorithmic abstractions as a ‘design brief’ of computational 
sovereignty, can be productive for artistic approaches in that it identifies the 
layers where such operations become more defined.  Where algorithmically 183
mediated processes of distribution of the sensible take place, they also produce 
an aesthetic renegotiation of agency, alienness and humanness. In this regard 
the proprietary orientation of algorithmic superstructuring is always already 
present, but can be reappropriated as alternative superstructuring. 
The possibility for alternative superstructuring is precisely the reason to bring 
the discussion of the distribution of the sensible, of political aesthetics, into the 
discussion of procedural films. Algorithmic superstructuring becomes apparent 
in the aesthetic and epistemic effects of algorithmic media. The affective space-
time of procedural films is also conditioned by the ways in which the logic of 
design built in the platforms, software and algorithms aids or disrupts the 
pervasive processes of commodification and capture of attention and affect. 
Procedural films can also become levers for disrupting this logic. Capitalist 
algorithmic systems of circulating, analysing and commodifying affect still exist 
within a gravitational pull towards the centrality of human vision. The call for 
posthumanist models of perception, therefore, can constitute an artistic practice 
 See Cynthia Rudin, ‘Stop explaining black box machine learning models for high stakes 182
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that aims to disengage with the existing modes, and to construct alternative 
ethical and political realities. In the two following chapters I will investigate the 
spaces of screensaver and game engine as case studies that open up the 
complex entanglements of filmic space-time, labour and design.
In this chapter I have addressed the idea of algorithmic superstructuring and 
questions of political aesthetics, labour, design and critical research practice. As 
I will show in the following chapters, procedural films in my practice operate less 
in the sense of the critical intervention through code and more as spaces of 
investigation. In the two case studies—screensaver and game engine—the 
liveness and procedurality are explored through the two distinct affective space-
times that are defined by their apparatuses. The fourth chapter, dedicated to 
screensavers, takes on the materialist temporalities of idle and productive time 
in regards to the screensaver and situates my work Chronic Film and its two 
iterations as procedural film and as a lecture-performance. The fifth chapter 
explores the idea of topological gamespace, emergence and liveness of non-
human agents such as bots and non-player character in order to conceptualise 
procedural films made with game engine, drawing on my work Non-Player 
Character. In the following chapters I will specifically concentrate on how the 
apparatus of each case study contributes to the affective space-times in my 





Image 1. Still from lecture-performance Chronic Film (2018).
This chapter introduces my investigation of screensavers as original procedural 
films. It explores their aesthetico-political operation, following the discussion 
from the previous chapter and adopting Rancière’s approach to technical media 
artefacts as participants in the ‘distribution of the sensible’. At the first glance 
the screensaver is a digital anachronism, a strangely persisting feature that still 
comes included with the current versions of the two most popular operating 
systems, Apple’s OS X and Microsoft Windows, even though it has been 
technically redundant for more than two decades.  Its relevance to the study 184
of moving image does not seem to amount to much, as for the majority of its 
existence the screensaver has been a mundane object, something like the 
photograph that comes with a frame. The screensaver is generally perceived as 
a decorative feature, aimed at personalisation of the personal computer. 
However, I argue that, seen beyond their decorative function, screensavers can 
 One could also add here that the screensaver’s secondary function as a security remains 184
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be regarded as as accidental artworks, generative moving images that run as a 
seamless loop in the gaps of the computer’s inactivity. In this sense, as I show 
later, the patterns of looped filmic space-time that they create have to be seen 
in the context of the patterns of labour and leisure and affective space-times of 
personal computing. 
The screensaver was also the first thing that pushed me towards making the 
body of work grouped under Chronic Film.  Born in the country that was still 185
called the USSR just before its dissolution, I encountered computers (and 
screensavers) relatively early. In informatics class at school, having successfully 
programmed the day’s task in QBASIC, I would spend the rest of the class 
modifying Windows’ screensaver, 3D Maze (Image 1), which, with its incessant 
movement and sharp camera turns, was a source of endless fascination—at 
least until Prince of Persia was installed. When my research on generative 
moving image prompted me to re-explore screensavers at a much later stage, 
the idea was already infected with a kind of anachronistic displacement that 
came from remembering my eight-year-old self, sitting in the living room of a 
different apartment, looking at a monitor much bulkier than my current one.
Watching a screensaver, back then and now, is never separated from the 
anthropomorphic significations. That the computer is waiting, or in sleep mode, 
is clear from the scarce and unimaginative looped dreams on the screen, akin 
to little sounds of snoring or breathing: showing that the machine is still 
operative, just asleep. The screensaver does not have the same kind of 
immersion that Walter Benjamin saw in the cinema, but it does have a kind of 
immersive intimacy that could only be encountered in a dark room, alone, facing 
the computer screen. The idea of a viewer as someone who does not just plug 
her perception into the machine of film consumption, but has to face the 
machine and face her own time passing in front of it, was appealing. 
Chronic Film, the work underlying this chapter’s argument, started as an 
attempt to re-create the outside-of-time feeling that screensavers exhibit. 
Technically, Chronic Film is an algorithm that plays out all possible images on a 
screen of a given resolution. Mathematically, it ends up as a continuous playing 
out of indecipherable noise. The first iteration of work was something like a 
 See Practice Overview and Documentation section of the current thesis, p. 158–163.185
	  87
structural filmic monument to time; not infinite, but an immensely long universal 
screensaver that it is not possible to consume as a film. In the process of 
making it, as versions proliferated and various questions entered the work, 
Chronic Film also became a lecture-performance. For this, I took the noise 
function as a starting point for a new relationship between the viewer and the 
screen, and as a promise of meditation, and made the algorithm into a lecture-
performance that laid out the human-noise relationship at the sites of nostalgia 
and divination. I will return to the discussion of this in the final section.
In the current chapter I aim to look at the screensaver as a software moving 
image artefact that opens up the questions of labour and the techno-materialist 
design of time. First of all, the affective space-time of the screensaver is very 
different from the traditional temple of cinema theatre. It is found at the office, 
the space of efficiency and timed breaks. Unimaginable outside of the shifting of 
paradigms from shared to personal computing in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the screensaver also accompanies the shifting of the space of labour 
into employees’ own homes. With the screen that conveniently goes ‘to sleep’ 
when one goes for a break, the cognitive labour does not have to stop. At 
home, the computer will greet the owner with the same fractal images that can 
be seen in the office. The screensaver’s audience is not a traditional film 
spectator, but a cognitive worker whose time and attention span is constantly 
assaulted and regulated by various interfaces.
Second, seen as a marginal form of moving image, the screensaver 
challenges not only the traditional notion of the viewer, but also the fundamental 
notions of film: linear temporality, footage and narrative. Instead, terms such as 
generative, repetition and loop come into the picture. Much like in the works of 
experimental film and media art, these capacities contribute to the creation of 
the particular affective space-time, inextricable from the critical discussion of 
patterns of labour, rest and attention. These lines of inquiry in the chapter are 
informed by the field of experimental film and artists’ moving image, as well as 
by the analyses of computer culture in the period from 1970s to 2010s.
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From Obsolete Materialism to Affective Loops
To anyone who owned a personal computer between the 1980s and 2010s, 
some of the following tableaux might be familiar: flying toasters; an infinite red 
brick maze; black space with stars flying past; colourful growing and interlocking 
pipes; a bright flurry of light travelling the screen; pixelated aquarium fish. In a 
well-known anecdote from the early 1990s, computer writer Andy Ihnatko joked 
about turning the older model of the Apple Macintosh into an aquarium as a last 
upgrade (it was fast becoming obsolete), only to start a trend of creating real 
‘macquariums’ (Image 2). The main goal of making one was to make the 
waterline invisible, so it would look like ‘a really good screensaver’.  Like an 186
aquarium, the screensaver creates a window into a space where digital (animal) 
images move in seamless operation.
 
Image 2. A planted Macquarium by Ben Wells. Photo by Ben Wells. 2004. CC 
BY 2.0 License.
 Andy Ihnatko, ‘Interview with Tommy Thomas: Andy Ihnatko on Macs, Writing, Innovation, 186
and the Macquarium’, Low End Mac Since 1997, 22 May 2007. 
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The screensaver, however, came into existence more as a hardware function 
of the screen than a decorative animation. In the early 1980s the phosphor 
coating in computer screens was prone to burn-in when graphics on the screen 
remained static for a prolonged period of time. Even though it would require 
hours and days for the image to be etched on the screen, in the case of a static 
interface (such as a news logo, for example) the burn-in could be produced by 
slow accumulation over time. The screensaver was created to prevent this 
condition. The first popular mention of a screensaver dates back to 1983. It was 
published as a Basic program in the article by John Socha, ‘Socha’s Toolbox: 
Save Your Monitor Screen’, in Softalk Magazine for the IBM Personal 
Computer.  Socha simply called the program scrnsave. The original IBM 187
Personal Computer’s hardware clock ran at the frequency 18.2 Hz, or at 18.2 
ticks per second; the programme instructed the screen to turn off after 3276 
ticks, or after three minutes. In a sense, if the screensaver could be considered 
an image at this point, it was more operational than figurative—part of a 
procedure, completely free from any demands for representation.
The 1990s witnessed the growing acceptance of the personal computer as a 
necessary home appliance.  The easy installation from a a floppy disk or CD-188
ROM contributed to establishing technology as a black box and to alienation of 
the user from the source code. In the 1990s the screensaver was marketed as a 
ready-to-use, boxed product that offered a playful personalisation for the user’s 
computer. And as the new liquid-crystal display (LCD) screens proved to be less 
prone to pixel degradation, in the late 1990s and early 2000s the screensaver 
eventually came to serve a purely decorative function. This, in its turn, 
conditioned the format: looped, abstract, without clear beginning or end, and 
largely void of considerations of narrative.
Who is the early computer user, and in what context does the shift from 
hardware to decorative function take place? The image of a male ‘computer 
geek’ takes its roots exactly in the 1980s’ adoption of personal computing. 
According to a 1985 study on computer use and shifts in time allocation 
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patterns, ‘the fact that 63 percent of the adopters are engaged in technical 
professions, are well-educated, and have above average incomes is 
noteworthy. At present, the home computer is a rather complex product 
requiring special skills and, possibly, some training’.  Unsurprisingly, the study 189
bypassed the question of gender altogether, acknowledging that it only 
addressed ‘the principal user’  in the household, not specifying who it was. 190
While early computation had been considered ‘women’s work’ and, as a result, 
was built by female data scientists and programmers,  from the mid-1980s 191
their participation drops.  Frink argues that the drop is linked to the 192
emergence of personal computers at the same time, and to the fact that they 
were marketed as machines for games, toys predominantly for boys.  From 193
that point on, the gender imbalance in computation remained consistently 
skewed towards male coders, scientists and designers. This context is 
important for the current study in order to clarify the circumstances in which the 
screensavers were designed and marketed.194
As screensavers in the mid-1980s and early 1990s were published in 
computer magazines, like many other programs, the users of different operating 
systems could type them out on their own home computers. A do-it-yourself, 
engineer-like feeling was a part of dealing with the computer at that time, as not 
only typing errors but also programming errors from the potentially 
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unpredictable interactions with other programs were frequent. Computers were 
still a new technology that did not offer a smooth operation straight out of the 
box. In this spirit, the articles usually contained recommendations for users who 
wanted to tweak the screensaver, encouraging them to deepen their knowledge 
of code and their machine. 
The September 1989 issue of ST-Log: The Atari ST Monthly Magazine 
offered its readers ‘The Ultimate Screensaver’, written by Richard Leinecker. It 
starts with a story somewhat indicative of the enthusiasm of that time:
As I pose the mouse to run ST Writer, I hear a voice from the kitchen. 
‘Hey, can you help with the groceries?’ Eager to dispel my current 
computer-addict image, I proceed to the car and bring in the groceries. 
One thing (submarine sandwich) leads to another (Miller Lite), and it is 
eight hours later that I return to my ST. 
I scream. A dim trash can has appeared in the upper right-hand 
corner of the ST Writer menu screen as well as the edit screen. I know 
that some of my prose is lacking, but what is ST Writer trying to tell me? 
Just this: ‘Your monitor now has a trash can permanently burned into it 
because you left it on for eight hours’.195
At the margins of this anecdote one can already notice the early user-
programmer in question: his engagement with code, the gender imbalance 
present in computer culture then (and still persisting now), as well as the time 
deficiency already affecting their lives. In evocative detail, the illustration to the 
article features the author on the run, with clock-faces on his shirt (Image 3).
The curious refusal of the screensaver to disappear completely after its 
functional redundancy shows that it does contribute to a certain kind of affect. 
Notwithstanding brief mentions in the histories of screens and interfaces, the 
screensaver as a cultural object is absent from academic discussions, including 
critical considerations of software or moving image. When it does appear, it is 
mostly in the industrial discussions on product design, shared computing, or 
entertainment articles on desktop psychology and personalisation of the 
interface. However, an undeniable fascination with the screensaver can be seen 
 Richard Leinecker, ‘The Ultimate Screensaver’, ST-Log: The Atari ST Monthly Magazine, 195
September 1989, 18-30, p. 18.
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Image 3. ‘The Ultimate Screensaver’ by Richard Leinecker. ST-Log: The Atari 
ST Monthly Magazine. 
in web repositories, emulators and freely circulating video recordings. Like 
many other obsolete software artefacts, and as a part of early net culture, 
screensavers were preserved and updated by enthusiasts. 
Even among obsolete software paraphernalia, screensavers possess 
something of a cult status. A tacit acknowledgement of that is seen in online 
repositories such as YouTube, where one can find clips such as 281 After Dark 
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screensavers.  The clip presents a colourful array of screensaver modules: 196
cars, numerous clocks, interface glitches, dominoes, animals, lines of code, 
blobs of paint, landscapes, aliens, geometrical abstractions, random flying 
objects, labyrinths, fractals, Disney characters, sea life, ghosts, self-playing 
‘tennis’ and other games, Simpsons, Star Trek, and others. The decorative 
status of screensavers makes them collectable objects. As artist Matthew 
Plumez-Fernandez notes: 
Screensavers were fairly simple software, and were not designed to run 
on super computers. You could see it as a kind of folk art. The 
screensaver became a cultural artifact that was overlooked because it 
was so common.197
Ironically, seeing screensavers as a decorative commodity, a form of ‘folk art’, 
also brings up an interesting consideration of how their affective space-times 
relates to their modes of presentation. As the discussions of net art and user 
culture in 1990s suggest, software and interface artefacts offer an insight into 
the vernacular culture of personal computer and its specific modes of human-
technology relations.  The value of addressing the affective-space time 198
created by the personal computer becomes especially clear when the 
screensaver is displaced from it. A 2017 installation at Het Nieuwe Instituut, 
Sleep Mode: The Art of the Screensaver, curated by artist Rafaël Rozendaal, 
presented the early screensavers for Apple and Microsoft operation systems as 
large projections on gallery walls. This decision was explained as a desire to 
‘submerge the visitor in a spatial experience’,  to make them really pay 199
attention to an overlooked, but fascinating software. As the description states:
Due to the format in which they are displayed in the exhibition, the 
images take on a degree of autonomy and become museum objects. 
Because they have also been stripped of their original function, here the 
screensavers can be judged on their inherent visual qualities. Visitors 
find themselves immersed in an animated landscape of abstract vistas 
 David Donarumo, 281 After Dark Screensavers, Youtube.com, 2011. https://196
www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1w1SQ3ezh8.
 ‘Sleep Mode: The Art of the Screensaver’, Exhibition essay, Het Nieuwe Instituut.197
 Olia Lialina and Dragan Espenschied (eds), Digital Folklore (merz&solitude, 2009).198
 Ibid.199
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dominated by colour, structure and the laws of nature and in which no 
movement is entirely predictable.200
This view clearly resonates with the modernist idea of a work of art as 
autonomous, and subject to an art market review of abstract art’s ‘inherent’ 
expressive qualities. However, even from documentation showing large 
projections of the flying windows and floating fish, it is clear that, by aiming for 
immersion, the exhibition seems to take away the precarious intimacy that the 
screensaver evokes when displayed on the home screen. Where screensavers 
are seen as media artefacts, they also evoke a space of reflection and affect 
that is markedly different from the assumed ‘neutrality’ of a white cube space. It 
also opens up a question of how they participate in distribution of the sensible—
under what sociopolitical circumstances and how they are being viewed. This 
brings me to the next section, in which I will address the affective space-time of 
screensavers and their position in relation to the temporalities of techno-
capitalist framework.
Screensaver and Techno-Capitalist Space-Time
As I argue in the previous chapters, the affective space-time of procedural films 
can be understood in its relation to material processes, including those of 
labour. Therefore, instead of the holder of the gaze of traditional film studies, the 
screensaver conjures up the image of a cognitive worker: one who is connected 
to the computer screen, leaves to have a break, and returns to see the fractals, 
flying toasters or some other looped images on her computer screen. The title 
of the screensaver pack After Dark is indicative of this imagination. In the late 
capitalist society, the subject that gazes at the moving image is likely to be 
sleep-deprived, tired and looking for respite; and it is after dark that the 
computer screen marks as the time when labour is not being done, but the 
subject is still at her working place. 
After Dark was sold as modular software, consisting of a number of different 
screensavers and encouraging users to develop and contribute their own 
modules. Created in the late 1980s by Jack Eastman and Patrick Beard, it was 
introduced first in 1989 to Apple Macintosh and in 1991 to Microsoft Windows. 
 Ibid.200
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In 1992 it became one of the top-selling software products in the world. In the 
thin history of screensavers it is probably the most noticeable: widely reviewed 
in computer magazines, mentioned in the histories of software and computation, 
and even referenced in popular culture (Image 4).
In one of the most famous After Dark modules, Flying Toasters, the user sees 
on the screen a fairly surrealist image: shiny toasters with little white wings, 
flying diagonally at different speeds across the screen. The toasters are 
accompanied by slices of toast of various shades. This imagery, as Jack 
Eastman explains in an interview, emerged in a feat of late-night inspiration 
when he wandered into a kitchen, saw a toaster, and his ‘sleep-deprived brain 
put wings on it’.  This story, of course, could have been intended as a myth of 201
a genius encountering the invention in their sleep, like Dmitri Mendeleev and his 
table of elements. But, more forcefully, it draws attention to the tired automatism 
of the late-night brain, consciousness ceding place to idleness and uncertainty. 
As commodity object, the screensaver becomes a part of a repository of 
mundane images, designed for everyday entertainment and functionality; but at 
the same time, it contributes to the mythology of early digital images, and to the 
mythology of the interaction between users and computers.
Image 4. Dilbert comic strip. Sunday February 20, 1994. © Andrews McMeel 
Syndication.
 Tommy Thomas, ‘Aggressively Stupid: The Story behind After Dark’, Low End Mac Since 201
1997, 9 February 2007.
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As mentioned before, the screensaver is a product of the shift that occurred 
in the 1980s towards personal computing.  Before this, time-sharing was a 202
crucial practice in early computation, introduced in the 1960s and a major 
paradigm by the 1970s. Time-sharing was initially a solution to the problem of 
‘idle time’ during a computer’s use. For example, the time that one user would 
spend only typing in the code would be idle in terms of processing, and this was 
too expensive to allow. Computer scientist Bob Bemer, who was one of the first 
to introduce the idea of time-sharing, sternly notes in the article ‘How to 
Consider a Computer’: ‘It is axiomatic that a computer should never stop, run 
useless problems or be subjected to manual operation and dial-twiddling. To do 
so deprives your fellow engineers of its benefit’.  Put differently, time-sharing 203
put direct value on computational time and power, to the extent that the value of 
the human operator’s time became secondary.
In later years, the screensaver could be found at the centre of relations 
forming the material network of immaterial labour. By the 1980s the rise of 
personal computing brought new meaning to the disintegration of the border 
between home and office. The computer became part of the household and, in 
doing so it brought the processes of cognitive labour home. While in the office 
the screensaver simply marks the minutes when the worker is idle, at home it 
embodies the continuous encroachment of productive time on leisure time. In 
the Autonomist Marxist tradition, immaterial labour is approached as ‘the labor 
that produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity’,  204
referring both to the increasing need for computer-enabled skills in production 
processes and to the increasing commodification of activities that were not 
previously recognised as work. Thus, the screensaver also arises in the period 
of transition towards a society in which various algorithmic operations, software, 
interfaces and data analysis become the main tools for perpetuating biopolitical 
control. The ultimate cognitive worker is the computer user, who, as Michael 
 See Jones, The Technical and Social History of Software Engineering, Chapter 7.202
 Bob Bemer, ‘How to Consider a Computer’, Automatic Control Magazine, March 1957: 203
66-69., p. 66–67.
 Lazzarato, Maurizio. ‘Immaterial Labor’, in Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, 204
edited by Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt (pp. 133–47 (University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
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Hardt and Antonio Negri argue, engages in immaterial labour of analytical and 
symbolic tasks, and is involved in the production of manipulation of affect.205
While screensavers themselves appeared at a time when governance was 
not yet armed with big data and algorithmic analytics, the outlines of what I 
described as algorithmic superstructuring were already clearly visible. The 
screensaver exists as a part of the particular space-time characterised by 
invasive commodification and oppressive temporality—a machinic order of time 
that comes from the urge to maximise efficiency. Crary vividly describes the 
pressure that capitalism puts on time: unrelenting pace, the constant pressure 
of productivity, and subsumption of every activity as yet another point on the list 
of cognitive production.  All time, apart from the time spent sleeping, is 206
reinforced with value. The pastimes that are not easily marketable as 
embodying actual, social, cultural or some other form of capital become de-
valued and forgotten. As Crary points out, ‘a 24/7 environment has the 
semblance of a social world, but it is actually a non-social model of machinic 
performance and a suspension of living that does not disclose the human cost 
required to sustain its effectiveness’.  Human bodies become inscribed in the 207
self-perpetuating system of technologically sustained habits, and the 
temporality that we inhabit is increasingly shaped as machinic. As Crary 
describes it: 
In spite of its insubstantiality and abstraction as a slogan, the 
implacability of 24/7 is its impossible temporality. It is always a reprimand 
and a deprecation of the weakness and inadequacy of human time, with 
its blurred, meandering textures. … the effectiveness of 24/7 lies in the 
incompatibility it lays bare, in the discrepancy between a human life-
world and the evocation of a switched on universe for which no off-switch 
exists.  208
In this regime, time itself confirms itself as inseparable from productivity, and the 
aesthetic markers that separate idle from productive time come vividly into view.
 See Section 3.4 ‘Postmodernization, or the Informatization of Production’, in Michael Hardt 205
and Antonio Negri, Empire (Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 281—303.
 Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (Verso Books, 2013).206
 Ibid., p. 8.207
 Ibid., pp. 29–30.208
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The procedural time of the screensaver therefore directly connects to 
patterns and configurations of labour and leisure. If, following Rancière’s idea, 
the screensaver still participates in the distribution of the sensible, then the 
temporality of the screensaver is inextricable from the affective space-time of 
personal computing. In the urban environment where ‘computer-generated 
virtual spaces coexist with the vernacular daily virtual spaces that we inhabit… 
as viewers and users’,  the screensaver becomes just one of the many virtual 209
windows, a part of our daily interface. Where it appears on the screen, one feels 
reminded of productive time, be it at home where one labours long past one’s 
capacity to do so, or at the office where a co-worker had already left, leaving the 
monitor on. 
At the same time, since the screensaver can only come to existence during 
idle time, it brings interruption to the structured temporality of 24/7. Even the 
screensaver, seemingly a carrier of idle time, can be made to serve efficiency. 
Driven by the demands of the ‘switched-on universe’ and in a paradoxical nod 
to time-sharing of the 1970s, the screensaver software had also acquired a new 
functional purpose: distributed computation. That means that the ‘idle time’ of 
the user is donated to scientific or other initiatives that use spare processing 
power to shorten calculation time. One of the most well-known is IBM’s World 
Community Grid, working with global risks projects in science, health and 
climate change. The time efficiency is underlined by the last page of the 
introduction, which suggests: ‘While you were learning about World 
Community Grid…your device could have analyzed 465 potential 
cancer signatures for the Mapping Cancer Markers project’. The screensaver in 
this case emerges as another node that strives to maximally include the human 
in the productive temporality.
Some media artists use screensavers as a means to engage with and 
reverse the existing configurations of office space-time. When re-appropriated 
for artistic use, the screensaver can also make the hidden connotations of 
productive and idle time visible, and act as a critique of the existing temporal 
order. For example, the screensaver made by anti-consumerist activist 
collective RTmark, Information Kiosk (1999), was intended for distribution 
among corporate intranets in order to ‘encourage workers to consider the 
 Anne Friedberg, The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft (MIT Press, 2006), p. 3.209
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agendas of corporate uses of power’.  Another of their screensaver works 210
made use of idle computer power to automatically send thousands of e-mails to 
Microsoft-owned mail servers, effectively trying to overload the system (a 
hacker tactic that has been used since 1997 and which is known as a ‘denial of 
service’ (DoS) attack). In both cases, the screensaver’s position—literally at the 
site of labour and at the centre of data processing regulation—allows it to be 
used for subversive gestures, be it in the form of an anti-corporate corporate 
newsletter or a DoS attack. The interruption of the office work here echoes 
Mario Tronti's idea of refusal to work as a tactic. Tronti argues that ‘the effective 
development of the political power of labour really begins from the moment that 
labourers are transformed into workers’.  Therefore blocking the work-process 211
as an intentional strategy, exemplifies the idea that productive power is always 
already a political power. In the context of screensavers it opens up a space of 
resistance to the oppressive productivity of 24/7 regime.
How does the procedural design of the screensaver feed into its affective 
space-time? Having imagined the screensaver within the set of labour relations, 
within the external dialectic of productive and idle time, I would like to call on the 
technical side of the screensaver’s own internal temporality. From the first 
example mentioned in this chapter, Socha’s scrnsave, to the more advanced 
screensavers of the late 1990s, the makers of screensavers were relying on the 
logical structure of the algorithm rather than on the expectations that a film-
maker might have about her future work: considerations of pacing, narrative, 
emotional affect, and others.
The operational logic of the screensaver—the loop—is also one of the most 
basic functions in computing. The loop is a fundamental idea in programming 
languages: it is one of the main structures that can underpin the execution of 
the code (after this action is finished, repeat it endlessly, or until a certain 
condition is met). It allows one to automate the algorithmic action by repeating 
the instruction a desired number of times. For example, the first instruction in 
the sequence of an algorithm may be to select an item of data and change it. 
Then, the next action checks if this item has reached a prescribed condition. If 
 Patrick Lichty, ‘RTMark Information Kiosk Screensaver’, Rockefeller Foundation New Media 210
Fellowships, 2003. 
 Mario Tronti, ‘The strategy of refusal’, Semiotext(e) 3, no. 3 (1980): 28–34, p. 28.211
	  100
not, the next instruction in the sequence would be to come back to the first 
instruction and repeat the whole sequence. When the condition is reached, the 
program moves on to the next action. A loop that does not have an exit function 
is called an endless loop and typically operates until the system detects it as an 
error and terminates the program, or unless there is another condition, such as 
terminating the program after a certain amount of time.
One could draw a quick parallel between the screensaver and experimental 
film, especially in the context of a museum or gallery space, where the struggle 
of art technicians to put the work ‘on the loop’ has seemingly gone on since the 
beginning of time. However, the nature of repetition that the computational loop 
invokes is different. To appreciate this difference between the moving image 
sequence on repeat and the algorithmic logic, one could turn to Peter Gidal’s 
Room Film 1973. Throughout the 55 minutes of the film, the camera, put at the 
centre of a darkened room, swerves around its own axis, filming the contents of 
the room, seen in a spot of light that rotates along with the camera. The overall 
effect of the film, which Michael Snow describes as being as ‘if it was made by a 
blind man’,  is one of incompleteness and the impossibility of representation 212
(of the whole room but also of the viewing subject). The camera’s movement 
possesses a kind of searching automaticity that excludes the human viewer. In 
the end, what is much more visible than the content of the film is the rule that 
underlies it, the algorithm of the circular movement.
The loop, therefore, is not an imposed quality but a part of the screensaver’s 
operation. And similarly to experimental film, it is also in contrast to mainstream 
cinema that one can see the screensaver’s resistance to linear time. When 
mainstream cinema introduces flashbacks, ‘plot-within-the-plot’ or other non-
linear methods, what Elsaesser calls mind-game or puzzle films,  the loss of 213
consequential narrative already leaves the spectator in confusion. Where in 
traditional narratives cinema has always strived to express itself from A to B, 
from cause to effect, in the case of the screensaver the loop becomes the 
starting point, and also the point of non-time, of generative suspension that can 
be started or ended at any point. This suggests an experience that is even 
 Gidal, ‘Artists’ Statement’. 212
 Thomas Elsaesser, ‘Puzzle Films: Complex Storytelling’, in Contemporary Cinema, edited by 213
Warren Buckland (Blackwell Publishing, 2009).
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harder to place in the traditional expectations, and the space-time enabled by 
the screensaver is starkly different from narrative-based progression.
This is also reflected in the notion of database cinema, which attempted to 
assimilate computational innovations such as ‘interactive film’ or non-linear film 
artworks in line with the existing context of film studies. In Manovich’s concept 
of new media the loop is featured as a new driving force for cinematic 
temporality and narrative:
Can the loop be a new narrative form appropriate for the computer age? 
It is relevant to recall that the loop gave birth not only to cinema but also 
to computer programming. Programming involves altering the linear flow 
of data through control structures such as ‘if/then' and ‘repeat/while’; the 
loop is the most elementary of these control structures.  214
While Manovich poses this question in terms of narrative form, his overview of 
the various iterations of the loop (the early cinematic toys, the repeated cycles 
in animation, the ‘repeat’ function in Quicktime, the interactive feedback loops in 
games and film) seems to ultimately present the loop more as a widely applied 
device. In screensavers, however, database cinema can be exemplified by one 
literal example: the Matinee screensaver developed by Softek in 1993. Matinee 
was the first screensaver that used full-motion video clips: altogether 38 
excerpts, of two to five seconds each, taken from public domain movies and 
cartoons. Users were offered the chance to edit the film themselves in the 
interface, which was designed as a film strip. The assembled ‘film’ was played 
not full-screen, but on a background representing one of the older media: a film 
theatre, a TV set or a newspaper. 
However, as a functional product, the looped screensaver also needs to be 
efficient. Even if the problem of the lack of processing power in the early 
computers was eventually solved, the screensaver as a product is still intended 
to be a program that runs in the background, and therefore needs to be one that 
does not impose heavy costs in terms of processing power. The screensaver 
needs to be seamless. For the most immediate translation of still graphics into 
moving image, this means turning to visualised geometrical formulas, which 
also means that the source code will be shorter and more efficiently written. 
 Manovich, The Language of New Media, p. 266.214
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Due to these considerations, the screensaver became an ideal outlet for 
generative abstract geometry. In combination with the fact that it needed to run 
for an infinite amount of time, this created a loop that was not repetitive but 
open-ended. This is exemplified by the iconic Windows screensaver Flying 
Through Space, where bright dots create an illusion of depth and stars rapidly 
passing by, as well as 3D Pipes and 3D Maze, which are probably the most 
recognisable examples of infinite generative 3-dimensional space. 
Such images describe the screensaver first of all as a technical image, driven 
by considerations of system requirements rather than by demands of 
representation. Procedural design of the screensaver also becomes built into 
the late-capitalist temporalities of machinic performance, in which system 
requirements also expand to include human workers. A screensaver becomes a 
placeholder, a suspension of productive time. However, much like experimental 
film, the affective space of the screensaver is not, for all its banality, abolished. 
The experience of seeing a screensaver is always accompanied by a certain 
degree of inaccessibility, be it because of the screensaver’s temporality or the 
banality of its images. Through this inaccessibility, the screensaver triggers the 
possibilities of boredom and introspection.
Idleness, Productivity and the Labour of Watching
In an episode of the US version of the mockumentary TV show The Office, the 
screensaver makes a brief but relevant cameo. In a meeting room, Michael, the 
manager, is giving a presentation on the ways one can make the quarterly 
report more exciting by printing it on coloured paper. When his subordinates 
display, in sequence, alert attentiveness, intense disappointment, shouts of 
encouragement and hope, he takes these to be reactions to his words. Even 
though he is still speaking, the listeners suddenly cheer, give a round of 
applause and exit the room, leaving him in complete certainty that he delivered 
an amazing speech. Needless to say, Michael is unaware that all this time the 
office workers were actually cheering for the bouncing DVD logo in the 
screensaver showing behind his back to finally land in a corner. While this 
episode informs that even watching a screensaver is more productive than 
office meetings, it also responds to the question of what kinds of time are 
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considered productive (and, therefore, spent well, valuable) and unproductive 
(just spent, or wasted). But what if one explores the possibilities of unproductive 
time further?
Agamben described the two great conditions of montage as repetition and 
stoppage. For him, these two conditions enable the ethics and the politics of 
cinema by opening up a space of ‘imagelessness’, a space beyond 
representation. The repetition reveals a paradoxical capacity of cinema to 
restore the possibility of what was and to render it possible anew. The work of 
images is important ‘because they are a way of projecting power and possibility 
toward that which is impossible by definition, toward the past’.  Relying on the 215
logic of the loop, the screensaver creates a state of suspension, a continuous 
conjuring of idle time. As Nicky Hamlyn notes in his studies of experimental film, 
repetition does not mean that the experience stays the same: seeing exactly the 
same thing might be ‘different from the first time around, and seeing it three 
times would produce further new experiences and knowledge’.  If one 216
chooses to engage with the screensaver, rather than ignore it as mere 
decoration, the continuous reproduction of computer code offers little variation 
but a very palpable sense of the passing of time. Most screensavers are ‘slow’, 
as they are designed only as placeholders for other events, and their design is 
meant to be functional. The amount of variation provides little respite to the 
curiosity of the accidental viewer; paradoxically, it is exactly this quality that can 
also make the screensaver entrancing in its own right.
The contemplatability of the screensavers partly owes to technical 
restrictions, as not only were screensavers mostly made to be low-cost (in 
terms of power) software, but computers were also not yet powerful enough to 
play full-screen video. This was the case with Seize the Day, a popular 1994 
planner application by Ian Gilman that included twelve animated background 
landscapes made by artist Mark Ferrari. The landscapes changed as the day 
progressed and had different weather states. ‘A calendar picture of a magical 
 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Difference and Repetition: On Guy Debord's Films’, in Guy Debord and 215
the Situationist International: Texts and Documents, edited by Tom McDonough (pp. 313–320) 
(MIT Press, 2004), p. 316.
 Nicky Hamlyn, Film Art Phenomena (British Film Institute, 2003), p. 93.216
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far-off land that lived and breathed in real time’,  the program proved 217
sufficiently emotionally engaging to amass a number of mentions in online 
discussions. One of the feedback quotes on the website states: ‘It is rare to find 
a piece of software that is soothing to even think about, especially when it’s 
something as potentially stressful as a calendar’,  ironically pointing towards 218
the same aesthetic space between idle and productive time that screensavers 
occupy. Not surprisingly, the affective function of the program has not lost its 
relevance, and in 2019 Seize the Day was re-issued as a mobile phone 
application, where on Android phones it can be used as a screensaver.
A similarly palpable experience of passing time is offered by slow cinema, 
such as instantiated in the works of figures such as Chantal Akerman, Andrey 
Tarkovsky, Lav Diaz, Apitchapong Weerasethakul, Tsai Ming-liang and others. It 
is characterised by minimalist aesthetics: long takes, slow pacing and 
contemplative rather than action-led plot. These devices contribute to slow 
cinema’s insistence on fully experiencing the passing of time, and to its 
resistance to the easy flow of narrative on which most mainstream films rely. 
Rather than an immersive escape from reality, slow cinema offers an 
introspective living-through, informed by the conscious intensity of the watching 
process. As Flanagan formulates it, it is ‘a cinema which compels us to retreat 
from a culture of speed, modify our expectations of filmic narration and 
physically attune to a more deliberate rhythm’.  Slow cinema can be seen as a 219
reaction to the accelerated tempos of late capitalism and its effects on the 
mainstream film industry, where easy consumption, most clearly seen in the 
Hollywood model, has been aided by a noticeable intensification of immersive 
narratives, fast pacing and special effects.220
In the conditions of late capitalism where the environment is oversaturated 
with information, attention itself turns into a precious resource, leading to such 
 Ian Gilman, ‘Ian Gilman – Seize The Day’. Personal website. https://iangilman.comsoftware/217
seizetheday.php.
 Ibid.218
 Matthew Flanagan, ‘Towards an Aesthetic of Slow in Contemporary Cinema’, 16:9 in English 219
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articulations of consumption as the attention economy.  As Terranova notes, 221
‘in a strange reversal of early information theory’s take on entropy, attention 
here becomes the scarce quantity which is “consumed” by that which is 
abundant, that is, information’.  Crary describes the economic aspect of 222
paying attention as the ‘ongoing crisis of attentiveness’, where 
the changing configurations of capitalism continually push attention and 
distraction to new limits and thresholds, with an endless sequence of 
new products, sources of stimulation, and streams of information, and 
then respond with new methods for managing and regulating 
perception.  223
In this framework, watching slow cinema can be also seen as an activity that 
requires a particular way of and attitude towards paying attention. 
One of the discussions of slow cinema becomes particularly pertinent in the 
context of redefining attention as a resource. In an article that sparked a well-
known debate on the methods and politics of slow cinema, James critiques slow 
cinema as an indulgent and easy method, one that is perpetuated by the 
festival circuit and the film critics.  Ultimately James wonders if watching slow 224
films is ‘worth it’.  While the resulting debate is not within the scope of this 225
research, it brings to light a pertinent issue of the practice of film-watching as 
economic activity, or as labour. As Schoonover points out, if the time of viewing 
is labour, what is it worth?  Schoonover notes that ‘slow art film anticipates a 226
spectator not only eager to clarify the value of wasted time and uneconomical 
temporalities but also curious about the impact of broadening what counts as 
productive human labour’.  Ultimately, for him, the question of slow cinema’s 227
worth does not end in the juxtaposition of slow practices to speedy ones, but 
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rather ‘speaks to a larger system of tethering value to time, labor to bodies, and 
productivity to particular modes and forms of cultural reproduction’.228
Extrapolating the experience of watching slow cinema to the experience of 
watching a screensaver helps to make visible their socioeconomic scaffolding. 
Where slow cinema exists in a more or less established canon of spectatorship, 
supported by dedicated agents such as festivals, independent film distributors 
and cinephiles, the screensaver can only be regarded as a commonplace 
software with fragmented viewership, preserved and shared by enthusiasts and 
largely excluded from considerations of film and art. In this regard, and in 
relation to my artistic practice, I seek to position the screensaver also as an 
artistic artefact that creates a space of reflection. The reason for this is simple: 
where a screensaver is re-imagined as an artistic artefact, it encourages the 
existence of emancipated spectators. The space-time that the screensaver 
activates is similar to that which Peter Gidal describes as characteristic of the 
machinic apparatus that connects the human spectator with the ‘non-human’, or 
simply ‘non-naturalised’ aspects of her own perception, through a structural-
materialist experiment on film.
Thus, the idle time of the screensaver relates both to the temporal drag of 
slow cinema and to the indifference of the technical automation. The minutes 
when both the computer and the human operator are not working are ultimately 
unproductive. What is created, then, during this time? Warhol would refuse the 
boredom of easy consumption of the mainstream genres that repeat ‘the same 
plots and the same shots and the same cuts over and over again’,  but 229
welcome the real boredom of seeing something that is truly unchanging
—‘because the more you look at the same exact thing, the more the meaning 
goes away, and the better and emptier you feel’.  The continuous algorithmic 230
loop in the screensaver offers the same scarce variation as Warhol’s Sleep 
(1963) or Empire (1964). 
The continuous loop and the banal images lead to boredom, and boredom 
leads to reflection, as suggested by Benjamin and Kracauer. For both of them, 
 Ibid., p. 68.228




boredom was a necessary condition for creating an experience outside the daily 
commodified gratification. As Moore points out, they connected the loss of the 
capacity to be bored with ‘the new labour and media environment of their 1920s 
modernity’.  The screensaver’s peak existence in the 1990s is similarly 231
situated on the brink of a turn towards the attention economy, where the ability 
to experience boredom would be pushed even further away from the 
consideration of daily life.
Inspired by these suggestions, I would argue that the screensaver is able to 
construct its affective space precisely because it is situated at the margins of 
the labour process, yet presents a completely unproductive time in itself. Much 
like slow cinema, the idle time of watching the screensaver cannot be 
commodified. The attention dedicated to it is mostly accidental, and can hardly 
be appropriated as a resource. Moreover, the experience itself is not 
accommodating. If anything, it is fragile: the viewer cannot influence their 
watching experience, or multi-task, as the screensaver occupies the screen 
completely, and as soon as the user moves a mouse, or presses the key, it is 
gone. In a rare essay dedicated to screensavers and their particular allure, the 
journalist Zack Hatfield points out:
You can’t consume a screen saver in an instant. You can’t fast-forward or 
rewind one. The genre, its own kind of endurance art, shuns immediacy. 
Fugitives from time, screen savers possess no real beginning or end. 
Their ouroboric nature is perhaps why preservations on YouTube, 
whether ten minutes or twelve hours long, tend to evoke disenchantment. 
Decades ago, stumbling upon a screen saver in a shared living room—or 
perhaps finding an entire office full of them at lunchtime, cubicles 
lambent with workers’ judiciously chosen modules—likely signaled your 
own solitude. When you’re watching one intentionally, that feeling never 
arrives.232
The allure of the screensaver is best seen on the home screen, in the late-night 
‘after dark’. The assigned computer at the office can also be a home screen, 
 Rachel Moore, ‘In Transit: Between Labor and Leisure in London’s St. Pancras International’. 231
In Public Space, Media Space, edited by Chris Berry, Janet Harbord, and Rachel Moore (pp. 
162–77) (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), p. 172.
 Zack Hatfield, ‘Salvation Mode’, The Paris Review, 23 May 2017.232
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insofar as the careful personalisation of the screensaver by the office worker 
counts. Children and tired adults will watch it out of curiosity, or because its 
trance-like repetitiveness is weirdly comforting. The human viewer is not 
supposed to be there: after all, the screensaver is only on because they have 
left. Yet, the sleepless subject is still there, contemplating the graphics on the 
screen. The ‘sleep mode’  of the screensaver is not the unassailable time of 233
bodily rest, which Crary positions as the last resistance to capitalism. Instead, 
the idle time of the screensaver is manifold: it is both a consequence of and a 
defiance of productive time, and also a trance-like meditation of generative time 
driven by an endless repetition of the loop.
Chronic Film (2018)
The final section of this chapter is dedicated to the discussion of my moving 
image work Chronic Film. Having started as a deadpan take on the idea of a 
screensaver containing all possible images, during the course of the project it 
evolved to encompass several versions and formats that investigated the 
questions of temporality, digital materialism, commodification of images and the 
mythologisation of media. In this section I will outline two main iterations of 
Chronic Film—the algorithm, or procedural film, and the lecture-performance—
linking them to the preceding discussions of the screensaver in this chapter. 
The viewing links and documentation of the multiple iterations of Chronic Film 
can be found on pages 158–163.
Chronic Film as Procedural Film
In the first and the most important iteration, Chronic Film is a software-based 
work, a procedural film. I often think of it, following the line of thought of 
structural-materialist film-makers, as a digital structural film, or as a cognitive-
 The ’sleep mode’ is one of the casual anthropomorphisms that we accord to algorithmic 233
operation on the daily basis (e.g. artificial intelligence or machine learning). Running the 
computer reduces the lifespans of its hardware: thus, the sleep of the machine is only a power-
saving compromise, a half-life where the hardware lifespans of the screen is sacrificed in favour 
of that of the CPU. On Windows operating systems, different power-saving configurations are 
still possible—sleep, hibernation, hybrid sleep, some of which are better suited for desktop 
computers, and some for laptops. In contemporary personal computers, the screensaver has 
almost completely ceded to simply turning off the screen, as they mostly rely on battery power, 
and the moving graphics consume it.
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Image 5. Screen capture, Chronic Film (2018) (algorithm).
materialist work in which the process of its live algorithmic performance is 
primary. Chronic Film is an algorithm that generates and plays out every 
possible combination of pixels—or, in other words, every possible image—that 
can be generated on a screen of a certain resolution (See Image 5). What 
results is a film of the duration longer than the possible life of human civilisation 
that is not really made for traditional filmic perception. Essentially, what the film 
addresses is an idea of materialising algorithmic time by taking the idea of 
cinema to be a sort of chronic condition.
A screen of a given resolution contains a finite amount of pixels; they, in turn, 
are defined by a limited number of colours. Potentially, these combinations can 
become all forms and kinds of images. Mathematically, because the number of 
combinations is finite, they are not all-encompassing. The idea of the film, 
therefore, speaks less to ideas of omnipotence and more to the idea of 
Shannon and Weaver’s theory of information that was briefly discussed in 
Chapter 1, where a signal or a message is always seen as ‘one selected from a 
set of possible messages’.  Given that the number of messages in the set is 234
 Claude E. Shannon, ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’, reprinted with corrections 234
from The Bell System Technical Journal, 27 (1948): 379–423, 623–656, p. 379.
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finite, ‘this number can be regarded as a measure of the information produced 
when one message is chosen from the set, all choices being equally likely’.235
One of the main inspirations for Chronic Film was Borges’ short story on the 
library of Babel, with the books containing all possible combinations of one 
language—the finite set of 24 letters, a comma and a full stop. When a similar 
logic is applied to a certain screen resolution, for example, 1280 x 720, a certain 
number of channels in each pixel (3 in RGB space), and a certain number of 
values for each channel, one can conceive of a finite, even if large, number of 
frames that can be generated with it; and so, a finite, even if inhumanly long, 
sequence of all these frames. Playing them out would conceivably contain all 
the images ever made, or yet to be made. While the actual length of the film is 
calculable, playing the film out completely would take more time than is left until 
our sun burns out. A similar work made in 1996 by artist John F. Simon, Jr, 
Every Icon, generates every possible icon on a grid of 32 by 32 squares in 
black and white, going through the pixel combinations in order, starting from the 
top left one in the square. Even with that restrictive resolution, the time required 
to see the work through would amount to several hundred trillion years.
The film is inaccessible to a human viewer, not only in terms of its lifespan, 
but also in terms of economic sustainability, as it is hard to imagine an institution 
that would exist for that long and support this artwork’s continuous running. The 
silly incongruity of the work with the currently dominant mode of consuming 
images makes it unsustainable. Potentially, exhibiting such an artwork to its 
logical end would mean handling the costs of supporting the server on which 
the work is based, the electricity cost, and the cost of updating hardware. As the 
duration of the work would preclude the possibility of any contractual obligation 
actually guaranteeing the work’s support and existence, Chronic Film cannot be 
properly assimilated by the art market. 
Furthermore, the noise function becomes significant. As can easily be seen 
from a comparison with the example of Every Icon; the better the resolution of 
the image, the more easily it translates, quite literally, to noise. The digital 
‘figuration’ of the algorithm can be expressed in different ways. During the 
work’s development, several versions of the algorithm were produced, in which 
 Ibid.235
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different mathematical formulas were used to determine the order in which the 
pixels change. For the exhibition in the Sanatorium Gallery in December 2017, 
a four-channel video recording of various algorithms, was produced.  The first 236
version changed the pixels one at a time, going through all the possible 
combinations for the pixel in the left upper corner of the screen, then for its 
neighbour to the right of it, and so on—similarly to Every Icon. The second 
‘seeded’ four starting pixels on the screen, and worked with their respective 
neighbours, changing four pixels on the screen at a time. The third version 
divided the screen into ‘blocks’ of pixels and analysed them, generating the 
possible combinations of pixels for each of them. The final one generated 
random combinations on the whole screen, resulting in the rendering, of noise, 
which, however, did not retain the previously generated combinations. In all four 
versions, the probability of seeing a non-abstract image was mathematically 
infinitesimal.
The current version of the algorithm was made in collaboration with 
programmers Thomas Bailey, Ian Edwards and Jeff Porter. The main difference 
in approaches between Every Icon and Chronic Film is that the algorithm in 
Chronic Film updates the pixels not in sequential order, but all simultaneously. 
As the software runs, it is given a resolution and a percentage for which update 
should happen—for example, 100% of the pixels on the screen are updated 
when the frame changes or 25%, which means that all the pixels on the screen 
are updated over four frame changes. The default web application runs at the 
resolution 800 by 450 pixels (16:9), and updates 50% of the pixels per frame 
change. As all the calculations occur prior to the visualisation, the initial loading 
process might take some time.
The algorithm is written in Javascript and works in the following way. The 
amount of all possible combinations of pixels is large, but not infinite. Assuming 
that the initial resolution is 800 by 450, and that for each of the three colour 
channels (Red, Green, Blue) of every pixel, there are 256 possible values, from 
0 to 255, the amount of all possible combinations would equal 256 ^ (800 x 450 
x 3). First, the algorithm ‘stacks’ the three colours channels on top of each 
other. An index (ironically called ‘Camera’ in the program) is able to grab values 
from the ‘stack’, choosing which items in the three channels to plug in the pixel.
 See documentation on p. 160.236
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The key point of the algorithm is that, before grabbing the values, it shuffles 
their sequence using a pseudo-random number generator. This ensures that the 
pixels are not just going through all possible combinations sequentially. In 
regard to the web application, seeding the pseudo-random number generator 
allows it to randomise a sequence, but memorise the order, so that the 
algorithm can run from the same step it previously stopped at. This makes the 
application incredibly lightweight, as all the calculation are done before the 
visualisation, and it only has to store a single integer in order not to repeat 
previous steps. 
In a way, Chronic Film takes the idea of a screensaver to a very extreme 
point. How many times have we seen a ‘screensaver’ of noisy interference on a 
TV screen when the channel doesn’t have a signal or when the antenna is 
broken? Noise comes from a materialist understanding of information, from the 
point where the signal itself is considered not yet a message, but as one of the 
options that can be made out from illegibility. The hardware function of the 
screensaver has become redundant as new monitors appeared, better 
equipped against physical degradation; similarly, with only the resolution as a 
reference, the screen simultaneously is and is not present in Chronic Film. What 
is left is its ghostly rectangular outline, a reminder of its material shape. By 
generating all possible images as noise, the virtual screen is at the same time a 
container for future contingency, and a reminder of the entropic state of 
information before it is organised into a message. From there, what becomes 
the starting point for the lecture-performance is exactly the dichotomy between 
signal and noise, and the stubborn refusal of the images to figurate, to become 
recognisable, and to be organised into patterns and shapes. 
Chronic Film: Lecture-Performance
The initial idea of Chronic Film was to exhibit it as a kind of filmic monolith, a 
monument to film-making that is not made for a human viewer. As the concept 
developed, and as I recognised that there was more than one way to construct 
such an algorithm mathematically, the four-channel version was developed and 
installed at the Sanatorium Gallery. Finally, I started to recognise the potential 
for a shared intellectual/emotional space, for the making of which the gallery 
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Image 6. Still from lecture-performance Chronic Film (2018).
modes of presentation were insufficient. Because of this I came up with the idea 
of making the algorithm of Chronic Film a part of a lecture-performance. (See 
Practice Overview and Documentation section of the current thesis, pp. 161—
163.) 
A lecture-performance is a format that is usually linked to the ‘educational 
turn’ in contemporary art. I see it, primarily, as a method that has its roots in 
institutional critique, and which has developed as a reaction to the 
‘professionalisation’ of art through the protocols of academia and to the 
authority figure of the artist-educator. Therefore, for me, the lecture-
performance has two important aspects: its capacity for a real-time performance 
of two counterparts (myself, and the algorithm); and its potential to disrupt the 
illusion of authority of the screen and of myself, in Mashinka Firunts’ words, to 
‘evacuate a position of sovereignty and circulate knowledge as a non-sovereign 
subject’.  It also reflects the diverse spaces where lecture-performances take 237
place—from biennales to conferences.
For Chronic Film, a format of lecture-performance became crucial. First of all, 
the real-time aspect of a lecture-performance acquires a particular significance 
 Mashinka Firunts, ‘Staging Professionalization: Lecture-Performances and Para-Institutional 237
Pedagogies, from the Postwar to the Present’, Performance Research 21, no. 6 (2016): 19–25, 
p. 22.
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when the lecture involves the time-critical media of procedural film. The two 
processes of parallel mediation, of me speaking and of the film unfolding, enter 
in a performative dynamic that affects how the viewers see the moving image. 
For this reason, the lecture consists of several parts. In the beginning I speak to 
the backdrop of pre-recorded moving images, and the narrative is fictional, 
imaginative. In the later part, in contrast, I step back, removing myself from the 
picture, launch the Chronic Film application or the online version (depending on 
the conditions), and the algorithm on the screen takes over. The way I am able 
to operate within the format of a lecture-performance, and the representational 
turn that the moving image itself makes when switched from pre-recorded to 
generative format, allows me to deconstruct the traditional hierarchical 
experience of image consumption. The traditional position of authority accorded 
to a lecturer is also questioned: the narrative is fictional, the images do not 
seem to connect immediately to the text, and the artist on the stage—myself—is 
able to remove herself from it. With all these considerations, I see the space of 
the lecture, compared to that of an art object, as conversational, not necessarily 
in dialogical sense, but in the sense of a space where knowledge can be 
shared, both in speech and through bodily and technical clues.
Overall, the lecture passes through three space-times: the virtual space of 
the screensaver, the footage that I shot on the Greek island of Delos and the 
algorithm of Chronic Film. The lecture continues to address the Shannon-
Weaver model of communication. In order to demonstrate how the fetishistic 
dimension of the figurative image works within with the processes of 
commodification and cultural appropriation, the lecture considers the figurative 
image as a signal and the technical processes surrounding it as part of the 
noise. 
The first space-time is the screensaver: a homely, intimate space where the 
endless procedural film on the screen causes reflection, boredom or even 
mystical trance, in the tradition of slow cinema. Starting from there, it draws on 
the experience that I outlined at the beginning of this chapter: seeing my 
younger self and considering her relationship to the screen and seemingly 
autonomous computer dreams. Through the labyrinth of Windows’ 3D Maze, the 
lecture departs to ancient/contemporary Greece or, more precisely, the island of 
Delos, which appears in the forms of both its popular game representation in 
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the Assassin’s Creed franchise and as documentary footage produced by me. 
Delos is considered to be the birthplace of Apollo, one of the most complex 
figures in the ancient Greek pantheon, who is known as an oracular deity and 
the patron of divination. Through Delos, the lecture engages in the parallel 
thinking of artefacts such as those that this island houses and of artefacts as 
digital images, subject to compression and glitching. Two re-imaginings become 
important here. The first is a figure of a female oracle who deciphers the visions 
that come to her in a smoke; the sybil is re-imagined as a computer (drawing on 
the times when computers were still human and predominantly women ). The 238
second re-imagining concerns the statues of the white lions of Delos (as 
originals) and their replicas as poor images. In this sense, the lecture-
performance takes on ancient Greek mythology as a poignant point in the 
history of Western thought, and as a contemporary participant in the 
commodification of images and cultural artefacts. The lecture draws a line from 
archaeological work, the mosaics and statues of the island of Delos, to the 
current moment of the reproducible and ubiquitous digital image. 
The final part of the lecture returns the artist and the viewers to the intimate 
feedback loop of the Chronic Film. The digital noise of the algorithm, by forcing 
the viewer’s brain to form mental images, is acted out as a divination and/or 
meditation, as a hallucinatory escape from the economies of efficiency and 
monetisation. Using the algorithm, this part of the lecture suggests how the 
spectator-screen ‘ownership’ model of image consumption can be broken, 
instead entering a state of image-word sensing. It juxtaposes the process of 
figuration, inevitably connected with the desire to objectify and contain, to the 
digital noise that is seen as a hallucinatory escape from the economies of 
efficiency and monetisation. Chronic Film introduces a quite radically alternative 
model of viewership (but also by inverting the gaze in quite a straightforward, 
deadpan way), by combining the act of speech with the visual noise. As the 
brain engages in pattern-seeking, shapes appear in the noise. Although it is 
impossible to see the actual shapes (if they are generated), the brain still 
creates them in the trick of optical perception. The searching gaze is met with 
the refusal of images to figurate on the screen and is forced to turn inwards—to 
the mental imagery that is being conjured within the brain as I speak. 
 Light, ‘When Computers Were Women’.238
	  116
Inspired by Melvin Moti’s Prisoner’s Cinema, Hollis Frampton’s Poetic Justice 
and (nostalgia), as well as Derek Jarman’s Blue, the work plugs into the working 
memory to reconstruct it in a process of a self-reflective live viewing—what can 
be more live than something happening directly in the brain? The film in this 
reading can be seen as not just procedural film, but also, at least in the artist’s 
conception, as a cognitive-structuralist film, as it verbally unpacks the processes 
of human perception at the same moment as it is connected to them. In this 
sense, it constructs a cybernetic feedback loop directly between the observer’s 
brain and the algorithm. Ideally the last part of the lecture works as a collective 
meditation with the algorithmically generated noise. Where the conditions of 
performance allow, the last part of the lecture essentially consists of viewing the 
noise accompanied by a soundtrack in a dark, sonically insulated, cinema-like 
space. I see such practices as a sort of human circuit-bending, of creating a 
space for continuous reflection and co-existence with the technical image, but 
also for trusting the brain to produce visions and thoughts, to daydream and 
hallucinate. In this regard, it continues my idea of the screensaver’s capacity to 
create spaces of reflection and generative mediation, and directly addresses its 
procedural space-time.
In this chapter I have considered the screensaver as a possible case of 
procedural film. Between its obsolete materialism and its later decorative 
function, the screensaver occupies a unique place in the studies of software 
and moving image. As I argue, the temporality of screensavers is conditioned by 
the patterns of idle and productive temporalities, and its affective space by the 
specific socioeconomic design of personal computers. Engaging with the 
screensaver as a marginal form of moving image, instead of a decorative 
commodity, allows me to consider the potential of exiting the pressure of 
productivity that Crary describes as 24/7, and instead enter a space of 
boredom, reflection and un-productivity. My artistic work in this regard can be 
seen both as a tool for accessing this space, and a further investigation into the 
dialectic of signal and noise in the screensaver’s visual space insofar as the 




Image 7. Still from Non-Player Character (2019).
This chapter investigates procedural films created using game engines, 
essentially intentionally non-interactive games where the observation becomes 
the main mode of experience instead of interaction. As Galloway points out, 
many games also account for periods of player inactivity by reverting to an 
ambient state, presenting a ‘perpetual happening, a living tableau’,  one in 239
which the machine performs even when the operator is not there. In this sense 
procedural filmic space, I would argue, can be found in most games where the 
player has an option of ‘doing nothing’.
The game engine is, historically, as much a product of military and scientific 
research as it is the heir to the Hollywood production pipeline and the narrative 
 Galloway, Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture, p. 10–11.239
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tradition of film-making.  It has been particularly noted and explored in relation 240
to mainstream and competitive games, where the trajectory from the military 
funding of early computer technologies towards warfare entertainment can be 
clearly seen. As such, it already supports the 'persistence of vision’. The 
gaespace exists in a particular relation to the idea of the depiction of life and 
bodies on screen, human or other: anthropocentric (organised around the 
experience of the human viewer/player), objectified and involving a naturalised 
cinematic perception, dependent on the existence of narrative, characters and 
traditional filmic structures.  241
Continuing with the discussion of apparatuses of procedural films, I explore 
the game engine as a complex techno-cultural artefact with its own power 
relations and imaginaries of autonomy, a site where socioeconomic agencies of 
the game corporations engage in the quantified regulation of human and non-
human participants. I will also show that the gamespace presents as a 
pervasive and expanding space of encounters between multiple and diverse 
participants (human players, third-party software, NPCs, bots) spanning both in-
game and external worlds.
This chapter follows the research conducted while working on the procedural 
film Non-Player Character, a re-make of a mechanical automaton in a 
gamespace, exploring it as a case study for a procedural approach to moving 
image and generative mediation. In the following sections I will pay particular 
attention to the figure of non-player characters (NPCs), virtual characters 
controlled by the game. In the commercial paradigm, the smoothness of the 
user experience often becomes the key motivation for the designers, and the 
NPCs are principally seen as a design feature that greatly helps to enhance the 
overall believability of the in-game world.  The design of NPCs in mainstream 242
games, especially in popular genres such as first-person shooters, rarely 
 See McKenzie Wark, Gamer Theory (Harvard University Press, 2007); Tim Lenoir, ‘All but 240
War Is Simulation: The Military-Entertainment Complex’. Configurations 8, no. 3 (2000): 289–
335; Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig De Peuter, Games of Empire: Global Capitalism and Video 
Games (University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Patrick Crogan, Gameplay Mode: War, 
Simulation, and Technoculture (University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Matthew Thomas Payne, 
Playing War: Military Video Games After 9/11 (NYU Press, 2016).
 Wark, Gamer Theory.241
 By ‘commercial paradigm’ I here refer to games that are built primarily with market-driven 242
goals in mind.
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disrupts the fulfilment of their functional goals—providing targets, loot and 
narrative direction. However, as the range of videogames constantly expands, 
and as more games introduce successful abstract gameplays with goals that 
are atypical (or even lacking entirely), it becomes less and less productive to 
draw distinctions based on the instrumentality of NPCs.  I will address this by 243
re-positioning NPCs as part of cultural imaginaries of autonomous agents and 
participants in processes of algorithmic superstructuring, rather than from the 
more instrumental point of view of commercial game design. The sensory and 
experiential aspects of virtual characters, the figurations, imaginaries and 
affects, are seen in this chapter as transversal rather than confined to the in-
game world. The mechanics of the game-world are guided by specific economic 
and design decisions, but they are never confined solely to the virtual world. 
Rather, the in-game experience inevitably spills into the economic, cultural and 
social fabric of the player’s life, producing other cultural encounters—lore,  244
videos, walkthroughs, memes and images. 
I argue, therefore, that NPCs are not only symptomatic of the hidden power 
relations in commercially produced games, but that they also bring new 
implications for such encounters in contemporary algorithmic culture, especially 
for media artists and game designers. It is therefore important, for the purposes 
of the argument, to tease out the commercial paradigm that traditionally creates 
reward-orientated, competitive, hierarchical, target-based game environments. 
Following that, I will return to Karen Barad’s idea of posthumanist 
performativity  to analyse how the gamespace can be re-imagined as a non-245
hierarchical local encounter between the player and the NPC. I will outline 
alternative constructions of the gamespace that borrow from the tradition of 
artificial life simulators on the example of Ian Cheng’s ‘live simulations’. I will 
finally survey the constructions of agency and figurations of non-human 
subjectivity that exist in independent games, showing how the NPCs evoke the 
 See Brendan Keogh, A Play of Bodies: How We Perceive Videogames (MIT Press, 2018), 243
for an approach that offers an expanded understanding of videogames that includes the more 
atypical works alongside the more traditional ones.
 In games, ‘lore’ refers to the entirety of knowledge available about the game universe 244
(usually fantasy or sci-fi), including its history, politics, mythology, art, etc. As this information is 
rarely available in an organised, unitary fashion in the game itself, it is often collected, 
systematised and shared by the players.
 Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity’.245
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questions of alienation and uncanniness, as well as developing further the idea 
of liveness, and proceed to the discussion of my procedural film Non-Player 
Character (2018–2019).
Gamespace Topology
In the discussion of the intersections of computational and filmic cultures, the 
game engine presents a particularly productive case study because it explores 
the predominantly anthropomorphic, realistic space of moving and interacting 
bodies and objects on screen—the way we usually perceive popular cinema. 
The game engine is therefore a cinematic agent within computational culture: it 
facilitates the entry of cinematic technologies into game design by providing 
tools aimed at perceptual realism—sustaining believable motion, physics, 
textures, lighting and characters. The game engine is open to modifications, 
and is highly adapted for cross-platform manipulations, such as importing of 
models and animations from secondary software, as well as exporting to 
different hardware. In this sense, within the game engine strategies of 
‘cinematic’ understandings of photorealism as indexical relation to the real come 
to be substituted and complemented by technical strategies offered by the 
game engine. As Gurevitch notes, ‘automated algorithms provide the spaces, 
objects and even “camera” with a set of behaviours consistent with the physics 
of the real world at the same time as they allow for a plasticity in such rules only 
possible in animation’.  In other words, the game engine not only reorganises 246
the traditional space of cinematic montage as quantified objects that can be 
easily moved and manipulated, for instance in digital animation software such 
as Maya 3D, but it also automates its functions. It also opens up the process to 
artists, independent film-makers and game enthusiasts, which can be clearly 
seen from the widely existing practice of ‘machinima’, video works recorded 
‘from within’ games or in engines. 
 Leon Gurevitch, ‘Computer Generated Animation as Product Design Engineered Culture, or 246
Buzz Lightyear to the Sales Floor, to the Checkout and Beyond!’ Animation 7, no. 2 (1 July 
2012): 131–49, p. 134.
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The hierarchical construction of the gamespace, as well explored in game 
and media studies,  originally comes from technologies of simulation that were 247
initially developed and funded as military research. For commercial games (and, 
consequently, for game engines), this has traditionally resulted in a particular 
aesthetic space, where everything is re-orientated towards a singular 
perspective of the player. In a warfare-orientated gamespace each object is 
assigned numerical value and is treated either as a target or a part of 
environment that can be used to tactical advantage. The user experience 
becomes the guiding vector, around which the pipeline and the subsequent 
updating of the game are organised. User experience has traditionally been 
approached as a two-part endeavour, consisting of gameflow (dramatic 
structure, pacing and building of reward and motivation) and usability (more 
practically, initial in-game learning, interface and difficulty levels). Both of these 
approaches have been largely heuristic until recently, when the data collection, 
or game telemetry, became a more standard practice.  Game telemetry allows 248
one to follow the player’s actions on any levels, from movement and decision-
making to the smallest behavioural details. Playtime and levelling speed 
become major indicators that allow one to quickly evaluate the difficulty of the 
game.  The smoothness of the user experience is therefore secured by the 249
game balance, a complex internal rule-set that dictates how the objects, 
strategies and tactics of the game relate to mathematical coefficients, ensuring 
that the game is not too easy or too difficult. Thus, in a gamespace, a player 
exists in a unique, calculable relationship to the NPCs (and/or other players), 
and within a complex visual economy/ecology that regulates non-human and 
human game agents alike. 
McKenzie Wark’s notion of the gamespace (as encompassing both in-game 
and real worlds) shows how gaming itself can be seen as a metaphor for life 
within the capitalist media ecology, in which processes of labour and affect are 
enmeshed in virtual worlds and images. In particular, she underlines the 
hierarchical character of the gamespace: 
 See Lenoir, ‘All but War Is Simulation’; Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, Games of Empire; 247
Crogan, Gameplay Mode.
 See Magy Seif El-Nasr, Anders Drachen and Alessandro Canossa (eds), Game Analytics: 248
Maximising the Value of Player Data (Springer-Verlag, 2013).
 Ibid.249
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What topology yields is not a cyberspace but a gamespace. The idea of 
cyberspace is still too linked to images from the world of radio and 
television, of flow and ‘seamless’ movement, of access and excess, of 
lines running anywhere and everywhere. Topology is experienced more 
as a gamespace than a cyberspace: full of restrictions and hierarchies, 
firewalls and passwords.250
In an interesting comparison with cinema (which, for her, only exists in the 
topographical space, one of representation), Wark describes the spatial 
dimension of the gamespace as topological, conflating the space of movement 
itself with the space of communication, and becoming instantaneous and 
homogenising, as well as ‘statistical, digital, simulated—algorithmic’.  The 251
gamespace consumes the representational—topographical,  and turns it into 252
an actionable database accompanied by navigation tools—topological. The 
storyline is replaced by an algorithm, and the objects and bodies on screen 
become items in a database.
Unity 3D, the software considered in this research and used for creating Non-
Player Character, is explicitly marketed as an accessible, ‘entry-point’ engine. 
The engine connects to a large network that consists of an online community of 
game developers and players with accompanying official and unofficial tutorials, 
an asset store, videos of gameplay, forums and other data. A significant aspect 
of this access is data collection: Unity’s user agreement explicitly states that 
inbuilt analytics tools will collect both technical data from players and the 
information on how game developers use Unity software. With among the 
widest cross-platform compatibilities of all engines (covering over twenty 
platforms, including mobile), Unity has unprecedented access to user data: in 
2016 it counted 770 million gamers.  Using this data, Unity 3D improves not 253
only the gameplay, but also the engine itself. The interface and settings that it 
offers to the developer are already supplied with options that have proven 
 Wark, Gamer Theory, para. 66.250
 Ibid., para. 65.251
 In Wark’s example (para. 69), Sid Meyer’s Civilisation, history and geography (the 252
topographical) are subsumed by the topological (the databases which the game activates). This 
offers a different situation from simply remediation of old forms—novel, cinema or television. 
Civilisation replaces narrative by recalling appropriate data from the database.
 See https://unity3d.com/public-relations, accessed on 16.03.2017253
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marketable, and the game experience is predefined by the larger infrastructure 
of military entertainment. Benjamin Nicoll and Brendan Keogh describe this 
feedback loop as the ‘circuits of cultural software’ that engage the creativity of 
the developer in a kind of soft self-governance.  The sensible aspects of 254
playing experience become crystallised, made reproducible in the game engine, 
and distributed as the new games. As Aylish Wood notes in her description of 
digital animation software Maya, it is not only
a means for creating computer-generated images, but also a discursive 
and material site in which the discourses become enmeshed… As such, 
software ceased to be an abstraction, and is instead an active element 
with the capacity to persuade and engage users in a particular discourse. 
In this way, the UI [user interface] operates through a form of 
governance.255
In this sense, if we consider the commercial gamespace as a socioeconomic 
network, everything within the game is hierarchically tied to the user experience, 
and the user experience itself is quantified, collected and analysed in order to 
generate profit in line with the algorithmic superstructuring behind the game. By 
engaging with the gamespace, the user enters the network of images in which 
her time, data and attention become subject to capitalist capture. The 
gamespace acts as a kind of ‘self-administered reality’  that is enabled by the 256
labour/play of the users. Moreover, the gamespace provides the users with 
instruments to perpetuate the processes of their own commodification and 
militarisation: the player contributes to it as both a spectator and a co-creator.  257
Cultural Imaginaries of Autonomous Agents in the Gamespace
What becomes interesting then are the socio-aesthetic relations that the players 
create with the game-world and the entities that they perceive as the other 
participants. The algorithmic superstructuring through the game engine then 
 Benjamin Nicoll and Brendan Keogh, The Unity Game Engine and the Circuits of Cultural 254
Software (Palgrave, 2019).
 Aylish Wood, Software, Animation and the Moving Image (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 32.255
 Retort, Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in the New Age of War (Verso, 2005), p. 187.256
 Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter, Games of Empire, p. 190; Wark, Gamer Theory, para. 111.257
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needs to be considered in the light of the idea of posthumanist performativity, as 
a renegotiation of agential borders. Whereas I have previously discussed 
procedural films in terms of liveness, the gamespace involves an active 
participation of NPC that are designed to seem like independently acting, lively 
agents. This also invites an inherently hierarchical reading of the gamespace 
and its participants. In single-player games, this means engaging, in the first 
place, with the NPCs that constitute the game-world. In multi-player online 
games, the competition for virtual resources and rewards often results in the 
construction of hierarchies (official and unofficial), where success translates into 
social capital, both in-game and outside of it.
Pointing out the power nodes in the gamespace, therefore, also requires 
looking not only at the completely autonomous entities such as NPCs, but also 
bots—player-made or third-party software that automates the game processes 
by controlling a player avatar. Bots could also be regarded as computer-
controlled characters made not to support but to circumvent the socioeconomic 
network of the gamespace. In multi-player games, bots are often used to collect 
resources. The internal game economy might require a certain amount of 
‘grinding’ from the players,  which openly puts the idea of play-as-labour back 258
in the in-game world in the form of truly tedious work required to achieve game 
rewards. As the bot’s script is often recorded directly from the human player’s 
movement, or uses predefined positions on the map, it can result in 
monotonous, easily identifiable patterns of behaviour and movement. In such a 
hierarchical construction, the bots can accrue not just functional, but distinctly 
dehumanised connotations. The distinction between ‘grinding’ by players (which 
is considered ‘honest’ labour) and cheating this process by using bots becomes 
particularly problematic in light of the phenomenon of ‘gold-farming’, the 
gathering of in-game valuables specifically to sell them for real currency. In the 
mid-2000s, media coverage of cases of gold-farming by low-paid Chinese 
workers (and even inmates) in the massive multi-player online role-playing 
game (MMORPG) World of Warcraft revealed how they were subjected to 
abuse and harassment from Western players, who also represented the main 
market for the sale of the virtual goods. Nick Yee demonstrates similarities 
 ‘Grinding’ is game slang for repetitive tasks that have to be performed for a certain amount of 258
time in order to unlock game content—for example, killing a particular type of monster over and 
over for resources or experience points.
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between the Western players’ prejudice against the Chinese gold-farmers and 
the real-life historical incidents of Western racism against foreign labour.  In 259
the hierarchy of the gamespace, this also means that the Asian gold-farmers 
were relegated to the status of farmbots, or NPCs who are disruptive to the 
gameplay and are therefore as disposable as any virtual monster. In her 
excellent analysis of the racialised depictions of gold-farming in World of 
Warcraft machinimas,  Lisa Nakamura notes that the farmers are shown 260
owning exactly the same avatar, ‘a male human wearing a red and gold 
outfit’,  evoking the idea of cheap and replaceable workers who ultimately 261
present as ‘undesirable underclassed social bodies’  among other players. I 262
would also suggest that in this relation the metaphor of NPC itself, or a bot, 
accrues dehumanising connotations in the sense that it marks the actual live 
humans as ‘non-people’, as sources of mechanised, automated agency that 
present a threat to the ‘real human’ labour Western players understand 
themselves to be engaged in. 
In a different cultural imaginary, this metaphorical move can also be seen in 
the recent appropriation of ‘NPC’ as a derogatory term in alt-right and 
conservative rhetoric in social media, to refer to a caricature of liberals as 
brainwashed, unable to think for themselves or to think critically. This use of the 
term was coined on 4chan imageboards in 2016, a popular anonymous image 
board. In October 2018 the resulting meme went viral, causing Twitter to ban 
1,500 newly-made NPC caricature accounts that were portrayed as easily 
triggered by provocations and only able to provide scripted, unimaginative 
answers. While NPC as a meme does not specifically pertain to gaming, it is of 
interest to the present discussion not simply as a meme that equates 
‘automated’ with ‘unthinking’, but as a metaphor in which a displacement of 
agency takes place, as political expression is eliminated by being pictured as a 
 Nick Yee, ‘Yi-Shan-Guan’, http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/001493.php, accessed 259
online on 04.02.2019.
 Machinimas are fan-made videos that are usually produced by recording in-game or by 260
modifying the game engine.
 Lisa Nakamura, ‘Don’t Hate the Player, Hate the Game: The Racialization of Labor in World 261
of Warcraft’, Critical Studies in Media Communication 26, no. 2 (1 June 2009): 128–44, p. 137.
 Ibid., p. 130.262
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mindless repetition. Moreover, the metaphor also works to re-establish the 
hierarchy in which the ‘NPC’ are at the bottom of the social network. 
At the same time, the deliberate humanisation of algorithms and devices that 
occurs in the corporate representation can be seen as inflation of the agency of 
autonomous entities. As algorithmic services and devices such as Amazon 
Alexa are increasingly portrayed as humanised, as bots or virtual assistants, 
they also provide the potential for shifting responsibility for a product onto the 
product itself. The 2016 case of Microsoft Twitter chatbot Tay is a good example 
of how subtle such redirection can be. Tay, depicted as a young woman of 
colour on her avatar, was meant as a self-learning experiment in computer-
generated conversational language, but instead quickly adopted extreme 
language, accumulating racist, misogynistic and anti-Semitic terms and phrases 
from social media. Media coverage described the bot as a ‘neo-nazi sexbot’ and 
‘racist’, the artificial intelligence as ‘dangerous’, and the whole case as ‘not a 
part of Microsoft’s plan’.  The imaginary agency of the chatbot, in this case, as 263
in many others, works as part of a rhetorical obfuscation that masks the 
systemic problems of machine bias by shifting the blame onto an 
anthropomorphic, seemingly autonomous virtual agent. 
The cases described above demonstrate how the NPCs and bots inhabit the 
world of cultural imaginaries, crossing from the gamespace to the real world. As 
the figure of the NPC enters the social arena online, it contributes to hierarchical 
relations in the conditions of competition for and accumulation of social capital 
(such as on anonymous message boards). They also perpetuate the 
constructions of agency in which they had previously been involved. The 
figuration of NPCs therefore becomes symptomatic of the processes of 
dehumanisation within techno-mediations of subjectivity in the shared networks 
where ‘the whole of life appears as a vast accumulation of commodities and 
spectacles, of things wrapped in images and images sold as things’.  264
Moreover, both in virtual and real environments, the treatment of the scripted 
 See Rachel Metz, ‘Microsoft’s Neo-Nazi Sexbot Was a Great Lesson for Makers of AI 263
Assistants’, MIT Technology Review, 27 March 2018; John West, ‘Microsoft’s Disastrous Tay 
Experiment Shows the Hidden Dangers of AI’, Quartz, 2 April 2016; James Vincent, ‘Twitter 
Taught Microsoft’s AI Chatbot to Be a Racist Asshole in Less Than a Day’, The Verge, 24 March 
2016. 
 Wark, Gamer Theory, para 6.264
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behaviour as dehumanised is part and parcel of the social and economic 
processes of alienation, where the ‘humanness’ of the opposing party is defined 
by the visible markers of their belonging to the privileged groups. In the case of 
the gold-farmers, one such marker is the capacity to speak English, and in the 
case of the alt-right appropriation of ‘NPC’ as a meme, the marker is simply the 
adherence to a given set of political values. The humanness of actors within the 
network cannot be taken for granted but is instead a quality that needs to be 
assigned. Bollmer cites the example of CAPTCHA as one such test, where 
‘“humanness” as such is not assumed online, but is attributed to a user through 
a minimal act of pattern recognition’.  In the network space, ‘one is not born a 265
human (or worker), but, rather, one becomes one on the internet through 
computational means of differentiation’.  Similarly, every time the human 266
player has to identify an NPC as such, she acts on external, audiovisual, 
cultural and interfacial markers in order to attribute ‘humanness’ to the thing that 
she encounters.
Seen in this light, the encounter of humans and non-humans in the 
networked aesthetic spaces can be surveyed by returning to Karen Barad’s 
'specifically posthumanist notion of performativity’.  In commercial games 267
interactions with characters are heavily regulated in-game. However, 
considering them in the light of Barad’s theory, in which the epistemological 
boundaries between objects and subjects are continuously redrawn, 
emphasises the actual encounter, in which players might consciously choose 
not to follow the prescribed way of interacting. Fan-made content, modifications, 
bots and YouTube videos can all be examples of this. Therefore, I see the shift 
from ‘agency’ to ‘agential’ and the emphasis on local-ness as useful to 
surveying the procedural encounters of the players and the NPCs. The 
gamespace is enabled by the game engine, an apparatus of simulation where 
the stakes of scientific accuracy might not be at risk, but performance as a non/
human and the potential for empathy become of primary importance instead. 
 Grant Bollmer, Inhuman Networks: Social Media and the Archaeology of Connection 265
(Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2016), p. 138.
 Ibid.266
 Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity’, p.808.267
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In cases where the player’s agency is limited from the beginning, such as in 
procedural films, which preclude intentional interaction, encounters with NPCs 
might produce alternative experiences. The renegotiation of agency can then 
work as an aesthetic method rather than a given condition. This approach can 
then be used as an artistic device that contributes towards dismantling 
traditional systems of representation. Considering the inactivity of the player in 
posthumanist terms, then, opens up ideas of non-human subjectivities, and 
building worlds and systems that promote curiosity, reflection and empathy, 
rather than competition and self-validation.
Independent Games, Artificial Life and Procedural Films 
So what happens when the ludic function is completely or partially removed 
from an environment that is, visually and aesthetically, potentially ludic? 
Following up the investigations of idle time in the previous chapter, it becomes 
interesting to consider a space of inactivity produced by the idleness of the 
player. Where the ludic function is understood as the culture of fast 
consumption of game and film spectacles, this results in ‘slow gaming’, a trend 
Heather Corcoran identifies in the interview with artist Bill Viola about his 
experimental video game The Night Journey (2010). The game mechanics of 
The Night Journey primarily consist of storytelling through exploration. 
Unsurprisingly, in the framework of the current research, the slow experiences 
accompany the game engine as surely as they did the screensaver in the 
previous chapter. Works that have exploration and movement as the main ludic 
vector made by independent developers, such as The Path (2009, Tale of 
Tales), Flower (2009) and Journey (2012) (Thatgamecompany), Dear Esther 
(2012, The Chinese Room), or Proteus (2013, David Canaga and Ed Key for 
Microsoft), are mirrored by big companies embracing the trend for the ‘open 
world’ games that allow undirected, free player movement and large game-
worlds.  Slow gaming accentuates the details and the functioning of the world 268
over the process of gratification of achieving the game goals. Bill Viola 
 These include, for example, such companies as Rockstar with Red Dead Redemption 268
(2010–2017) and Grand Theft Auto (1997–2013), Square Enix with Final Fantasy, Interplay 
Entertainment with Fallout, CD Projekt RED with The Witcher, Konami with Metal Gear Solid V, 
Bethesda Game Studios with Skyrim, etc.
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describes it as a shift towards a mode of reflection and observation that creates 
encounters rather than satisfaction:
First person perspective is not only about line of sight… In cinema, it 
typically signals a shift to the inner subjective state, as the camera 
transitions from external optical perception to the inner visions of mental 
and emotional states of being. One of the core mechanics of The Night 
Journey is the user’s ability to ‘reflect’, that is, to stop and look deeply 
into some feature in the landscape which in turn reveals a vision of 
another invisible dimension within that object. Here, the heart of 
interaction is to slow down and to see past the surface in a process of 
raw discovery. Looking deeply into things is rewarded, and this is only 
made possible by momentarily relinquishing control of interaction and 
giving oneself to vision.269
The same mechanics are reflected by David O’Reilly’s independent game 
Mountain (2014), a mountain simulator. In a remarkably deadpan way, it does 
exactly that: the gameplay consists of a mountain floating in deep space. The 
only actions available to the player are the initial sketch according to which the 
mountain is generated, changing the camera angle and making bell sounds on 
the keyboard. Time passes, the weather changes; from time to time, various 
objects, from trash cans to sports equipment, crash into the slopes. At some 
point, after 15 to 50 hours, the mountain explodes. The game then ends and 
can be started again, offering no reward. Mountain does not merely simulate the 
ambient state in the absence of player activity; it engages an active 
transformation of the user/player into a reflective observer. The only ‘character’ 
in the game is the mountain itself. Mountain challenges the idea of what a 
gamespace should be by its quiet absurdity, its over-emphasised centrality in 
the player’s experience and its anticlimactic gameplay. In the culture of fast 
rewards, it provides a meditative experience that produces a space of 
(self-)reflection and empathy.
In a manner similar to Galloway’s notion of ambient environments as ‘living 
tableaux’, game mechanics can also completely exclude interaction, resulting in 
 Bill Viola, ‘About the Journey, Not the Destination: Slow Gaming and an Interview with Bill 269
Viola’, in Artists Re:thinking Games, edited by Ruth Catlow, Marc Garrett, and Corrado Morgana 
(pp. 20–25) (FACT, 2010), pp. 23–24.
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procedural films. One example of a procedural film that directly delegates all 
agency to an NPC is the art simulation San Andreas Deer Cam (2015–2016) by 
Brent Watanabe (mentioned in the introduction). Instead of the main character, 
the work follows a deer—an animal NPC that continues to follow its normal 
autonomous operation. Initially the work was livestreamed on Twitch, a popular 
platform where players can share their experiences in-game. Having an NPC as 
the main character, however, opened up an experience that is drastically 
different to normal gameplay. The virtual world is seen from a different position 
than usual, not tied to in-game goals and directions. Rather, it is shown in its 
ambient state, in a state of simulation that has been left to run on its own. As 
the witnessing of such ‘internal’ logic of the game precludes all interactivity, it re-
imagines the game-world as a space where the player’s agency is removed. 
Instead, the procedural agency of the NPC, however limited it might be, 
becomes the main engine of the aesthetic experience. 
The movement of the NPC in games is usually reliant on pathfinding 
techniques: layers of information expressed as grids, navigation meshes or 
waypoints, which the pathfinding algorithm uses to locate the best route. In San 
Andreas Deer Cam Watanabe gives the deer the same functions that are 
already available to a pedestrian NPC, but he also alters them so that the 
movement is more unpredictable. This includes, for instance, occasional 
transportation to a random location, which prevents the deer from getting stuck. 
The scripting of NPCs in Grand Theft Auto V is already quite complex and 
aimed at creating realistic social behaviour, which allows the viewer a glimpse 
into the secret life of the other inhabitants—beachgoers, policemen and 
bystanders (who at some points attack the deer). In addition, the work was 
originally shared on a platform used by players to live-stream themselves 
playing. This set up the perception of the work as an act of anticipating the 
agency of the ‘player’—in this case, the computer itself. The space of 
presentation in this sense is an integral part of the local encounter of the viewer 
and the NPCs. All these elements come together to produce an aesthetic 
experience in which the emergent behaviour and interactions of the characters 
become the focus point. This artistic reversal of roles leads to an important 
rethinking of the hierarchical ‘topology’ of the gamespace, even while in most 
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role-playing games (RPG) the explicitly emergent behaviour and unpredictability 
of NPCs still represent too great a financial risk.270
Unlike the warfare entertainment paradigm, in the games that are influenced 
by the field of artificial life,  emergent behaviour is encouraged. In the context 271
of the figurations of NPCs, artificial life presents interesting insights for their 
perception as independent agents. The liveness can be seen as an aesthetic 
device that closely links to the movement (animation) of the NPCs and arises 
from their perceived agency. Here, procedural liveness requires an investigation 
into technical and cognitive aspects of posthumanist performativity. As Stacey 
and Suchman suggest, echoing Barad’s approach, 
recognizing the animating power of movement can draw our attention to 
the possibilities for liveliness inherent in the materialities with which we 
are entangled, and to differences that matter between the life of 
incarnate beings and the liveliness of things.  272
The liveness in artificial life discourse is particularly linked to the movement of 
the virtual characters, who no longer present as targets but as entities with an 
agenda. 
One of the early biological inspirations for computer systems of artificial life 
can be seen in John von Neumann’s 1949 cellular automata, a model for a self-
replicating machine constituted as cells in a grid, each cell being able to 
assume a finite number of states and to affect the cell closest to it. Von 
Neumann was working on the design of self-replicating robots at the time. 
However, it was collaboration with Stanislaw Ulam, von Neumann’s colleague at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, who was studying the growth of crystals, that 
prompted the model of self-replication imagined as cells. Von Neumann’s model 
pre-dated raster graphics, mathematically based on pixels, or dots, arranged in 
a grid, even though in its initial iteration it was only a design drawn on paper. 
 Ironically, warfare-orientated games, and especially first-person shooters, can be noted as 270
an exception: the game AI (Artificial Intelligence) systems responsible for warfare activities are a 
popular field of development, as they do not require extensive or close interaction with the 
NPCs themselves. The creation of emergent social behaviour in commercial games, however, is 
still, at the time of writing, a niche trend rather than mainstream practice.
 From the examples that are more focused on the non-player characters rather than large 271
scale simulations—Creatures (1996), The Sims (2000), and recently Species (2018).
 Jackie Stacey and Lucy Suchman, ‘Animation and Automation—The Liveliness and Labours 272
of Bodies and Machines’, Body & Society 18, no. 1 (1 March 2012): 1–46, p. 31.
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One of the first models of self-replicating artificial life visualised on the screen 
was John Conway’s 1970 Game of Life, inspired both by a game of go and von 
Neumann’s automata. The game constitutes a simple 2-dimensional grid game 
with cells that could exist as either ‘dead’ or ‘alive’, and evolve after the initial 
pattern is set by a player. Each generation, or turn, the following rules would 
apply: any dead cell with exactly three neighbours becomes alive; and any live 
cell with more than three or less than two neighbours dies, due to overcrowding 
or loneliness respectively. The rules ensured that the replication of the cells 
would not fall in either of the two extremes, becoming homogenously disordered 
or completely empty.  The introduction of the game coming at the same time 273
as accessible personal computers made it extremely popular, resulting in 
players exploring the ‘patterns’ that could lead to one or another sort of 
behaviour. The basic patterns that Conway discovered while developing the 
game fell into static ‘still’ forms and repeating ‘oscillators’. Once launched, the 
Game of Life would develop on its own, leaving the player to watch the patterns’ 
movement. 
Artists such as William Latham, Jane Prophet, Karl Sims and others 
produced what could be considered the first evolution-mediated digital artworks 
at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, roughly at the same 
time as the scientific community developed artificial life simulators. William 
Latham’s collaboration with software designer Stephen Todd yielded a series of 
evolutionary derived digital sculptures, from the first Coiled Form (1987), Artist 
as Gardener (1987), White Horn (1990) and Mutator C (1993) to Mutator2 
(2013), an extension that implemented not just static forms but a real-time 
environment, accessible online. Latham (1992) remarked of Mutator C that it 
‘derives its methods from processes of nature, and was partly inspired by a 
simulation of natural selection’.274
In Karl Sims’ artwork Evolved Virtual Creatures (1994), the survivability of the 
organisms is measured on the basis of fitness of locomotion in a physical 
environment. As attempts at locomotion are not always successful, the 
 Martin Gardner, ‘Mathematical Games: The Fantastic Combinations of John Conway's New 273
Solitaire Game “Life”’, Scientific American 223 (October 1970): 120–123. 
 Stephen J. P. Todd and William Latham, Evolutionary Art and Computers (Academic Press, 274
1992), p. 2.
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movements of the characters, built out of simple geometrical shapes, are 
perceived either as successful or as a struggle, or sometimes as comical—not 
unlike the pathfinding struggles of NPCs. Hayles, writing about this work, notes 
that ‘invariably viewers attribute to these simulated creatures motives, 
intentions, goals, and strategies’.  Artificial life representations, as even 275
scientific projects show, always involve the perception of such movement as 
agential, in some sense. Stacey and Suchman cite Stefan Helmreich’s 
observation of an artificial life program Artificial Fishes with Autonomous 
Locomotion at the fourth conference on Artificial Life in 1994: 
As the audience laughed at the video, and at the movements of these 
artificial fishes on the screen, it became clear that the ‘lifelike’ quality of 
these simulations produced an unease and sense of wonder that was 
precisely the cultural resource that made these creatures seem lively.  276
A more recent example, the OpenWorm  project that started in 2011, is aiming 277
to become one of the first programs to completely simulate the locomotion of a 
simple organism (in this case, the roundworm Caenorhabditis Elegans). The 
goal of recreating the whole function by simulating all 959 cells active in the 
body of the worm is tellingly formulated as building ‘the first digital life form’.278
What becomes visible from the discussion of the unease produced by the 
artificial organisms’ locomotion is the act of witnessing itself that perpetuates 
the liveness of virtual characters. As Kember notes: 
What ALife aesthetics emphasises then […] is the affect of lifelike 
behaviour and the experiential existence of intelligent or autonomous 
agency in the eye/I of the observer. This aesthetic may be as old as the 
history of automata but it is currently expressed as a factor of biological 
machines which by definition share agent status with human-animals, 
 Katherine Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts 275
(University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 193.
 Stacey and Suchman, ‘Animation and Automation—The Liveliness and Labours of Bodies 276
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but which in the discourses and practices of autonomous agent 
research, derive agent status from human-animals.279
Kember’s observation responds well not only to the conception of ‘life’ in the 
sciences in general, and where the agential ‘border’ is drawn, but also to the 
dilemma of characterising NPCs as a kind of artificial life. While artificial life may 
be restricted to scientific models of natural processes, games inspired by 
Darwinian evolutionary processes, for instance, are still unfolding in the 
aesthetic field of a simulation. The liveness, meant as a pre-attribution of 
agential qualities, becomes visible in such works, even if the player’s position is 
one of the all-powerful creator/voyeur. The affect produced by the autonomously 
operating virtual characters is often explained by the well-known effect of the 
‘uncanny valley’, proposed in 1970 by robotics engineer Masahiro Mori, which 
described a strong sensation of eeriness at witnessing human-like replicas. 
While initially the effect was linked with the appearance of its instigating object, 
a study by Stein and Ohler suggests that it might also be a case of cognitive 
dissonance, tied to the fact that the viewer can have a prior categorisation of 
the subject as human or non-human, and accordingly attributes agency and the 
ability to feel emotions.  In the study, four groups of participants were shown 280
the same scene, built in Unity 3D: a dialogue between two virtual human 
characters in a VR environment. The information given to the groups differed in 
the following respects: that the characters were controlled by a human operator 
or by a computer; and that the dialogue was generated live or scripted. The 
study showed that the group which found it the most eerie was that which was 
told that the dialogue was improvised and was a result of autonomously working 
AI, confirming the study’s initial suggestion that there is also an ‘uncanny valley 
of the mind’,  as the authors put it.281
A similar unease can be seen in the discussion of special effects and digital 
animation. As Aylish Wood points out in her investigation of computer-generated 
animation software, moving images can reveal traces of their digital origins, 
 Sarah Kember, Cyberfeminism and Artificial Life (Routledge, 2003), p. 130.279
 Jan-Philipp Stein and Peter Ohler, ‘Venturing into the Uncanny Valley of Mind—The 280
Influence of Mind Attribution on the Acceptance of Human-Like Characters in a Virtual Reality 
Setting’, Cognition 160 (March 2017): 43–50.
 Ibid., p. 43.281
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something that she calls ‘digital contours’ that ‘add another affective dimension 
to our experience of moving images’.  Leon Gurevitch, describing the 282
computer graphics of biological kinematics in Finding Nemo (2003), Shark’s 
Tale (2004), Antz (1998) and A Bug’s Life (1998), notes: 
In all these features, the animation supposedly deals with the natural 
world, but in all cases the teeming masses of animated objects betray a 
certain industrial and mass-produced nature. What is apparent in the 
mass-produced quality of these features, that betrays their synthetic 
nature, is the fact that nonhuman automation has clearly played a large 
part. The task of rendering and animating so many hundreds of 
thousands of objects, characters and environments would be so large for 
analogue animators as to be near impossible. Instead, what the viewer 
beholds is a composite of animated and simulated image forms only 
made possible by the synthetic means of computer automation.283
From this description, it becomes clear that the technical aspects of perceptual 
realism in digital animation cannot be accounted for just by laying computer 
graphics out on the commercially orientated scale that ranges through various 
stages of perfection—from ‘schematic’ to perpetually imperfect (framed as a 
still-imperfect tool), to ‘indistinguishable from real’ and further to ‘hyper-real’. 
Following the discussions in artificial life and computer graphics, the 
procedural liveness of the moving image could be approached from different 
positions. Even if the procedure is regarded in its instrumental, functional 
capacity, it can be still seen as actively remaking the human counterpart. Dan 
North notes that 
special effects can be perceived by their mechanical idiosyncrasies or 
deficiencies, by inadequacies of their manufacture, or by simple 
acknowledgment of impossibility…but these are not truly failings of the 
technology or the technicians. Rather, they are points of access for the 
spectator’s critical engagements with the film on the technical level.284
 Wood, Software, Animation and the Moving Image, p. 10.282
 Gurevitch, ‘Computer Generated Animation’, pp. 134–135.283
 Dan North, Performing Illusions: Cinema, Special Effects and the Virtual Actor (Wallflower 284
Press, 2008), p. 5.
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The instrumentality of the procedure becomes a point of emancipation of the 
viewer, given the critical engagement. Alternatively, procedural liveness in 
artificial life is a more radical renegotiation. Historically, one of the stronger 
claims within the field of artificial life is the potentiality of seeing it not as a 
replication of existing process but as a process of life in its own right. In his 
discussion of behavioural ‘phenotypes’ in artificial life, Langton (1993) suggests 
that ‘the “artificial” in artificial life refers to the component parts, not the 
emergent processes. If the component parts are implemented correctly, the 
processes they support are genuine—every bit as genuine as the natural 
processes they parallel’.285
Jane Prophet and Helen Prichard describe the progression from ‘weak’ to 
‘strong’ conceptions of artificial life as a shift in agential position. The former ‘is 
built around a human protagonist (programmer) breathing life into technical 
artifice, writing a lifelike program that potentially exceeds the programmer’s 
rules by displaying emergent behaviour’, and the latter suggests that it is 
possible to create life with different media, computational, chemical or other, if 
the definition of life is focused ‘on the usefulness of seeing life as dynamic 
processes intra-acting with their environment’.  In art simulations, concern 286
shifts from the authenticity of the processes towards their perception by the 
human observer and qualities such as complexity, movement, figuration into 
recognisable patterns. Liveness therefore presents as a complex co-articulation 
of the technical aspects of the simulation, movement on screen and pre-
attributed agency. Emergence implies that properties or programs appear on 
their own, often developing in ways not anticipated by the person who created 
the simulation. Structures that lead to emergence typically involve complex 
feedback loops in which the outputs of a system are repeatedly fed back as 
input. As the recursive looping continues, small deviations can quickly become 
magnified, leading to the complex interactions and unpredictable evolutions 
associated with emergence.  287
 Christopher Langton, Artificial Life, section 6.5 ‘Genuine Life in Artificial Systems’.285
 Helen Prichard and Jane Prophet, ‘Performative Apparatus and Diffractive Practices: An 286
Account of Artificial Life Art’, Artificial Life no. 21 (2015): 332–343.
 Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature 287
and Informatics (The University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 225.
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The liveness of the NPCs is the main drive behind Emissaries,  the trilogy 288
of live simulations by Ian Cheng. Emissaries presents virtual environments 
made in the game engine Unity 3D and filled with NPCs whose behaviour is 
generated live according to an evolutionary-inspired algorithm. Throughout the 
trilogy, the viewer develops a profound sense that the characters on the screen 
live their own life. This is especially prominent in Emissary Forks at Perfection 
(2015–2016), where it is supported by a narrative and the way the characters 
look and move. In a future where humanity has already become extinct, an 
artificial intelligence Talus Twenty Nine controls evolution or, as Cheng puts it, is 
‘compulsively gambling’  on its outcomes. As such, the narrative also works as 289
a meta-narrative for the simulation itself, as the gamble takes place each time 
the work runs a new cycle. The narrative (or, rather, its rough outline) repeats 
each run: a dead body of what seems to be a 21st-century human celebrity is 
dug up, and Talus Twenty Nine sends the Shiba Emissary, its super-pet, to 
guide the zombie-like human figure through the generative landscape of its 
world. The lush surroundings are what was previously a site of a massive 
catastrophe (an erupting volcano in the prequel, Emissary in the Squat of 
Gods), which Cheng describes as a ‘fertile Darwinian playground’  where the 290
characters and the land can evolve, interact, and play out emergent variations 
that constitute the basis for the work. And as Nora Khan notes, ‘this world can 
run on indefinitely, with no end state, and no final form’.291
In a talk at the Whitney Museum of American Art, Cheng said that the first 
experiments with the game engine were fuelled by a desire to create ‘a video 
game that plays itself’.  All three of the works, as described by Cheng, contain 292
a live simulation and a story, which ‘threaten to destabilize and mutate one 
 The Emissaries trilogy consists of Emissary in the Squat of Gods (2015), Emissary Forks at 288
Perfection (2015–2016), and Emissary Sunsets the Self (2017).
 http://iancheng.com/, accessed on 15.01.2018.289
 Ibid.290
 Nora Khan, ‘No End State: Ian Cheng’s Live Simulations’, lecture, ‘New Ways to See: Digital 291
Art Criticism Now’ at Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, November 29, 2016. https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=TAgoFaR98cE
 Ian Cheng, talk in ‘New Ways to See: Digital Art Criticism Now’ at Whitney Museum of 292
American Art, New York, 29 November 2016. 
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another into new patterns of behavior’.  Within this dichotomy, the traditional 293
figure of the NPC is re-imagined as the Emissary, a ‘narrative agent’,  the 294
force that changes the story, rather than following it. The NPC is therefore a 
figure that challenges the human viewer. The complexity and unpredictability of 
the environment constantly disrupt any attempts to make sense of the narrative 
or motivations or reasons behind the NPC’s behaviour, resulting in an 
interesting balancing act where the viewer is simultaneously both alienated by 
and attracted to what is happening on the screen.
Cheng’s position in a sense approaches the concepts suggested by the field 
of artificial life. His idea of simulation expands beyond ‘contained nature’ or a 
copy of existing processes; he suggests that, paradoxically, the simulation has a 
better access to the ‘real’ of the world than human beings. For him, the causal 
‘forking’ of his work belongs to ‘the real’ of the world, to which we as human 
beings only have a limited access:
For humans eager to touch outside their own humanness, or for humans 
who long for a closer relationship to reality’s messy dynamics, an open-
ended simulation may provide a new kind of exercise. The game is called 
Forking at Perfection: As the simulation produces change after change 
after change before you, and emergent behaviors and perceivable truths 
parade into your neocortex, you resist the awe of discovery, the stress of 
chaos, the delight of mutation, and the temptation to satisfactorily walk 
away then and there with new knowledge or ideas. Those are just 
human-scaled trophies. Instead, fork that feeling like nature forks 
perfection and keep the simulation in play. For learning to love this 
forkish feeling is learning to love the vulgarity of being alive is learning to 
love simulation and simulation might be all we ever really got.295
Suggesting the ‘forking’ as a dynamic in its own right brings us back to the 
discussion of algorithmic superstructuring as procedural remediation. 
Procedural films can be seen in the same light as oscillation between the 
algorithmic function and animation. As Pasi Väliaho notes in Biopolitical 
 http://iancheng.com/#simulations, accessed on 03.01.2019.293
 Ibid.294
 Ian Cheng, ‘Simulation: Forking at Perfection’, Mousse Magazine 49, Summer 2015.295
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Screens, ‘computer-generated images such as the ones we encounter in video 
games and virtual reality applications seem to function less like optical 
processes and more like the affective-cognitive processes associated with 
hand-eye coordination and with the brain’s capacity to simulate’.  296
The discussion of the dynamic between the perception of liveness and its 
technical apparatus therefore leads to an interesting consideration of oscillation 
between the filmic and the algorithmic in procedural films. Procedural autonomy 
of NPCs is normally regulated by a limited set of elements: animation 
sequences, behavioural trees and realistic physics of light and movement. As 
can be seen from the discussion of artificial life, independent games and visual 
effects, however, even simple means are sufficient to create an illusion of 
liveness, or even life. In this, procedural films that rely on the apparatus of 
simulation, resonate with the theories of animation, in which the plasticity and 
movement themselves are sufficient to evoke liveness. In a seminal quote, 
Eisenstein, writing on Disney, describes this feeling in the following way: 
We know that they are . . . drawings and not living beings. 
We know that they are . . . ‘miracles’ and tricks of technology, that such 
beings don’t really exist. 
But at the same time:
We sense them as alive.
We sense them as moving, as active.
We sense them as existing and even thinking!297
Eisenstein clearly identifies the gap between rational perception and affect. The 
animating power of moving image does not cancel out its rationalisation but 
acts independently as direct impact on the senses. In this sense it also 
approaches the previous elaboration of posthumanist and technical aspects of 
affect. Where gamespace easily relies on uninterrupted cinematic illusion to 
immerse its viewers/players, it also disrupts as easily when processing power or 
 Pasi Väliaho, Biopolitical Screens: Image, Power and the Neoliberal Brain (MIT Press, 296
2015).
 Sergei Eisenstein, Eisenstein on Disney, edited by Jay Leyda (Seagull Books, 1986), p. 55.297
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Image 8. Screen capture from Non-Player Character (2019).
bandwidth proves insufficient and the gamespace ‘lags’.  Such technical 298
glitches constitute the gamespace alongside other elements, and can also be 
re-appropriated as artistic methods. The liveness then both ‘proceeds’, in the 
sense of the original Latin meaning of the word ‘procedure’, and breaks the 
perceptual realism.
Non-Player Character (2018–2019): Procedural Film
The artistic work that I have undertaken as a part of my research into game 
engines developed as an investigation of autonomy re-imagined as reflective 
practice. The procedural film Non-Player Character presents a mechanical 
automaton, Tipu’s Tiger, re-made in a gamespace. The documentation can be 
found in Practice Overview and Documentation section of the current thesis, 
pages 164—166.  A larger context for the work comes from Tiger Bones, a 
lecture-performance first written in 2016 and then re-written in 2018. In many 
aspects it outlined the ideas that led to the creation of Non-Player Character; 
 ‘Lagging’ occurs when the game system works at a noticeable delay between the player’s 298
action and the environment’s response (for example, in online games lagging might exist 
between the server that houses the game and the player’s computer).
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Image 9. Automaton Tipu’s Tiger, ca. 1793. © Victoria & Albert Museum.
the second version specifically explored the succession of cultural imaginaries 
of the tiger, culminating in Non-Player Character. For this reason, I include the 
lecture for reference, as a part of research and investigation for this work,  but 299
I do not consider it a part of the argument about procedural films. 
The main character of Non-Player Character is based on a mechanical tiger 
made for Sultan Tipu of Mysore, India, in the late 18th century (Image 9). Tipu 
spent 17 years of his rule fighting against the British East India Company. Tipu’s 
Tiger is an almost life-size scene of a tiger attacking a white man, presumably a 
soldier, reaching for his throat. At the end of the fourth Anglo-Mysore war, in 
May 1799, Sultan Tipu was killed during the Siege of Seringapatam, and in 
1800 the automaton was despatched to London along with other loot. It became 
a popular exhibit in East India House, the company headquarters, changed 
locations several times in the process of the company’s dissolution, and was 
finally moved to South Kensington Museum, re-named the Victoria and Albert 
 See Practice Overview and Documentation section of the current thesis, p. 168.299
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Museum in 1899.  It can still be seen on display as a part of the permanent 300
collection of the V&A.
Tipu’s Tiger is an example of the image prized for its symbolic power. The 
automaton’s historical trajectory can conceivably be seen in gamespace terms, 
where the symbolic power of images enables real socioeconomic relations. Re-
imagined as an NPC, it gains new agency within a new set of relations to the 
world it inhabits. The mechanical automation gives way to the programmed 
automation of movement not restricted by the demands of the game balance. 
As the mechanical automation of the 18th-century automaton gives way to the 
movement of a 3D model, the affective space similarly shifts from the space of 
conquest, to the space of reflection or even boredom.
The original automaton was conceived as a musical instrument. The inside of 
the tiger conceals a mechanical organ that can be operated by two people: one 
to turn the handle that moves the bellows (as well as the man’s arm and the 
tiger’s ear), and the other to play the keyboard with button keys made of ivory. 
The sounds are meant to reflect the man’s moans and the tiger’s growling.
The virtual re-imagining of the tiger also re-instates it as a generative musical 
work. The coding of Non-Player Character was done in collaboration with Rob 
Homewood, the 3D-modelling by Zoë O’Shea, and the library of sounds was 
created by composer James Wilkie, combining new fragments with the sounds 
derived from the recordings of the original automaton’s operations. The tiger in 
the work walks through a symbolic forest, with birch trees that extend vertically 
throughout the space that does not have any typical representation for the 
‘floor’. As the tiger walks, the sounds activate and are attached to ‘invisible 
objects’—a technique often used in game design in order to facilitate the 
operation of various effects.  These objects attach themselves to the closest 301
trees at random, leading to a processual generative composition that not only 
depends on the tiger’s movements and its stops, turns and disappearances, but 
which is also spatialised, as any potential viewer, given an appropriate sound 
system, would be able to sense the distribution of the sounds in space around 
 Susan Stronge, Tipu’s Tiger (V&A Publishing, 2009), pp. 65—71.300
 For a particularly 'animist' explanation, see Nathan Grayson, ‘The Invisible Bunnies That 301
Power World of Warcraft’. Kotaku, 24 January 2017. https://kotaku.com/the-invisible-bunnies-
that-power-world-of-warcraft-1791576630.
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her. This presents a curious inverting of the original automaton’s mechanism, 
with ‘pipes’, or sources of sounds, being re-made as environment, rather than 
being placed inside the musical instrument.
The random operation of the tiger is limited. It is reduced, essentially, to the 
gesture of walking and several other options—turning, stopping and 
disappearing. The perlin noise algorithm,  a popular tool in procedural content 302
generation, is used to produce random values, which are then inserted into 
scripts controlling the tiger’s speed, the rate at which it turns and the camera 
rotation (Image 10). The camera movement also repurposes the script that was 
initially created for feeding the values from the mouse input (rotation and 
zooming in and out with the mouse wheel) into the virtual camera, as normally 
happens in interactive game environments. In Non-Player Character, the 
camera moves are controlled at random. The tiger also switches between 
several states, which are determined by a simple random number generator. A 
similar repurposing of previous assets can be seen in the model of the tiger 
itself. The initial 3D model was acquired from Unity’s asset store, a large 
depository for ready-made solutions, models, datasets and plug-ins that simplify 
a game’s construction. It was based on a realistic animal, which my collaborator 
Zoë O’Shea modified so that it started to resemble the wooden automaton. 
There is a certain contradiction in the tiger’s model. The texture is recognisably 
that of a wooden surface but the movement corresponds to that of the 
anatomically realistic animal. The dataset can be alienated from the original 
model and superimposed over any other ‘rigged’ skeleton.  The gamespace in 303
this sense also becomes a space of ready-mades, where various data and 
commercially made elements can be remixed into a required configuration.
Non-Player Character also creates a large amount of reflection and new 
research contexts. While developing this work, I considered two other strategies 
for aligning the procedural aspects of the film with the technical conditions of 
game engines. One strategy was actually to involve one of the existing games  
 Adrian Biagioli, ‘Understanding Perlin Noise’, 2014. https://flafla2.github.io/2014/08/09/302
perlinnoise.html.
 Rigging, in the most basic sense, is a technique of creating a ‘skeleton’ for a 3D model. As it 303
allows the 3D model to move much in the same way that a puppet for animation can be moved, 
it can be used to create a realistic range of movement that is coherent to the in-game laws of 
physics and the model’s ‘anatomy’. 
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float xMove = Mathf.PerlinNoise(1 + _xNoise, 2 + _yNoise);
float yMove = Mathf.PerlinNoise(100f + _xNoise, 200f + _yNoise);
float dMove = Mathf.PerlinNoise(1000f + _xNoise, 2000f + _yNoise);
AutoX = Utils.RangeRemapClamped(xMove, 0f, 1f, -0.1f, 0.1f);
AutoY = Utils.RangeRemapClamped(yMove, 0f, 1f, -0.1f, 0.1f);
AutoD = Utils.RangeRemapClamped(dMove, 0f, 1f, DistanceMin, 
DistanceMax);
}
// Function to drive the camera movement




// _x += Input.GetAxis("Mouse X") * XSpeed * Distance * 0.02f;
// _y -= Input.GetAxis("Mouse Y") * YSpeed * 0.02f;
 
_x += AutoX * XSpeed * Distance * 0.02f;
_y -= AutoY * YSpeed * 0.02f;
 
_y = ClampAngle(_y, YMinLimit, YMaxLimit);
 
Quaternion rotation = Quaternion.Euler(_y, _x, 0);
 





if (Physics.Linecast (Target.position, transform.position, out hit, 
_layerMask)) 
{
Distance -=  hit.distance;
}
Vector3 negDistance = new Vector3(0.0f, 0.0f, -Distance);
Vector3 position = rotation * negDistance + Target.position;
transform.position = Vector3.SmoothDamp(transform.position, 




Image 10. Non-Player Character. Source code. The previous script’s functions 
are commented out, and perlin noise is introduced. 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with the already developed set of relations. This, like in Brent Watanabe’s work, 
would probably work as a shortcut for connecting the space of the artwork to the 
mixed ecology of the game engine that I explore in this chapter. The other 
strategy was creating a system relying on external generative process (such as 
Nicolas Maigret’s Pirate Cinema), including the sociopolitical space, by direct 
involvement of procedurally analysed data. While I am still exploring both 
strategies for other works, in the case of Non-Player Character, I chose to 
underline the isolated, minimalistic character of the environment. What I was 
interested in is the filmic experience of the gamespace, and I felt that this 
required a certain amount of distancing from the practices of machinima and 
modding that both rely on existing games. 
Non-Player Character was also created as an experiment in re-articulation. If 
Tipu’s Tiger can be considered as a historical case of a non-player character, 
then its virtual re-make becomes an algorithmic automaton. Where the original 
had French mechanism installed,  the virtual one borrows algorithmic ready-304
mades from the asset store. Similar to the original, it has clearly defined rules 
and a limited range of freedom. However, even small amounts of randomness 
injected into work result in liveness. In this sense, Non-Player Character, as a 
re-articulation of re-articulation—from a live tiger to a virtual one—opens up 
potential for techno-animist considerations of procedural films.
In live simulations and other works made with the help of game engines, 
seemingly opposite vectors converge: liveness as a unique quality of animation, 
as affective power of mutating and shifting; and liveness as scientifically 
inscribed life—formalisation and quantification of the bodies and bodily 
movement. In this chapter I have addressed the idea of gamespace as a 
topological network that includes human and non-human participants. I have 
explored the affective spaces in independent games, artificial life and artistic 
simulations in order to see how procedural autonomy can be articulated in 
relation to virtual characters. Finally, I have outlined the concept of my artistic 
work Non-Player Character in relation to these investigations. 
 According to Arthur Ord-Hume, ‘Tipu’s Tiger - Its History and Description - Part I’, Music and 304
Automata 3, no. 9 (1987):24-25.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I put forward the idea of ‘procedural films’ and proposed a 
conceptual framework in order to investigate their affective and critical potential. 
In so doing, I analysed them as techno-cultural artefacts implicated in broader 
sociopolitical design of time and human experience. Seeing them in the context 
of filmic-algorithmic affective entanglement, and addressing algorithmic 
autonomy as an important factor in this context, led to a renegotiation of the 
spectatorship models as discussed by film studies, as well as the ideas of film 
perception, duration and temporality. I conducted a theoretical and artistic 
investigation of the two case studies, the screensaver and the game engine. 
Through these the thesis also engaged with broader questions posed by the 
automation of cultural processes, exploring the role of autonomy in filmic/
algorithmic affect in the sociopolitical design of the technical apparatuses, and 
in the various cultural imaginaries that they produce.
These questions have been shaped by an interest in the ways in which 
algorithmic logic can enter the space of filmic experience in artistic practice, and 
how artistic practice, in its turn, can interrogate the political aesthetics of this 
intersection. The research also aimed to address the gap between the related, 
but rarely articulated in terms of this relation, areas of media art and 
experimental moving image. Addressing this gap, the thesis aimed to produce 
not only a conceptual framework for procedural films within the boundaries of 
my own artistic research practice, but also as framework that could be applied 
to broader scope of generative techniques in media art, and as an investigation 
of autonomy as affective space, which could be extended to other 
considerations. 
My artistic and curatorial work informed the investigation. In order to reflect 
the intertwined positions of theory and practice, I have structured the thesis as a 
progression from establishing the frameworks and operational concepts to an 
investigation of the case studies, drawing on and developing concepts initiated 
by my curatorial work in the third chapter, and including the discussions of my 
own artworks in the last two chapters.
In the first chapter I set out the initial framework for the investigation of 
procedural films as techno-cultural artefacts, with an emphasis on filmic-
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algorithmic entanglement and on algorithmic autonomy. By investigating the 
idea of spectatorship, I proposed an alternative conception for an ‘apparatus’ of 
procedural films, drawing on work of Karen Barad. The posthumanist 
renegotiation of the traditional positions of the film and the film’s spectator then 
opened the space for considering the material and technical construction of 
affect.
In order to do this, in the second chapter, I analysed the construction of 
affective space-time in procedural films. Where affect can be considered as pre-
individual, as I argued, one can also see it as technical. In this way, the 
externality of filmic/algorithmic affect is channelled by the autonomy of 
algorithmic performance, and by the imaginary ‘inhumanity’ of the material 
processes involved. Developing this concept, I outlined a genealogy of 
autonomy in moving image practices, drawing on the practices of structural film-
makers and the algorithmic generative techniques in contemporary art 
practices. I demonstrated how algorithmic affect is characterised by liveness 
and driven by the specific logics of the technical apparatus behind the film, and 
situated the practical aspects of my own artistic methodology in relation to the 
renegotiation of agency between the viewer and the work.
In the third chapter, drawing on Rancière’s notion of the ‘distribution of the 
sensible’ and on discussions of algorithmic governance in my curatorial work, I 
developed the concept of algorithmic superstructuring. In doing so, I addressed 
the question of political aesthetics as a procedural algorithmic remediation and 
investigated how algorithmic autonomy operates within algorithmic governance. 
I argued that seeing software artefacts in algorithmic networks, processes of 
labour and design, processes of distribution of affect, reveals the critical 
capacity, motivations, agencies and imaginaries of the participants involved, 
including media artists. 
The next two chapters were dedicated to the investigation of the two case 
studies from my artistic practice. In the fourth chapter I analysed the 
sociopolitical design and affective space-time of the screensaver. I have initially 
outlined the screensaver’s multiple iterations as a feature for protecting 
hardware, as a decorative object and as an object of nostalgic curiosity. I 
addressed the screensaver as a technical artefact situated at the intersections 
of human labour and bureaucratic design of time and experience, revealing the 
fascinating temporalities of idle and productive time. Where the attention 
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economy and the techno-capitalist acceleration of productivity have encroached 
on every instance of idle time, the screensaver remains an enigmatic artefact, a 
space where boredom, reflection and un-productivity constitute the affective 
space-time. In the discussion of my artistic work, I have constructed this space 
in two ways. The procedural algorithm of Chronic Film constructs a meditative 
space of reflection much in the same way that the screensaver does, drawing 
on the idea of techno-materialist construction of images as signals concealed in 
the noise. The lecture-performance Chronic Film takes this idea further, 
constructing a space of reflection by a radical re-imagining of the traditional 
cinematic model of spectatorship. By enacting the idea of mental images, and 
by letting them be derived from the visual noise of the algorithm, the lecture-
performance presents a cognitive structuralist investigation of algorithmic 
generative procedures in the space of filmic/algorithmic affect.
In the fifth chapter I addressed the media artefact of the game engine. 
Drawing on the work of McKenzie Wark, I outlined the topological construction 
of the gamespace as transversal network of affects, figurations and imaginaries, 
where the sociopolitical design of the technical apparatus and the agencies of 
game corporations engage in the regulation of human and non-human 
participants. Based on these findings, I have further investigated the 
construction of power relations and imaginaries of autonomy through the figure 
of the non-player character. Here, I relied on Karen Barad’s notion of 
‘posthumanist performativity’  and theories from the field of artificial life in 305
order to suggest a non-hierarchical model of encounter with non-human agents. 
Finally, I extended the discussion to include my artistic work Non-Player 
Character. The development of the work—essentially, the process of 
reconfiguration of the mechanical automaton into an algorithmic one—also 
contributed to the idea of procedural films as complicated networks of human 
and non-human agents. While the interest in non-player characters has 
informed my practical and theoretical investigation from the beginning, the 
development of this work opened up additional questions of randomisation, 
algorithmic ready-mades and techno-animism.
The motivation for exploring procedural films was fuelled not only by their 
marginal status as objects of study. Exploring algorithmic autonomy becomes 
 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes 305
to Matter’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28, no. 3 (1 March 2003): 801–31.
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especially important in the moment where advanced processes such as 
machine learning and big data analytics are used in the creation of various 
‘intelligent’ machines, virtual assistants and chatbots. The investigations of how 
they are sustained by filmic and algorithmic affect in the current thesis become 
increasingly relevant. In light of overwhelming marketisation of such processes 
by the large corporations who remain stakeholders in big data collection and 
development of proprietary algorithms, the calls for raising media literacy and 
de-mythologising of the discourses of technology gain prominence.
By bringing the political aesthetics of procedural films to the fore, the thesis 
prepares the ground for further practical and scholarly pursuits. Investigating the 
game engine as a tool for artistic research has provided me with further plans, 
drafts and artwork proposals. In particular, in the next year I will be undertaking 
a re-articulation of my film Data Field (2018) as a game environment. The film 
constructs a posthumanist version of the intersections of my family history with 
the history of Soviet Union, in particular, through the figure of the old wooden 
village house that was built by my great-grandfather in 1918. Re-articulating 
these sites of memory and history as procedural spaces will be, in essence, a 
continuation of direction already hinted at in Non-Player Character, which 
engaged with the mechanical tiger as a historical case of non-player character.
Another unexplored investigation of procedural films lies in the important 
topic of machine learning, its relationship with moving images and the specific 
task of video frame prediction. While I have briefly touched upon the topic in my 
study of algorithmic superstructuring, there was not enough time and space to 
engage with it within the scope of my practice. This was partly owing to the fact 
that the techniques themselves are still in the early stages, and that the relevant 
technical papers making them accessible have been published in the last 
several years.  The cultural and media archaeological investigation of frame 306
 See, for instance, Carl Vondrick, Hamed Pirsiavash and Antonio Torralba, ‘Anticipating Visual 306
Representations from Unlabeled Video’, in The IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and 
Pattern Recognition (CVPR) (2016), pp. 98–106; T. Xue, Jiajun Wu, Katherine Bouman and Bill 
Freeman, ‘Visual Dynamics: Probabilistic Future Frame Synthesis via Cross Convolutional 
Networks’, in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 29, edited by D. D. Lee, M. 
Sugiyama, U. V. Luxburg, I. Guyon and R. Garnett (pp. 91–99) (Curran Associates, Inc., 2016); 
Ruben Villegas, Jimei Yang, Yuliang Zou, Sungryull Sohn, Xunyu Lin and Honglak Lee, 
‘Learning to Generate Long-Term Future via Hierarchical Prediction’, in Proceedings of the 34th 
International Conference on Machine Learning—Volume 70 (pp. 3560–69) (JMLR.org, 2017).
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prediction techniques, however, would be an immense contribution to the 
considerations of autonomy and affect in procedural films.307
Procedural films, both as a framework for investigating techno-cultural 
artefacts, and as artistic practice that explores the autonomous algorithmic 
affect, can take on the task of de-mythologising the various imaginaries of 
technology, as well as of deliberate use of such mythologies, as I showed in my 
research. My hope therefore is that not only this thesis could contribute to 
further recognition of procedural films as unique and under-explored objects of 
study, but also potentially be useful to other practitioners, to contribute to the 
understanding of how exactly the blackboxing of technology happens, and what 
role various visuals, mythologies, fictions and imaginaries play in the 
construction of technology.
 For example, see Gil-Fournier and Parikka, ‘Visual Hallucination of Probable 307
Events’ (Routledge, 2020/2021).
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Practice Overview and Documentation
This section contains the overview of the practical component of the current 
thesis, and provides an expanded description of the materials submitted. Where 
the thesis draws on my artistic or curatorial practice, this section serves as a 
reference in the same way that the bibliography does for theoretical works, and 
can be consulted for illustrations, further links and clarifications. The sections 
are dedicated to the three bodies of work: Algorithmic Superstructures concept; 
procedural film and lecture-performance Chronic Film (2018); and procedural 
film Non-Player Character (2018-2019). I also provide a brief description of the 
works that are referenced in the thesis, but are not a part of practical 
submission.
Algorithmic Superstructures 
IMPAKT Media Art festival, October 2018, Utrecht, The Netherlands 
The research conducted within the conceptual framework of Algorithmic 
Superstructures is a part of the argument of the current research, and applies to 
both artistic and curatorial aspects of my work. The initial research done for 
IMPAKT festival Algorithmic Superstructures, however, only applies insofar as it 
served as a starting point and a breeding ground for the ideas that I have 
developed and presented in the third chapter. For this reason, I attach the initial 
concepts and information on the festival for reference and documentation 
purposes, and as a research record. 
My share of responsibilities in curating the festival reflects my skillset as 
artist-researcher, film-maker and educator. I coined the term ‘algorithmic 
superstructures’, and together with Yasemin Keskintepe we developed the 
concept. I was also responsible for the larger part of education programs for the 
students of Utrecht School of the Arts (HKU) and Royal Academy of Art in The 
Hague (KABK), and curated the film program. For the outline of the film 
program, please see the brochure submitted as the practice component. 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Image 11. Festival Poster. IMPAKT 2018.
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Image 12. Festival Catalog, Table of Contents.
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Festival Description
Algorithmic superstructures are looking over your shoulder. Moving as you 
move, determining what you see, anticipating what you desire, they construct 
the reality around you. How and when did that happen, and why haven’t we 
noticed?
Algorithmic superstructures reimagine the world as a matter of computational 
design. Caught in the interconnections of opaque operating systems, created in 
pursuit of profit and control, we have become streams of data subjected to 
continuous analysis.
As the democratic foundations of our society are being actively hollowed out 
and populist rhetoric takes over public space, protocols and interfaces come to 
govern our experiences, aspirations, life decisions and even politics. The 
IMPAKT Festival 2018 explores the architecture behind algorithmic 
superstructures. What hidden realities and new imaginaries do algorithmic 
superstructures uncover in the post-truth era?
Algorithmic Superstructures offers you a diverse programme of art, 
technology and media culture.
The IMPAKT Festival 2018 is curated by a team consisting of Luba Elliott 
(UK), Alex Anikina (UK/Russia) and Yasemin Keskintepe (Germany).
Educational Programs
May 22, 2018: guest lecture Algorithmic Superstructures and tutorials for the 
students at MA Non-Linear Narratives at the Royal Academy of Art (KABK) in 
the Hague, Netherlands.
June 17-22, 2018: 5-day workshop Algorithmic Superstructures for 
undergraduate students of HKU University of Arts, Utrecht, Netherlands. 
Workshop’s themes - ‘Black Boxes for Fiction Makers’, ‘Post-truth, Soft Power 
and Algorithms’, ‘Post-Truth Methodologies’ - engaged with the artistic 
strategies of addressing the conditions of algorithmic governance and social 
media populism.
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Image 13. Workshop Algorithmic Superstructures for undergraduate students of 
HKU University of Arts, at the IMPAKT Centre for Media Culture. June 17, 2018.
List of Materials Supplied as Practical Component with the Thesis
• Algorithmic Superstructures. Festival brochure. Filename: IMPAKT2018-
booklet.pdf
• ‘Algorithmic Superstructures, IMPAKT EVENT’, Festival theme presentation 
on May 23, 2018, IMPAKT Centre for Media Culture, Utrecht, Netherlands. 
Video documentation. Filename: 
Algorithmic_Superstructures_IMPAKT_Festival_Theme_Presentation_May
_2018.mp4
List of Additional Materials Accessible Online
• Festival archive https://impakt.nl/festival/2018/
• Video documentation of festival panels, keynotes and talks: https://
www.youtube.com/user/ImpaktChannel/videos
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• Algorithmic Superstructures exhibition documentation: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2Q0ybSZq5o





Procedural film, finite duration.
 
Image 14. Chronic Film (2018), web version.
Description
Chronic Film exists as a procedural film and a lecture-performance. As 
procedural film, Chronic Film is a generative algorithm that plays out every 
possible combination of pixels that can be generated on a screen of a given 
resolution. It is visualised as continuous noise. Similar to structuralist-materialist 
approaches, the algorithm re-assembles the digital apparatus of cinema so that 
it loses figurative power and enters a chronic condition, where the film has to 
last for billions of years in order to play all possible images.
The main iteration of the algorithm is located at chronicfilm.net, where all 
participants can view the two current resolutions and contribute to the labour of 
exhausting all possible recombinations.
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List of Materials Supplied as Practical Component with the Thesis
MacOS versions:
• Chronic Film, 800: 450 resolution, 100% update. Filename: 
Chronic_Film_800x450_Full_Update_macOS.app
• Chronic Film, 1280: 780 resolution, 50% update. Filename: 
Chronic_Film_1280x720_Partial_Update_macOS.app
Windows versions:
• Chronic Film, 800 : 450 resolution, 100% update. Filename: 
Chronic_Film_800x450_Full_Update_Windows (folder)




November 9 - December 9, 2018, Sanatorium Gallery, Istanbul, 4-channel 
version.
Image 15. Chronic Film (2018), November 2019. Courtesy Sanatorium Gallery.
Image 16. Chronic Film (2018), November 2019. Courtesy Sanatorium Gallery. 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Chronic Film 
Lecture-Performance, duration: approximately 45 minutes.
Image 17. Still from lecture-performance Chronic Film (2018).
Description
The lecture-performance takes the posthumanist reading of Chronic Film to the 
three temporal locations that unsettle the traditional ideas of film by addressing 
the multi-layered computational aesthetics that underlie image processing and 
transmission. The lecture works with the Shannon-Weaver model of 
communication where the signal is seen in relation to the noise that 
accompanies the transmission. In order to see how the fetishistic dimension of 
the figurative image works within with the processes of commodification and 
cultural appropriation, the lecture considers the figurative image as a signal, 
and the technical processes surrounding it as noise.
In order to do that, the lecture-performance starts from ancient Greece, at the 
island of Delos, which is considered to be the birthplace of Apollo. The parallel 
thinking of artefacts as the ones that this island houses, and of digital images, 
helps to outline an alternative history of the image and its figurative practices. 
Two re-imaginings become important here. First, a figure of a female oracle who 
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deciphers the visions that come to her in a smoke; the sybil is re-imagined as a 
computer (drawing on the times when computers were still human and 
predominantly women). The second re-imagining concerns the statues of the 
white lions of Delos: as replicas, as poor images, they degrade with time and 
compression caused by the elements. These two elements help to set up the 
processes of noise, of decoding and degrading of signals against the 
commodifying aspects of figuration, so that in the lecture’s final part, the digital 
noise of the algorithm, by forcing the viewer’s brain to form mental images, is 
seen as a meditation, as a hallucinatory escape from the economies of 
efficiency and monetisation. 
List of Materials Supplied as Practical Component with the Thesis
• Chronic Film. Main documentation. Filename: 
Chronic_Film_Lecture-Performance_Main.mov




• July 10, 2019: Media Design department at NABA, Nuova 
Accademia di Belle Arti, Milan. http://workshop.naba.it/2019/07/10/
chronic-film-from-dust-to-pixels/
• July 8, 2019: WORK HARD! PLAY HARD! SIDE AFFECTS, Skype 
Lecture, Minsk, Belarus. http://workhardplay.pw/en/2019/
• May 26, 2018: META MARATHON, NRW-Forum Düsseldorf, 
Germany https://2018.metamarathon.net/
• July 21, 2017: Moscow Experimental Film Festival. http://
en.mieff.com/2017/alexandra_anikina
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Image 18. Chronic Film at WH!PH! summer school, July 2019. Skype lecture. 
Courtesy Dzina Zhuk and Nicolay Spesivtsev.
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Non-Player Character 
Procedural film, infinite duration. 
Image 19. Screen capture from Non-Player Character (2019).
Description
Non-player characters are computer-controlled characters in games. Usually 
they serve as expendable targets: they are habitually shot and ‘looted’, or used 
as crutches for the narrative. The NPC is animated only as far as it is necessary 
in order to appear realistic to the player. This is consistent with commodified 
visual culture that game engines perpetuate. Precise mathematical models 
apply both to players’ virtual bodies and the in-game objects. The models, in 
their turn, are based on the quantification of user experience, enabled through 
data collection and telemetric tools. 
The main character of Non-Player Character is based on a mechanical tiger 
made for Sultan Tipu of Mysore, India in the late 18th century, who spent 
seventeen years of his rule defending his province against British East India 
Company. Tipu’s Tiger is an almost life-size scene of a tiger attacking a British 
soldier, reaching for its throat. At the end of the fourth Anglo-Mysore war Tipu’s 
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Tiger was seized and transported to UK, where it was first exhibited in the East 
India Company headquarters and can currently be seen in the V&A collection, 
London.
Tipu’s Tiger is an example of the image prized for its symbolic power. Re-
imagined as an NPC, it gains new agency within a new set of relations to the 
world it inhabits. The mechanical automation gives way to the programmed 
automation of movement not restricted by the demands of the game balance. 
What new pathways can be created by an NPC that is given to chance 
operation rather than to assume the role of a target?
List of Materials Supplied as Practical Component with the Thesis
• MacOS version, Non-Player Character. Filename: 
NPC_macOS.app.
• Windows version, Non-Player Character. Filename: 
NPC_Windows (folder).
Exhibition History
• September 2019: Besides the Screen conference exhibition, São 
Paulo, Brazil
• June 28 - August 18,  2018: ‘The Matter of Horror’, Solyanka VPA 
Video Performance Animation, Moscow, Russia.
List of Additional Materials Accessible Online
• Besides the Screen exhibition catalog. https://issuu.com/menotti/
docs/besides_the_screen_2019__cat_logo_/114
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Image 20. Non-Player Character (2019). Screenshot of work in progress. 2018.
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Artworks from my practice, referenced in the current research
Some Entropy in Your Tea (2013)
Image 21. Still from Some Entropy in Your Tea (2013)




Image 22. Slide from Tiger Bones (2016-2018).
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